Tag: corporate governance
William Savitt, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Aneil Kovvali, Harry A. Bigelow Teaching Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School
Professor Bebchuk and his coauthor Roberto Tallarita have launched a broadside against recent efforts of business leaders, scholars, and lawyers to promote a corporate governance model that permits directors to take into account interests other than stockholders—a governance regime that authorizes directors to manage their corporations having in mind the interests not of stockholders alone,…
Lucian A. Bebchuk, James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance, and Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School
Roberto Tallarita, Terence M. Considine Senior Fellow in Law and Economics, and Associate Director of the Program on Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School
To address growing concerns about the negative effects of corporations on their stakeholders, supporters of stakeholder governance (“stakeholderism”) advocate a governance model that encourages and relies on corporate leaders to serve the interests of stakeholders and not only those of shareholders. We conduct a conceptual, economic, and empirical analysis of stakeholderism and its expected consequences. Stakeholderism, we conclude, is an inadequate and substantially counterproductive approach to addressing stakeholder concerns.
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Cornell Law Review is proud to announce Vol. 105, Issue 4, with Articles and Essays exploring Tort as Private Administration; Justice Scalia’s Campaign Against Legislative History; Corporate Privacy; Product Liability Law; and Student Notes that explore the Racial Gap in Financial Services and a Crime-Fraud Exception to Executive Privilege. Thank you to our amazing authors for their outstanding collaboration and patience with us during the COVID-19 pandemic.
William W. Bratton, Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School
Simone M. Sepe, Professor of Law and Finance, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona; Université Toulouse 1 Capitole; and Toulouse School of Economics
In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corporation. This Article subjects the market control paradigm to comprehensive economic examination and finds it wanting. The market control paradigm relies on a narrow economic model that…