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Tag: Equal Protection

Article

Constitutional Rights in the Machine-Learning State

Aziz Z. Huq

Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 

This Article offers a start to the larger project of developing a general account of substantive rules and enforcement mechanisms to promote due process, privacy, and equality norms in the machine-learning state. Cataloging notable state and municipal adoptions of machine-learning tools, it considers how existing constitutional norms can be recalibrated (in the case of due process and equality) or retooled (in the case of privacy). It further reexamines the enforcement regime for constitutional interests in light of machine learning’s dissemination. Today, constitutional rights are (largely) enforced through discrete, individual legal actions. Machine learning’s normative implications arise from systemic design choices. The retail enforcement mechanisms that currently dominate the constitutional remedies context are therefore particularly ill fitting. Instead, a careful mix of ex ante regulation and ex post aggregate litigation, which are necessary complements, is more desirable.

Nov 2020

The Thirteenth Amendment in Legal Theory

George Rutherglen, John Barbee Minor Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia.

Introduction Unique among constitutional amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment has been eclipsed by its own success. It gave rise directly to the Civil Rights Act of 1866,1Act of April 9, 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). which was enacted under Section 2 of the Amendment; and the rights conferred by the 1866 Act, in turn, served as…

Sep 2019

Article

What is Discriminatory Intent?

Aziz Z. Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

The Constitution’s protection of racial and religious groups is organized around the concept of discriminatory intent. But the Supreme Court has never provided a crisp, single defini­tion of ‘discriminatory intent’ that applies across different in­ stitutions and public policy contexts. Instead, current jurisprudence tacks among numerous, competing conceptions of unconstitutional intent. Amplifying the doctrine’s complex­ity, the Court…

Jul 2018

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