Cornell Law Review

The Electors Clause and the Governor’s Veto

Nathaniel F. Rubin. J.D., Stanford Law School, 2018. My thanks go to Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Allison Douglis, Fares Akremi, and Adam Hersh—without whose feedback and guidance this Essay would not have been possible.  My thanks too to the editors of the Cornell Law Review for their excellent work under trying conditions—including Victor Flores, Nicholas Pulakos, Lachanda Reid, Gabriela Markolovic, and Jared Quigley. All errors are my own.

This Essay examines whether the United States Constitution allows a governor to veto a state legislature’s bill governing presidential elections. The Constitution does not support this seemingly intuitive proposition directly, and on its face appears to vest control over presidential elections solely in the hands of state legislatures: while Article II of the Constitution explicitly provides for the “Legislature” of each state to control the “manner” in which electors are chosen, it makes no mention of state governors. This vagary in the Constitution’s text takes on particular import in light of political polarization over election administration in recent years. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted numerous states to make emergency modifications to their election systems, including delaying elections or attempting to cancel marginally competitive presidential primaries. Commentators have even expressed fear that a state legislature may eventually attempt to exercise its plenary authority to determine how presidential electors are appointed under Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution to choose electors without holding a popular vote. This Essay answers these concerns by arguing that a state governor can veto state legislatures’ bills governing presidential elections on the same terms as any other legislation.

Jan 2021

Article

The Paradoxical Impact of Scalia’s Campaign Against Legislative History

Stuart Minor Benjamin, Douglas B. Maggs Professor of Law, Duke Law School

Kristen M. Renberg, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Duke University & J.D. student, Duke Law School

Beginning in 1985, Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia advocated forcefully against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s position, in line with his textualism, was that legislative history was irrelevant and judges should avoid invoking it. Reactions to his attacks among Justices and prominent circuit judges had an ideological quality, with…

May 2020

Article

The Corporate Privacy Proxy

Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. J.D., Loyola University New Orleans College of Law (2001)

 This Article contributes to the First Amendment corporate privacy debate by identifying the relevance of agriculture security legislation, or ag-gag laws. Ag-gag laws restrict methods used to gather and disseminate information about commercial food cultivation, production, and distribution—potentially creating a “right” to control or privatize nonproprietary information about animal and agribusinesses. Yet, corporate privacy rights…

May 2020

Harnessing Law and Economics to Disincentivize Corporate Misbehavior

Zachary Henderson, Law Clerk, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

Top-level executive compensation has increased by over 1000% over the past four decades and is now primarily based on a corporation’s market performance. The size and number of corporations is also at an all-time high, and corporate misbehavior has never been so profitable for the small handful of executives at the helms of the world’s…

May 2020

Article

Justiciability, Federalism, and the Administrative State

Zachary D. Clopton

Article III provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to certain justiciable cases and controversies. So if a plaintiff bringing a federal claim lacks constitutional standing or her dispute is moot under Article III, then a federal court should dismiss. But this dismissal need not end the story. This Article suggests a…

Sep 2018