LAWYERS’ ABUSE OF TECHNOLOGY

Cheryl B. Preston†

INTRODUCTION ........................................... 881

I. MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING TECHNOLOGY ABUSES . 883
   A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct ........ 884
   B. Professionalism and Civility Standards or Creeds ....................................... 886
   C. Ethics Opinions and Court Opinions .......... 888
   D. Best Approach for an Immediate Need ........ 889
   E. Speech and Other Legal Implications of Lawyer Regulation ............................. 890

II. WHY TECHNOLOGY ABUSES WARRANT IMMEDIATE AND TARGETED COVERAGE ........ 893
   A. Lack of Anonymity and Privacy ................ 893
   B. Rights Waivers ................................ 895
   C. Misplaced Trust ................................ 896
   D. Ubiquity and Diffusion ....................... 898
   E. Verifiability ................................... 899
   F. Permanence and Aggregation ................. 899
   G. Instantaneity and Informality ............... 900
   H. Lack of Context ............................... 903

III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO ADDRESS TECHNOLOGY ABUSE IN THE LAW ......................... 904
   A. Rule 1.1: Competence ........................ 905
   B. Model Rule 1.6(a) and (c): Confidentiality of Information .......... 909
      1. Oversharing .................................. 910
      2. Reviews, Ranking, and Feedback ........... 911
      3. Internet Provider Disclosures .............. 913
      4. Unsecured Access ............................. 914
      5. Terminated Devices .......................... 916
      6. Ransomware .................................. 917
      7. Employer Access .............................. 919
      8. Employee Access ............................. 920
      9. Information Storage .......................... 922

† Edwin M. Thomas Professor of Law, Emerita, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. I thank the staff of the BYU law school library for tremendous support and the faculty for reviews and comments. I also thank Austin R. Martineau for his in-depth work on the original draft, and Matthew J. Sorensen, Brandon Stone, and Andrew Hoffman.
10. Reasonable Efforts to Protect ................................ 924
C. Rule 1.7(b) and (c): Conflicts of Interest ........ 930
D. Rule 3: Obstruction and Extrajudicial Statements ..................... 931
   1. Rule 3.4(a): Obstruction and Spoilation of Evidence ................ 931
   2. Rule 3.6: Extrajudicial Statements by Non-Prosecutors .......... 932
   3. Rule 3.8: Extrajudicial Statements by Prosecutors .............. 933
E. Rules 3.4, 4.1, 4.4, and 5.3: Abuse of the Research Process .......... 934
   1. Friending ........................................ 936
   2. False Names and Identities ................................ 939
   3. Entrapping Disclosures .................................. 940
   4. Hacking ...................................... 942
F. Rule 3.4(b): Coaching Witnesses .................................. 943
G. Rules 3.5 and 4.2: Ex Parte Communications ......................... 944
   1. Friending ........................................ 945
   2. Follower Notifications .................................. 946
   3. Public Posts Intended as Messages .......................... 947
H. Rule 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law .......................... 950
I. Rule 7.1: Misleading Information about a Lawyer’s Services ........ 956
J. Rules 7.2 and 7.3: Restrictions on and Requirements of Advertising .. 959
K. Rule 8.2: Disparaging Judicial and Legal Officials .................... 961
L. Rule 8.4: Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession ................. 962
   1. Rule 8.4(c): Fraud and Deception .......................... 962
   2. Rule 8.4(e): Improper Implication of Influence ............... 963
   3. Rule 8.4(d) and Rule 8.4(g): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice . 966
      a. Rude, Crude, and Inhumane Descriptions of Participants in the Legal System ............. 966
      b. Disrespecting Opposing Counsel, Opposing Clients, and Others .......... 968
      c. Creation, Use, and Storage of Improper Electronic Content ............... 971
   4. Rule 8.4(g): Discrimination and Prejudice ................ 973
CONCLUSION ............................................ 974
INTRODUCTION

Lawyers are highly educated and, allegedly, of higher than average intelligence, but sometimes individual lawyers demonstrate colossal errors in judgment, especially when insufficiently trained in the new and emerging risks involved with the technological age. For instance, although the internet is a necessary tool for attorneys and is now a prominent feature in the everyday lives of all actors in the legal system, this technology poses particularized and often unanticipated risks of professional and ethical abuse—risks that are extraordinary both in quantity and intensity. As Harvard’s Director of the Center for the Legal Profession warned: We are “only at the forefront of seeing the kind of changes that technology is likely to bring to legal practice,” and these changes will “have a profound effect on how we think about regulating lawyers.” Unfortunately, the American Bar Association (ABA) missed an opportunity it

---

1 Sofia S. Lingos, Solo and Small Firm, A.B.A. TECHREPORT, 2016, at 1, 8 https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/publications/techreport/2016/solo_small_firm.html [https://perma.cc/E4HK-TQ64] (“It is undeniable that technology plays an ever increasing role in our profession and that gaining and maintaining an aptitude early on is necessary.”); see also 4 AM. BAR ASSN., LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: WEB AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY xxxi (2013) (reporting that lawyers increasingly rely on email, text messaging, web conferencing, and social networking to communicate with clients and others); Robert Ambrogi, This Week in Legal Tech: Ethics and Technology Competence, ABOVE THE L. (July 11, 2016, 3:02 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/07/this-week-in-legal-tech-ethics-and-technology-competence/ [https://perma.cc/KVG6-CZTE] (discussing how a firm that is not up-to-date with advances in technology not only faces a competitive disadvantage, but also risks ethical rebuke).

2 See Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services 107 (rev. ed. 2010) (“If you are not [connected to the network and accessible to your client], there is every chance . . . that your competitors will be. The astute lawyer of tomorrow, even if grudgingly, will want to have more or less full-time presence, day and night, on the network, to ensure that any queries from clients will be addressed by their firm rather than by another.”); Aaron Street, Mobile Technology, A.B.A. TECHREPORT, 2016, at 1, 2 https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/publications/techreport/2016/mobile.html [https://perma.cc/5MTX-APLW] (last visited Aug. 10, 2017) (“In total, 77% [of survey respondents] say they use the internet for working away from the office. Presumably, these 2016 Survey respondents assumed ‘use the internet’ was somehow different than accessing email, because 99% check email while out of the office (89% regularly do).”).

3 Drew T. Simshaw, Ethical Implications of Electronic Communication and Storage of Client Information, 59 RES GESTÆE, Dec. 2015, at 9. See also Lingos, supra note 1, at 2 (“Technological incompetence is not merely a disadvantage, it may be an actual ethical violation.”).

had with its own Ethics 20/20 Commission\(^5\) to address meaningful changes in the practice of law wrought by technology.\(^6\) However, the opportunities for unethical and unprofessional behavior in the use of electronic communications and storage cannot be ignored. This Article assesses the risks of technology abuse and proposes a scheme for addressing the professional and ethical problems that have and will continue to accompany the shift to digital lawyering.

Part I of this Article sets the stage for how to effect change within the existing regulatory scheme to address technoblunders in the legal field. It differentiates various modes of managing and punishing lawyers and briefly explains the role of the First Amendment in regulation of the bar. Part II demonstrates why technologies pose inherent, increased, and intensified risks for incivility, unprofessionalism, and unethical behavior. While the core principles of honesty, respect of others, and confidentiality that are the basis of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct\(^7\) (Model Rules or Rule) and civility standards adopted by individual state, local, and court bar associations do not change with the use of technology, the gaps and ambiguities in the Model Rules and the civility standards make them ineffectual in addressing technology. Lawyers need to be informed, trained, and warned about specific risks to avoid in an area where the risks are new and any error in judgment can be unusually extensive and severe. In addition, the newness of the technology and the widespread use of email, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Yelp, Angie’s List, AVVO, Lawyers.com, various platforms for blogs and chatrooms, and other sites warrant efforts to provide more advance guidance alerting of risks and defining safe practices than is necessary with long recognized practice hazards that law students are taught to avoid. Public realization that lawyers are incompetent to use technology, are spying or otherwise deceiving others to get electronic information, or cannot be trusted to keep confidential information and defense strategy private undermines the entire profession.


\(^6\) See infra notes 9–10.

\(^7\) MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
Part III provides specific ways that attorneys can and do use technology unprofessionally and unethically and suggests specific changes to address these issues. Part III is organized in the numerical order of the provision of the Model Rules most relevant to particular harms. Although ordered in accordance with the Model Rules, the same concerns arise with published professionalism standards. The recommendations are targeted not exclusively to changes in the Model Rules. Recognizing the institutional and political difficulty of effecting any changes in the Model Rules and the urgency of addressing technology risks, I recommend that changes be made, first, in the various bar associations’ professionalism standards, and then through the process of adopting Model Rules. Because drafting consistent and clear professionalism standards can be daunting, I suggest specific language for each of the concerns. The related twin problems of educating lawyers and making certain that regulations are enforced are beyond the scope of this Article.8

I
MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING TECHNOLOGY ABUSES

Attorney conduct is subject to regulation as a condition to licensure, membership in bar associations, and admittance to practice before particular courts. Like participants in other endeavors, such as securities traders and sports competitors, lawyers are subject to rules. The directives and guidelines for conduct in the profession come in various forms.

In spite of these various rules, the profession has made almost no effort to explicate for future guidance how technology may pose particular risks to civility, professionalism, and ethics and how the risks should be addressed. One lawyer stated it this way: “All the rules that the legal profession relies on to instruct lawyer behavior were forged before the emergence of twenty-first century technology. The rule book for this young century has not been written yet.”9

One major issue in regulating lawyers is the need to control their willful and intentional violations of ethical and professional standards. Many willful violations are covered in the Model Rules. But that level of regulation is insufficient. As the technoblunders explicated in this Article demonstrate, at least some attorneys are just negligent in their use of technology and

8 For a discussion of these issues, see Cheryl B. Preston, Professionalism in the Trump Era (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
others do not seem to consciously register the misrepresentations inherent in their use of new discovery searches and other methods. In many cases the lawyer should have realized that such conduct was inappropriate and foreseen the harmful consequences. Other technoblunders are a result of insufficient recognition of new risks.

A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The primary mechanism for lawyer regulation is the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated in model form by the ABA and adopted, typically with few variations, by the various state bar associations.10 I refer generally to all state versions as Model Rules, unless a variation in a particular state context is noted. The Rules define with some precision the point at which disciplinary action will be taken.11 But the level of conduct in the Model Rules is set to a low goal—minimal ethics. Even then, continuing and escalating instances of misbehavior demonstrate that the Model Rules are insufficient to regulate attorney conduct.12

The ABA has mechanisms to evaluate where the Model Rules need changes and to propose draft language.13 Unfortu-

10 All states have based their ethics rules on the Model Rules, except California, where the Model Rules “may be considered as a collateral source.” Diane Karpman, ABA Model Rules Reflect Technology, Globalization, CAL. ST. B.J. (Sept. 2012), http://www.calbarjournal.com/September2012/EthicsByte.aspx [https://perma.cc/PUJ7-QCD4]. In other states, the Model Rules are “considered highly influential guidance when states update their own idiosyncratic Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id.
13 The ABA commenced a review of the Model Rules in 1997 when it established the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (“Ethics 2000 Commission”) to consider necessary changes based on developments since the Model Rules were adopted in 1983. For a more detailed description of how changes to the Model Rules can be initiated and adopted, and the history of such amendments, see Dzienkowski, supra note 12, at 87–88. The product of the 20/20 Commission was thoughtfully criticized by Professor Dzienkowski. Id. at 71 (“Most observers viewed Ethics 20/20 as a major opportunity to examine and consider changes that recently have taken place in the legal professions of the United States and other countries. The resulting work product,
nately, the ABA Commission 20/20, specifically tasked to address advances in technology, made its contribution submerged into the comment for Model Rule 1.1.14 The Comment offers only the following vague and insubstantial advice: “[A] lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”15 In terms of other forms of direction, the ABA has only begun to scratch the surface with an opinion letter on social media, but it is directed only at judges.16 Commentators widely criticized the failure to realistically address technology; for instance, one quipped, “The Deafening Silence of the ABA Model Rules.”17

Even in an ideal world, the process of the ABA adopting changes to the Model Rules and urging each bar association to adopt the changes, is political, cumbersome, and lengthy.18 A level of care to involve all constituencies and changes that are the result of long term thoughtfulness may be necessary for crafting a uniform set of rules that lead directly to enforceable punishments,19 but the ABA has used these procedures to however, has disappointed many scholars and lawyers because the results do not match the promises.”).  

14 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”).

15 Id.


17 Saleel V. Sabnis, Attorney Ethics in the Age of Social Media, A.B.A. (June 8, 2016,) http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/articles/spring2016-0616-attorney-ethics-age-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/T4GQ-6S6P]. He continued, saying:
When the ABA amended the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2013, there was no specific mention of social media other than a not-so-subtle reminder that an attorney must stay abreast of changes in technology. The ABA’s silence was incongruous with the everyday demands placed on litigators to harvest information on social media.

Id.


19 Albeit in a different context, one author’s argument that we should not address advances in technology by changing the Rules is convincing. In arguing that the rules of civil procedure should not be amended to take into consideration advances in technology, the author states, “a change devised now might be irrelevant, and might even be harmful, four years from now.” Steven S. Gensler,
avoid taking action. Expecting timely revisions of the Model Rules to further address technology is at best a long-term goal. In fact, Professor Dzienkowski argues that “the structure of the ABA is such that few, if any, fundamental reforms have any chance of adoption by the ABA House of Delegates.”

B. Professionalism and Civility Standards or Creeds

In an attempt to address the lapses of the Model Rules, many states and courts adopted express statements of acceptable and unacceptable behavior norms. Taking on many different names, these statements of professionalism were originally envisioned to serve an aspirational purpose, clarifying and in some instances going beyond the Model Rules. These published best practices are denominated as professionalism and civility standards, creeds, pillars, codes, etc. I use these common titles interchangeably. The stated expectations in creeds generally aim higher than the minimums delineated in the Model Rules and are designed “to encourage dedication to professionalism and civility.” Today, many jurisdictions

---


Dzienkowski, supra note 12, at 92.

See id. at 73 (noting that codes of civility “were largely viewed as a solution to the failures of the ABA Model Codes”).

See A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273, 302 (1998) (citing 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § AP4:107, at 1269–70 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997)) (“Many civility or conduct codes were formulated in the 1980s and 1990s.”). The number of creeds seems to have fluctuated over the years from 100 in 1995 to 150 in 2005. Marvin E. Aspen, A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 STETSON L. REV. 253, 253 n.2 (1998). See also Allen K. Harris, Increasing Ethics, Professionalism and Civility: Key to Preserving the American Common Law and Adversarial Systems, 2005 PROF. LAW 91, 112 (“More than 150 state, county and city bar associations have adopted professionalism codes to encourage enhanced professional behavior and support increased judicial control of incivility and other unprofessional behavior.”). Today there are about 125 such creeds that various organizations and jurisdictions in the United States have adopted. This decline may reflect consolidation, for instance, where lower courts exchange individual creeds for those of the state or circuit. The ABA has compiled an extensive, but not exhaustive nor current, list of the professionalism creeds adopted in various jurisdictions around the United States. Professionalism Codes, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/professionalism/professionalism_codes.html [https://perma.cc/K9E9-V3CB] (last updated Mar. 2017).

For a list of extant creeds and how they are styled, see Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, app. A.

Id. at 707.
have taken steps towards making professionalism creeds enforceable.\textsuperscript{25}

In professionalism standards, an ideal place to address new and changing issues, there is virtually no treatment of technology abuses.\textsuperscript{26} The first two states to hint at the issue in professionalism standards are Utah and Florida.\textsuperscript{27} The preamble to Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility now states:

Lawyers should educate themselves on the potential impact of using digital communications and social media, including the possibility that communications intended to be private may be republished or misused. Lawyers should understand that digital communications in some circumstances may have a widespread and lasting impact on their clients, themselves, other lawyers, and the judicial system.\textsuperscript{28}

The Florida Expectations of Professionalism was amended in 2015 to include:

\textbf{2.5} A lawyer's communications in connection with the practice of law, including communications on social media, must not disparage another's character or competence or be used to inappropriately influence or contact others. (See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(d)).

\textbf{2.6} A lawyer should use formal letters or e-mails for legal correspondence and should not use text messages to correspond with a client or opposing counsel unless mutually agreed.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{25} Id.

\textsuperscript{26} Id. at tbl.9. Only three creeds from that survey mention technology in any form, and they address it only in terms of transmitting material. Id. The most comprehensive treatment of technology is from the Denver Bar Association:

1. We will use data-transmission technologies only as an efficient means of communication and not as a means of obtaining an unfair advantage. The use of such technologies does not require receiving counsel to discontinue other matters to respond.

2. We will honor reasonable requests to retransmit materials or to provide hard copies.


\textsuperscript{27} No professionalism statements included other uses of technology as of 2014. See Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 714 n.75.

\textsuperscript{28} UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY pmbl. (2014).

To avoid negligent and accidental abuses, lawyers must be educated in, and then reminded of, the ethical and professional risks. Professionalism creeds, even if not directly enforced, can form a basis for educating and mentoring lawyers with respect to advances in technology. They may be the most appropriate medium for addressing technology issues in the short run until the ABA or another regulator can provide a firmer solution.

C. Ethics Opinions and Court Opinions

Another method of regulating attorney conduct is through the issuance of ethics opinions, which address a question submitted about a specific issue or behavior. In addition, bar associations can issue individualized, ad hoc responses to members of the bar who ask specific questions about the interpretation of the Model Rules. Although some formal opinions include excellent discussion of the risks and expectations, only a very few have addressed technology. The best effort emerged in November 2016 from the District of Columbia Bar Association. But formal opinions are, in practice, of limited use in disseminating widespread standards and guiding future conduct. Few lawyers think to consult ethics opinions on new questions of technology use. Fewer take the time to search through ethics opinions unless they understand they are taking a considerable risk.

In addition to ethics opinions, in a few jurisdictions, technology abuses by lawyers have resulted in published opinions by the disciplinary body or the courts. These are useful in
training lawyers in this area but tend to involve only the most egregious cases with the most extreme facts. The few precedents on proper technology use are not available in each jurisdiction and are not uniform or consistent in coverage or result.

D. Best Approach for an Immediate Need

Although changes to the Model Rules to account for technology are necessary, the professionalism creeds offer a mechanism that can be more responsive and flexible in the meantime. The potential of stated standards in creeds to address ongoing developments in practice such as the advent of technology is enormous, but most creeds are not currently effective. The use of creeds in this function will require focused attention and significant redrafting.36 Unfortunately, as presently written, almost all of the professionalism creeds are inconsistent, erratic in coverage, and poorly worded. Even the best of creeds are also largely impotent. Including references to common technology related abuses would be an important improvement, but bar associations should also consider using this opportunity for change to undertake a general revision of the wording of their creed and consider options to give them


36 See, e.g., Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 723. The provision that appears most frequent in [various state creeds] is the vague charge to “treat others in a courteous and dignified manner” or to “act in a civil manner,” which forty-five of the forty-seven creeds included. This general objective is not very helpful without being further refined and defined within the creed . . . . Also common are provisions urging honesty (without specific definition or elaboration) and provisions against knowingly deceiving or misrepresenting fact or law. Because Model Rules 3.3, 4.1, and 7.1 cover misrepresentation, restating the honesty requirement in unenforceable creeds may suggest that honesty is aspirational, not essential. Such a creed would be more helpful if it articulated borderline cases where the honesty implications are less obviously addressed in the Model Rules.

Id.
teeth. The survey in *Incentivizing Lawyers to Play Nice: A National Survey of Civility Standards and Options for Enforcement* offers a comparison of the subjects that these creeds handle and commentary on the problems in which some of them wallow. With this information available, each bar association has some comparables to assist them in being more inclusive in the subjects they address and in improving wording. The ideal would be carefully worded sets of standards that are fairly uniform across the nation.

A related issue is how to make revised creeds more effective in sending the message. Some bar associations are already treating creeds as enforceable in various ways, and others are active in making such creeds effective starting points for lawyer education and guidance. For example, some states are incorporating the creeds into their Attorneys’ Oaths; other jurisdictions have implemented programs for referring offenders to investigation boards. Some courts have gone so far as to issue serious sanctions for uncivil conduct violating professionalism creeds. Because of poor drafting and little enforcement, most codes of professionalism have failed.

Despite their flaws, professionalism standards offer the best vehicle within the current regulatory framework for meeting the urgent need to address the issue of technology and social media until we can treat these issues more formally in the Model Rules.

E. Speech and Other Legal Implications of Lawyer Regulation

Finally, a note on the speech implications of regulating professionalism and civility is in order. A robust and thorough discussion of the historical and current treatment of the intersection between attorneys and free speech is well beyond the scope of this Article. This issue has been addressed in detail in a plethora of books and articles. I include here only a short

---

37 *Id.* at 713–23.
38 *Id.* at 724.
39 *Id.* at 729–32.
40 *Id.* at 732–34.
41 *See* Dzienkowski, supra note 12, at 73.
summary of the status of speech and lawyer regulation law in hopes of exposing the implausibility of successful First Amendment challenges to the proposed professionalism creeds or Model Rules.

It is well accepted that licensed members of bar associations are subject to speech restrictions that would not apply to lay persons. These restrictions go well beyond what can be said in court filings, at hearings, and other official contexts and cover speech technically outside of legal system processes. Although these restrictions are not without strain, “important state interests compete with attorneys’ First Amendment rights and justify greater restrictions on lawyers’ speech rights.”

The Model Rules and local rules of states and courts often restrict and penalize attorneys for what they say. These restrictions generally fall into two broad categories: restrictions on commercial speech and restrictions on speech that affects the administration of justice. In deciding whether a restriction is constitutionally permissible, the court weighs “the State’s interest in the regulation of a specialized profession Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567 (2009); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305 (2001); Sarah DeFrain, Note, Grievance Administrator v. Fieger: The Tenuous Link Between Attorney Silence and Public Confidence in the Legal System, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1823, 1824 (2008).

43 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (“Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech.”); see also Sullivan, supra note 42, at 569.
44 See, e.g., Grievance Adm’r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 142 (Mich. 2006) (punishing an attorney for undignified speech made on a radio broadcast); In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 2011) (upholding reprimand of attorney for email communication made to opposing counsel outside of formal proceedings).
45 Day, supra note 42, at 162 (citations omitted); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985) (“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. An attorney is received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain. He becomes an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” (alterations in original) (quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928))); Grievance Adm’t, 719 N.W.2d at 142 (holding that coarse attorney speech “warrants no First Amendment protection when balanced against this state’s compelling interest in maintaining public respect for the integrity of the legal process” (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))).
46 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); SUPREME COURT OF OHIO COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, PROFESSIONAL IDEALS FOR OHIO LAWYERS AND JUDGES (2013).
47 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6; WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS’N, CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (2001).
against a lawyer’s First Amendment interest in the kind of speech that [is] at issue.”

Where the restriction is supported by a compelling governmental interest, it will be upheld as constitutional. In general, the state’s interest in regulating commercial speech is less compelling than the interest in regulating attorney speech that affects the administration of justice. It follows, then, that rules restricting attorney commercial speech are sometimes invalidated when challenged on First Amendment grounds, whereas rules implicating the administration of justice and the image of the profession—such as the majority of the professionalism creeds herein discussed—are generally upheld as constitutional. Attorneys knowingly and willingly enter into a highly regulated profession, implicitly waiving the right to unrestrained expression. They should expect to be subjected to some speech restrictions by virtue of being “officers of the court,” capable of influencing the administration of justice.

In conclusion, regulation of attorney conduct is generally allowed even when it involves speech. Many provisions of the Model Rules address restrictions on speech. The suggestions in this Article for clarifying and modifying creeds of professionalism in the short term, and the Model Rules in the long term, are well within the exceptions for regulating lawyers.

---

49 See cases cited supra note 45 (describing what constitutes a compelling government interest).
51 E.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985) (reversing an attorney’s suspension for heated criticism of the judiciary’s administration of the Criminal Justice Act); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (nullifying a state ban on the use of pictures in legal advertisements); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking Arizona’s flat ban on attorney advertising of legal services, but leaving open other options to regulate advertising attorneys); cf. cases cited in supra note 45 (upholding restrictions on attorney speech); see also Mattei Radu, The Difficult Task of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6: Balancing the Free Speech Rights of Lawyers, the Sixth Amendment Rights of Criminal Defendants, and Society’s Right to the Fair Administration of Justice, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 497 (2007) (arguing that Rule 3.6 strikes an appropriate balance between an attorney’s right to free speech and the state’s valid interest in the proper administration of justice).
52 See DeFrain, supra note 42, at 1824 (citing another source).
53 Id. at 1844.
54 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6, 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
Technology use imposes both unique and heightened risks to lawyers, clients, and the legal system. As compared to the type of conduct that was originally targeted in the Model Rules and professionalism creeds, the features of electronic communications make more likely unethical and unprofessional behavior and, when it occurs, more damage to individuals and the legal system. The interests and values that animate the Model Rules and creeds are the same whether on or offline. But the ways the harm is inflicted are subtler and outside of the awareness of many attorneys, even those who are not naïve or inexperienced technologically. Thus, a tantrum online is much more likely to be exposed and disseminated than oral conversations or a sheet of paper. The digital era represents some fundamental behavioral and attitudinal changes. For instance:

With social media, the world is literally just a few mouse clicks away from a company’s most confidential information, raising growing concerns about a company’s own employees disclosing confidential information via social media. Exacerbating this is the fear that social media has desensitized people to the fact of disclosure of formerly private information because so much of it is done voluntarily—and so easily. When taken with the tendency of social media users—especially younger ones—to blur the line between social life online and work, crucial proprietary information can be out the door almost before the employee knows it. The concept of information—any information—being private is almost obsolete to many people. If they have access to it, what’s so bad about others having it?

Thus, Part II reviews various non-exclusive reasons why technology warrants specific attention in the regulation of the profession.

A. Lack of Anonymity and Privacy

The internet creates an unwarranted illusion of anonymity and privacy. Although an expert in encryption, Tor, and anti-
trace relays can hide the source and content of some messages, the average internet user cannot expect privacy or anonymity unless no one is trying to find or unmask a post. Any savvy computer user can trace the source IP address for a post and the identifying MAC number of the originating computer. In addition, many lawyers are still extremely sloppy about creating secure and uncommon passwords and then keeping the passwords private.\textsuperscript{57} Leaving a confidential letter or an ill-advised note on one’s desk or within easy access of a determined snooper is unwise. Stepping away from a computer that is logged into a user’s account runs the risk of exposing what is on the screen and anything else a search of the computer or a look at browsing history might reveal. Social media is particularly risky. Recently, in hiQ Labs, Inc. \textit{v. LinkedIn}, a district court expressed skepticism about an argument that LinkedIn’s users expect privacy, noting that LinkedIn’s privacy policy is illusory. “LinkedIn . . . trumpets its own product in a way that seems to afford little deference to the very privacy concerns it professes to be protecting in this case. . . . LinkedIn’s own actions do not appear to have zealously safeguarded those privacy interests.”\textsuperscript{58}

Federal laws cover the intentional interception of electronic transmissions and hacking or exceeding access authorization.\textsuperscript{59} Additionally, unauthorized access to electronic information is covered in some states by the common law trespass to chattels.\textsuperscript{60} However, these laws have not prevented wide scale violations by people unaware of the law, the risk of being

\textsuperscript{57} Using the same password for all password-protected services you use means that when someone obtains your password for one of these sites, they will have access to all of them. Using words from the dictionary for a password means a brute force dictionary attack by hackers will crack your password. Using long strings of letters and symbols and numbers means that passwords will be difficult to remember. Many sites now require the use of numbers and characters in passwords.

It is time to start using a password manager . . . . A password that is short and simple enough for you to remember is too short and simple to be secure.


\textsuperscript{60} \textit{See, e.g.}, Register.com, Inc. \textit{v. Verio, Inc.}, 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004).
caught, and the seriousness of the implications. Furthermore, in most cases, even when a perpetrator is caught, the harm has already been done. Once an embarrassing or unethical communication has been made public, arguing that access to internet posts was obtained illegally or that the material on a computer was stored by someone else is not an effective response. As in the case of Yath v. Fairview Clinics, once the information about plaintiff’s sexually transmitted disease and her new lover had travelled through her husband’s family and onto Myspace.com, it was little comfort that the information had been obtained illegally by an employee of a medical clinic.

Moreover, the law does not prevent the reproduction and distribution of information by a third-party who did not participate in the illegal access. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, an activist allegedly found a tape of a private cell phone conversation in his mailbox, which he then sent to the press. Because it could not be proved that the recipient of the tape was a party to the illegal acquisition of the conversation, the wiretap statutes did not apply and thus spreading this information was legal.

B. Rights Waivers

Increasingly, internet users are waiving what rights to privacy and protection they have. Websites often assert a “terms of use” policy, “end user license agreement,” or the like in clickwrap or even browsewrap form. These wrap contracts may give the website owners or operators a license to use customer postings and photographs for their own purposes and to sell or sublicense these to others. If so, the author and original


62 See Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 38–40 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). The plaintiff’s personal information was released online prior to the determination that the information was obtained illegally. The response could not remedy the damage done. Id.


64 Id.


66 For example, Facebook’s terms of service provide that “you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any
copyright owner of the post cannot force the site, or the assignees and sublicensees, to take it down.67 Some websites offer processes that allow users to erase personal information themselves; however, this is not a guarantee of privacy and creates no legal obligation for the service provider.68

Many employers have access by contract. Courts have upheld the right of employers to access the content of internet transmissions and stored computer content originating from, received on, or saved on company owned machines.69 The same applies to employer owned internet access accounts and mobile devices.70 Some employers disclose their right to such access and require employees to consent in an internet use policy or employee handbook. Others do not, but courts have generally found that an employee cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such content.71

C. Misplaced Trust

Many communicants on the internet share an unfounded belief that their message will be seen only by the intended recipients. Recently, the adultery-based dating website Ashley Madison suffered a serious hack that exposed the names and email addresses of the site’s users, which information went

---

67 See Venkat Balasubramani, Xcentric Ventures Chips Away at Small Justice’s Copyright Workaround to Section 230, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 5, 2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/04/xcentric-ventures-chips-away-at-small-justices-copyright-workaround-to-section-230.htm [https://perma.cc/MNQ5-PXDT] (saying that even though a lawyer gained copyright to the contents of a website post, that website had a right to keep the post online because of the license granted in the terms of service).

68 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 66 (“When you delete [intellectual property] content, it is deleted in a manner similar to emptying the recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that removed content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time [but will not be available to others].”).

69 See Kara R. Williams, Protecting What You Thought Was Yours: Expanding Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from Employer Computer Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 357 (2008).

70 See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding as early as 1996 that there is no “reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be intercepted by management.”)

71 Id.
viral.\textsuperscript{72} As with prior, well publicized disclosures, these hackers will inspire copycats.\textsuperscript{73} Any promise that digital information will be hermetically sealed in a mayonnaise jar is tenuous. Although secrets have always spread, in years past, fewer people had the technology to rapidly share secrets. Moreover, passed-on oral information was recognized to become increasingly less reliable with each subsequent retelling, while exact copies of a writing or a tape are hard to refute.

Even if no one intercepts an online conversation or circumvents privacy settings, the content of group posts is only as trustworthy as the others who have authorized access. Friends, family members, coworkers, and others may not understand that another’s posts made in a “private” group should not be copied and sent to outsiders.\textsuperscript{74} This often happens without the slightest intent to criticize or harm the author, but some later recipient may have other ideas. One Myspace user posted a journal entry that was later submitted to a local newspaper.\textsuperscript{75} The court reached the obvious holding on the law: users of social media have no reasonable expectation of privacy.\textsuperscript{76} In a Fourth Amendment context, one court observed: “While [the user] undoubtedly believed that his Facebook profile would not be shared with law enforcement, he had no justifiable expectation that his ‘friends’ would keep his profile private.”\textsuperscript{77}

The ABA’s formal opinion on social media issued to judges states what every lawyer should be taught:

Judges must assume that comments posted to [a social media site] will not remain within the circle of the judge’s connections. Comments, images, or profile information . . . may be electronically transmitted without the judge’s knowledge or permission to . . . unintended recipients.\textsuperscript{78}


\textsuperscript{73} Id.

\textsuperscript{74} ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 1 (“Judges must assume that comments posted to [a social media site] will not remain within the circle of the judge’s connections. Comments, images, or profile information . . . may be electronically transmitted without the judge’s knowledge or permission to persons unknown to the judge or to other unintended recipients.”).


\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 1130.


\textsuperscript{78} ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 1.
In addition, an array of observers may be present in a chatroom without disclosing their presence or their real identity. Interested third parties may convince another member of the group to disclose his or her password, and access the computer of a co-worker or family member while it is logged into a chat room, blog, or social media site. In its opinion regarding proper technology use for judges, the ABA correctly observed a truth applicable to all technology users:

In contrast to fluid, face-to-face conversation that usually remains among the participants, messages, videos, or photographs posted to [social media] may be disseminated to thousands of people without the consent or knowledge of the original poster.79

D. Ubiquity and Diffusion

Internet use has become pervasive in all ages and groups, including lawyers.80 Every person can be a publisher on a national and global scale with a few keystrokes and a click. Each person’s associates, friends, and relatives (including prior acquaintances entirely ignored for the last forty years), are now sending numerous messages that seem to warrant a quick reply. The ease and speed of electronic communications means writers give less thought to what they write (or tweet) back.81 Conversations in which two like-minded people whispered casually at the watering hole after work are now taking place online and can, in painful detail, be displayed in writing and out of context for the world to see. Unprofessional and hotheaded comments in emails are prone to being found, copied, reposted, and forwarded to the person berated in a way that face-to-face comments between two people would not. The risk that maladroit messages will be forwarded to a judge, opposing counsel,

79 Id. at 2.
80 See Allison Shields, Blogging and Social Media, A.B.A. Techreport, 2016, at 1, 2 https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/publications/techreport/2016/social_media_blogging.html [https://perma.cc/DFY5-ZAZA] (last visited Aug 11, 2017) (reporting that “76% of respondents report that they individually use or maintain a presence in one or more social networks for professional purposes. This number has also remained relatively steady since 2013.

Not surprisingly, the group most likely to report individually using or maintaining a presence in a social network is respondents under the age of 40, at 88%, followed by those between the ages of 40–49 at 85%, then 50–59 years old at 81%, and 64% of those 60+ years old, again all remaining reasonably consistent from 2013 to the present.” (emphases omitted)).
81 Given the nature of some of President Trump’s tweets, hopefully they were not thoroughly thought through. Leslie Currie, Trump’s 8 Worst Tweets of 2018 (So Far), STUDY BREAKS (Jan. 9, 2018), https://studybreaks.com/culture/trump-tweets-worst-2018/ [https://perma.cc/X47B-9PUW].
client, juror or other target is vastly magnified online. Thus, electronic communications are more lethal than prior modes of discussion.

E. Verifiability

The accuracy of a report of others’ statements using electronic communication can be easily verified, whereas oral interactions cannot. It is difficult to “spin” the meaning when the exact words used are on display. The experience of Federal District Judge Richard Cebull serves as a prime example. After he forwarded a racially charged email to some “old buddies,” the exact content of that email was forwarded in a chain to unintended recipients. Judge Cebull lamented, “It was not intended by me in any way to become public.” Unfortunately for the judge, his name was attached to contents circulated beyond his reach.

F. Permanence and Aggregation

The internet’s memory cannot be controlled by the original poster. A computer drive or disk can keep innumerable messages without bothering with space, filing cabinets, or document clerks. And unlike oral or print communication, digital information is easily searchable by names and other terms. A tidbit of a client confidence in a tweet can be connected to other bits of digital information to reveal information lawyers believe was never told to anyone. Internet service providers often cache copies of “deleted” data forever. Material thought to have been destroyed can resurface at a later date. In contrast to the European Union, the United States does not require

---

83 Id.
84 Id.
87 ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 2 (“Such data [posted to social media] have long, perhaps permanent, digital lives such that statements may be recovered, circulated or printed years after being sent.”).
88 See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317 (ruling that a person may request to have third-party websites containing information about them removed from search engine result lists); Charles Arthur, Explaining the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ – The Newest
internet service providers to delete electronic information, unless the content is illegal and the provider is under notice. 89

G. Instantaneity and Informality

The instantaneity of online communications permits, if not encourages, severely pococurante messages. Because of the ease and informality of online communication, people say things online that they would not say in a letter or face-to-face. 90 Social norms that encourage people to self-regulate—for example, shunning or reprimands from neighbors, family, and coworkers—are largely lost online. 91 Internet use seems to override any sense of inhibition or caution, perhaps because


91 Anonymity removes many of the social controls that may have deterred offenders in the pre-Internet era. Anonymity also reduces accountability and accuracy. . . . While one may argue that anonymously authored postings are not as credible as identified postings, the mere existence or prevalence of online gossip or online insults may have a negative effect even where such information is refuted or discredited. One study showed that repeated exposure to information made people believe the information was true, even where the information was identified as false. The “illusion of truth” appears to come from increased familiarity with the claim and decreased recollection of the original context in which the information was received.

Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAR L. REV. 993, 1009 (footnotes omitted).

Significant work has been done on the power to control behavior generated by the social expectations of members of communities and even strangers who share expectations and whose shock or disapproval is enough to discourage unacceptable behavior. See generally ROBERT ELICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 230 (1991) (discussing inter alia the role of gossip and hero worship in adjusting behavior); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 976–77 (1995) (analyzing the coercive effects of language); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 916 (1996) (describing ways in which norms and roles incentivize and disincentivize conduct). For many online posts, anonymity is assured unless someone is
users wrongly harbor an illusion that their communication will never reach beyond the intended recipient. In addition, digital natives are carrying on more and more conversations electronically that historically were not in writing. Given the immediacy of texting coupled with clumsy, tired thumbs, an electronic reply may be more easily misspelled, misstated, and misaimed.

Language in electronic messages is typically more casual and filled with hyperbole and tasteless attempts at humor. Research by social scientists reveals that we tend to be vastly overconfident in our ability to clearly communicate by email.92 Comments that might be in an offhand aside to the person in the next seat in a meeting can, and frequently do, implicate flaws in clients, other lawyers, judges, jurors, and the legal system, and project messages that erode public trust in the legal system. When made electronically, such comments can be preserved, verified, and disseminated in writing to a wide audience.

Employees who would not confront a boss in the hall seem willing to say what they think online. An employee shared that she and another employee had been fired on Facebook.93 A third worker commented on the post, stating that “[the boss] did both of y’all wrong.”94 Word got back to the boss,95 who disapproved of what could be read as disloyalty. The third worker then posted: “[S]omeone did not like what I had to say even though it’s MY fb, MY post/comment. I can say what I please. don’t like whatcha see? then scoot.”96 Ultimately, the person who had to “scoot” was the third worker, who was fired and initially denied unemployment benefits.97

The sender may choose the wrong emoji. I once included a face with big tears to convey sadness and the recipient had to motived enough to expend time and money in uncovering the source. See Kim, supra, at 1010–11.


94 Id.

95 Id.

96 Id.

97 Id. She was first denied unemployment benefits and consequently sued the company. The court held that Martinez (the third worker) was entitled to benefits. Id.
tell me that this emoji conveys laughing so hard that one is crying. The message, thus, was inappropriate. Many electronic devices autocorrect words that appear (to it) to be misspelled. The text is replaced with what may be a commonsense choice but is inaccurate, sometimes after the writer has moved down several lines. My daughter announced the birth of her baby named Hugh. A friend’s voice text came across as “Congrats on BBQ.” This is a trivial error; others might be significant. Following an interview with a Salt Lake City firm, one applicant wrote to praise the firm for its “nurturing” of new associates and instead praised their “neutering” of new associates.98

Often, the author of a post believes that catchy comments will be seen as a harmless jest. However, for defamation purposes, that assumption cannot be relied upon. At least one judge has ruled that comments made on Twitter should be taken just as seriously as comments in other, more formal settings.99 After Courtney Love tweeted that her former lawyer was “bought off,” the lawyer brought a libel suit.100 Counsel for Courtney Love argued that the tweet was just the hyperbole often found on the internet. The court ruled that Love made the comments with “a widely used internet vehicle for communicating personal views,”101 and will be held to the words she used.102 This is only the decision of a single district judge, but the analysis is convincing and other courts may be willing to take online messages literally.103

98 Message on file with author. It is probably true that neutering new associates would result in higher billable hours.


101 Id.

102 Id.

H. Lack of Context

Internet interactions can be taken easily out of context.104 Ask Sarah Palin about seeing Russia105 and Michelle Obama about being proud of her country.106 It is much easier to copy and paste word snippets that, without context, carry a different meaning than the speaker or poster intended. The casualness and back and forth of an email chain means that writers may be more terse and improvident than in other settings. Without the entire chain, a statement in one email could carry an entirely different meaning.

Internet posts consist only of bare words and an occasional emoji, without the body language usually present in face-to-face conversations and without the tonal distinctions of oral conversations.107 The impediments in accurately conveying a message electronically are so acute that some have called for punctuation that indicates mood (such as one to denote sarcasm).108 Facebook even started experimenting with a “satire” tag to help users avoid getting duped by popular satiric news stories.109

The speed and the ease with which an electronic communication can be sent means that an errant click on “reply all” could send one’s snotty commentary on a post to the entire listserv. Other potential pitfalls lie in the ability to copy and paste a long list of recipients’ emails without reentering or re-reading each. A prior message may have been used to reply. The parties believe the new interchange includes only two people, not realizing that the “reply” went to everyone on the list. Just recently, one of my research assistants accidentally sent a “kissy face” image and a personal message to his landlord; it

---

104 ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 2 (“[R]elations over the Internet may be more difficult to manage because, devoid of in-person visual or vocal cues, messages may be taken out of context, misinterpreted, or relayed incorrectly.”).
was intended for his wife. No harm done, but it is easy to imagine more damaging images and messages. The old-fashioned process of printing duplicates and typing out the addresses on envelopes, by contrast, makes this kind of unintentional over-distribution so much less likely in non-digital contexts.

In a provoking example, after oral arguments for a case involving the State Bar of Nebraska, the former bar president sent an email to the attorneys who had argued for the bar.\textsuperscript{110} He also cc’d the bar’s Executive Council, which unfortunately included the Chief Justice as the Supreme Court Liaison.\textsuperscript{111} The email congratulated the attorneys for dealing with “ill conceived [sic] and uninformed questions” from the bench.\textsuperscript{112} Because the Chief Justice had seen the email, he felt it necessary to reveal it to the other members of the court, as an ex-parte communication.\textsuperscript{113} This whole embarrassment was facilitated by the ease of including groups in the recipient field of an email without separately inputting names. Clearly, the internet presents a host of new issues that make ethical and professional faux pas more likely and spread their harm more widely.

III
PROPOSED CHANGES TO ADDRESS TECHNOLOGY ABUSE IN THE LAW

Stopping uncivil and unprofessional behavior by lawyers is the focus of many of the Model Rules and the clear intent of professionalism standards. Most printed court and bar association standards include a generalized and overarching statement, such as this one: “[L]awyers shall treat all other counsel, parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all proceedings in a courteous and dignified manner.”\textsuperscript{114} The sentiment is noble, but it does little to incentivize change and less to identify when the line is crossed.

In this Part, I discuss how technology use frequently runs afoul of various principles of ethical and professional behavior.

\textsuperscript{110} Joe Patrice, This Is Why You Always Check the Address Field Before Sending an Email, Above L. (Oct. 7 2013, 3:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/this-is-why-you-always-check-the-address-field-before-sending-an-email/ [perma.cc/6SR8-FHUL].
\textsuperscript{111} Id.
\textsuperscript{112} Id.
\textsuperscript{113} Id.
\textsuperscript{114} UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY r. 1 (2014). Around nineteen states have adopted a similar standard. Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at tbl.1.
I organize this discussion in the numerical order of the individual Model Rule that is most closely associated with a particular type of abuse. I do not mean to suggest that the problems must now be addressed in terms of the Model Rules. Although enforcement actions could currently take the form of violations of the Model Rules, my main concern is preventing abuses in the future. Thus, I suggest that each bar association and court explain these issues in the official statements of expectations or professionalism creeds that they enact. At some point, hopefully, the Model Rules will be reexamined to consider express inclusion of these ethical and professional problems in the text of the Model Rules. I order the discussion in accordance with the format of the Model Rules only for convenience. I begin with issues related to the content of Model Rule 1.1. However, the most important discussion falls at the end in the coverage of Rule 8.

A. Rule 1.1: Competence

Model Rule 1.1 requires “competent representation.” The ABA Commission 20/20 took a small step toward acknowledging the importance of technology in the practice when they added a comment to Rule 1.1 stating that “a lawyer should keep abreast . . . of the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.” Many states have adopted this provision, including Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah. Commendably, Florida went beyond the suggested language of Model Rule 1.1 and not only adopted the language of the Rule, but also took a concrete step toward making sure that Model Rule 1.1 is followed by requiring Florida lawyers to “take at least three hours of CLE in an approved technology program as part of the 33 total hours of CLE they must take over a three-year period.”

115 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
116 Id. at cmt. 8.
117 See Ambrogi, supra note 1.
Admonitions of competency are being considered or adopted in various states in a variety of alternative forms. Many courts now encourage or require lawyers to conduct discovery in digital formats. A California ethics opinion states that if an attorney lacks the required competence for proper e-discovery, she should “(1) acquire sufficient learning and skill before performance is required; (2) associate with or consult technical consultants or competent counsel; or (3) decline the client representation.” A few bar association creeds mention use of technology in discovery and transfer of documents.

As technology becomes more and more pervasive, ignorance of beneficial uses of technology is increasingly unacceptable, and can result in very real consequences for lawyers and their clients. Many have opined that not using technology during legal research may constitute a lack of diligence because online legal research provides the most up-to-date picture of the law. Further, online fact discovery is likely to reveal important additional information to help build a client’s case or assess a client’s risk. Failing to use technology to streamline practice and save wasted time could lead to fees a court might find unreasonable.

Although most discussion of technology uses and abuses centers on litigators, transactional lawyers are not immune from technoblunders. The recent District of Columbia Bar association ethics opinion warns that lawyers entrusted with fulfilling due diligence for cases involving securities, pending sales

---

120 See Ambrogi, supra note 1.
122 See, e.g., UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY, supra note 28, 14 cmt (“Lawyers should only use data-transmission technologies as an efficient means of communication and not to obtain a tactical advantage.”); ASS’N BUS. TRIAL LAWYERS, LOS ANGELES CHP.T., ETHICS, PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILITY GUIDELINES 3–4 (2016) http://www.abtl.org/pdfs/la_civilityguidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/QDJ8-55TW] (containing an entire section on electronic discovery); FLA. BAR, supra note 29, at 2.17 (“A lawyer must ensure that the use of electronic devices does not impair the attorney-client privilege or confidentiality.”).
123 See, e.g., Ellie Margolis, Surfin’ Safari—Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 82, 92 (2007) (“Courts routinely emphasize the relative ease and quickness of Sheparding, particularly with the use of Westlaw or Lexis, implying that failing to perform this simple task is a basic lack of diligence.”).
124 Ivy B. Grey, Not Competent in Basic Tech? You Could Be Overbilling Your Clients—and Be on Shaky Ethical Ground, A.B.A. J.: LEGAL REBELS (May 15, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/tech_competence_and_ethical_billing [http://perma.cc/X8BA-LBER] (“[F]ailing to become competent in technology would also lead to unreasonable fees. This may be more than a billing write-off—it may constitute an ethical violation.”).
and purchases, and regulatory compliance must thoroughly review all social media postings and the situation may “require advice about whether social media postings or use violate statutory or rule-based limits on public statement or marketing.”125 It references limitations on such public statements and guidelines from federal, state, and local agencies.126 It explicitly notes the Security and Exchange Commission’s recent action relating to the risk that social media may be a communication about an initial public offering,127 and that “[i]nadequately disclosed interactive Internet downloads may constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”128 The Model Rules do not address the risks for transactional lawyers, and neither do the professionalism standards of any state. This specificity is novel to the D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 371. The ABA goes so far to change the Model Rules to require lawyers to be competent in electronic communications but offers no guidance for transactional lawyers.

Not just disuse, but mistakes in understanding how technology works can have serious consequences. In Wisconsin for example, a lawsuit was recently dismissed because of an email that allegedly landed in a lawyer’s junk mail folder.129 The plaintiff and his lawyer Timothy Davis did not appear at a deposition on June 6th because “the email notice went to the lawyer’s junk email folder.”130 Apparently no one in the office saw a mailed notice. Assuming the lawyer in this case is telling the truth, this example is a warning about relying on the delivery of electronic notices and neglecting careful handling of hard copy mail. In addition, Davis alleges that the lawyers for the opposi-

---

125 D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 371, supra note 33, at 3.
126 Id.
127 Id. (first citing Complaint, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC No. 082, 3009, No. C-4264 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009); and then citing Decision and Order, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC File No. 082, 3009, No. C-4264 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009)).
128 Id. at 3 (citing Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 69279, 2013 WL 5138514, at 5 (Apr. 2, 2013) (“[I]suer communications through social media channels require careful Regulation FD analysis comparable to communications through more traditional channels[, and] the principles outlined in the 2008 Guidance . . . apply with equal force to corporate disclosures made through social media channels.”)).
130 Id.
tion did not receive discovery documents he sent because their system could not receive email files larger than ten megabytes. Lawyers must be on the alert for sending documents in smaller batches or emailing opposing counsel to be sure that files were received before assuming they were.

Although a lack of a technological savvy may not always result in consequences as drastic as having a case dismissed or missing discovery deadlines, it will never do the client any favors. One way to approach this issue would be to amend the requirements for continuing education to require some credits for classes on properly using technology in the practice of law. In the last year promising materials are starting to be available for even the smallest bar association to use in providing at least initial education to members.

Unfortunately, much of the education on social media available to lawyers is promotional. That means it is teaching about how to promote yourself and your practice and it is given by commercial interests that are happy to assist you by selling use of their platforms. For instance, Kevin O'Keefe, CEO of LexBlog, introduces his various presentations with this:

The key for lawyers is learning how to turn the digital dials by using social networks and media effectively. Learning here comes from trial and error.

Adapting to the cultures each social media present is like traveling to a foreign country. You get comfortable over time and keep the faux pas to a minimum as you start.

But encouraging lawyers to dive in and hope to overcome mistakes over time is the wrong message. Lawyers should be

131 Id.


134 Id.
taught how to avoid “faux pas” as well as ethical and professional violations first.

While waiting for the Model Rules to be more explicit, bar associations should consider professionalism standards that encourage the use of electronic discovery and recommend online factual research. Moreover, technological competency requires recognizing the risks of online social media and electronic communications. No lawyer is competent to practice law in this century without becoming aware of the risks of electronic communications and social media as described in Part II. A general statement in a professionalism creed could include the following language, but as the following subparts illustrate, various issues require more detailed individual coverage:

Lawyers should educate themselves on the merits of e-discovery and online research, as well as the obligations of researching social media in the course of due diligence. Further, lawyers should be aware of potential negative consequences of using digital communications and social media, including the possibility that communications intended to be private may be republished or misused. Lawyers should understand that digital communications in some circumstances may have a widespread and lasting impact on their clients, themselves, other lawyers, and the judicial system.

B. Model Rule 1.6(a) and (c): Confidentiality of Information

Model Rule 1.6(a) provides: “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client,” except under limited circumstances.\(^{135}\) Of course, attorneys have been on notice about the importance of confidentiality for a century. However, attorneys may not recognize the ways that electronic communications, research, and storage lures a conscientious attorney into inadvertent violations.

What lawyers should be required to know is that, with more options of storing and transmitting client information, inadvertent disclosure of client information is much more likely in the cyberworld.\(^{136}\) Protection of important digital data is often handled too casually by attorneys. The frequency of on-

---

\(^{135}\) MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).

\(^{136}\) See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research is to Reveal: The Growing Threat to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–9 (2011) (discussing the possibility that third parties can gain access to private information through online tracking); Michael E. Lackey, Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of Tweeting, Facebooking and Blogging, 28 TOURO L. REV. 149, 155–56 (2012) (“The ease of sharing and publicizing
line posts, texts, tweets, and other forms of social media correspondingly increase the risk of exposing confidential information. Also, the ease and instantaneousness of the medium encourages sloppy and thoughtless disclosures. Something about the internet leads people to overshare, to unduly trust those they imagine are watching, and to fail to use caution or even proofread.137 Lawyers must be aware that, in addition to their own electronic devices, access to confidential information may occur from third parties’ devices when they receive or generate messages to the lawyer.

Lawyers fail to consider the various kinds of technoblunders that give rise to ethical and professional risks. This section reviews common categories of confidentiality breaches arising with the use of technology.

1. **Oversharing**

Attorneys have been known to complain about their day’s work or regale others with tales of competence and success in particular cases or transactions. Some of these communications provide enough information to lead a recipient to figure out exactly what client and what transaction was involved, even if the lawyer did not mention specific names or obvious facts. Historically, these kinds of sloppy and “accidental” disclosures took place in closed groups during oral conversations, making it less likely for those disclosures to spread and be made available to others who might want to harm the client. In writing online, such disclosures can easily be spread and become exceedingly dangerous both to the client and to the integrity of the legal system.

An outrageous example of oversharing involves an assistant public defender in Illinois who posted sensitive client information on her blog, referring to clients by their first names and even revealing information relating to a client’s drug use.138 A less outrageous, but still problematic, example involved posting that “the client just lied to me about a crucial

---


2018] LAWYERS’ ABUSE OF TECHNOLOGY 911

fact - I hate it when they do that.”\textsuperscript{139} Such a post could “reveal confidences because the post has a date and a time, and a reader might well be able to identify which client [she was] meeting with.”\textsuperscript{140}

A thoughtful District of Columbia ethics opinion states that “[w]hile lawyers may ethically write about their cases on social media, lawyers must take care not to disclose confidential or secret client information in social media posts” and that it is always necessary to obtain consent from the client before posting any details of their case online.\textsuperscript{141}

Even if an attorney is reasonably certain that disclosures of case or client details will not be prohibited by the rules of his or her jurisdiction, it is always best to err on the side of caution in obtaining consent from the client.\textsuperscript{142} Added complications arise where a lawyer posts on social media about a client, and then posts personal opinions on seemingly unrelated political or social topics that ultimately are adverse to the potential interests of the client.\textsuperscript{143}

2. Reviews, Ranking, and Feedback

Another hotspot for disclosure mistakes arises with the trend of using the internet for feedback. A significant feature of the internet is a lawyer’s ability to invite comments and ratings and clients’ ability to gripe online. Lawyers have revealed confidential client information while responding to negative feedback on rating sites. One lawyer responded to a negative rating with this: “I dislike it very much when my clients lose, but I cannot invent positive facts for clients when they are not there. I feel badly for him, but his own actions in beating up a female co-worker are what caused the consequences he is now so upset about.”\textsuperscript{144} A lawyer may in self-defense spill out a justification that reveals too much about the case. When it happens

\textsuperscript{139} Smith, supra note 56, at 7.
\textsuperscript{140} Id.
\textsuperscript{141} D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 3.
\textsuperscript{142} See id.
\textsuperscript{143} See id.
in writing on a publicly accessible and easily duplicated and preserved medium, the harm is vastly enlarged.

In a culture where a company’s online presence is just as, if not more, important than its physical presence, a bad review online can have a substantial impact. One lawyer in Utah decided that the best way to deal with a negative online review that stated he was the “[w]orst ever,” among other things, was to sue the person who posted the review for “defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference with prospective economic relations.”\textsuperscript{145} The district court dismissed all of the claims and was upheld by the appellate court, holding that the online review was merely an opinion and thus did not rise to the level of a tort.\textsuperscript{146} The publicity from the suit brought far more attention to the negative review and did nothing to make this lawyer more appealing to future clients. As one blogger who covered the opinion said, “Spoiler alert: suing the client is not the correct answer.”\textsuperscript{147} Someone should have given this bit of advice to Alisa Levin, a lawyer who filed a defamation lawsuit against a former client for calling her a “legal predator” and a “con artist” in a Yelp review.\textsuperscript{148}

In responding to reviews of any nature, lawyers must be careful not to reveal client confidences. The District of Columbia, for example, permits lawyers to reveal client confidences only when responding to “‘specific’ allegations by the client concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.”\textsuperscript{149} D.C. rules also “specifically exclude[] general criticisms of an attorney from the kinds of allegations to which an attorney may respond using information otherwise protected . . . .”\textsuperscript{150} The New York State Bar takes an even stricter stance and holds

\textsuperscript{146} Id.
\textsuperscript{148} Debra Cassens Weiss, \textit{Chicago Solo Files $1.1M Defamation Suit Against Ex-Client for Alleged ‘Legal Predator’ Yelp Review}, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 14, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chicago_solo_files_1.1m_defamation_suit_against_ex_client_for_alleged_legal/?utm_source=maestro&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=weekly_email [https://perma.cc/J3GY-J7PP]. In response, the former client republished the Yelp review, which, as a top review, drove Levin’s name and the allegations to national fame. Id.
\textsuperscript{149} D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, \textit{supra} note 33, at 3 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT r. 1.6(e)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014)).
\textsuperscript{150} Id.
LAWYERS’ ABUSE OF TECHNOLOGY

that, “[a] lawyer may not disclose confidential client information solely to respond to a former client’s criticism of the lawyer posted on a [lawyer-rating website].”\footnote{\textit{Id.} (quoting N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Ethics Opinion 1032 (2014)).}

3. \textit{Internet Provider Disclosures}

Other risks arise with social media websites. Lawyers’ three most commonly used social media networking sites are Facebook, Twitter, and especially LinkedIn.\footnote{\textit{See} Stephen Fairley, \textit{How Lawyers Are Using Social Media in 2017}, \textit{The Nat’l L. Rev.} (June 20, 2017), \url{https://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-lawyers-are-using-social-media-2017} [https://perma.cc/SED7-RV5Q].} The ABA 2016 Tech report found that ninety-nine percent of large firms, ninety-seven percent of mid-size firms, ninety-four percent of small firms, and ninety-three percent of solo firms have a LinkedIn profile.\footnote{Shields, supra note 80 (“In total, 78\% of respondents report that their firms maintain a presence on LinkedIn. This represents a drop from previous years, when this number topped 90\%. This could be due to a greater understanding on the part of respondents that a firm presence on LinkedIn (a law firm business page), may be different than firms requiring or encouraging their lawyers to complete their individual LinkedIn profiles, or it could mean that firms are not seeing the value of firm business pages on LinkedIn and prefer to focus more on \textit{individ-}ual lawyers [sic] profiles and networking to gain visibility for both the lawyers and the firm.”).} LinkedIn offers users the option to import contact information from an existing email account; doing this may “publicize details about clients, witnesses, consultants, and vendors.”\footnote{\textit{Lackey & Minta, supra} note 136, at 155.} Caution is warranted in such instances and confidentiality issues may arise because use of social media websites often involves access to address books, and allows the social media site to suggest potential connections with people the lawyer may know who are already members of the social network, to send requests or other invitations to have these contacts connect with the lawyer on that social network, or to invite non-members of the social network to join it and connect with the lawyer.\footnote{D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, \textit{supra} note 33, at 3.}

This can be a huge technoblunder because: 

\[\text{[In many instances, the people contained in a lawyer’s address book or contact list are a blend of personal and professional contacts. Contact lists frequently include clients, opposing counsel, judges and others whom it may be impermissible, inappropriate or potentially embarrassing to have as a connection on a social networking site. The connection services provided by many social networks can be a good}\]

\footnote{\textit{Id.} (quoting N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Ethics Opinion 1032 (2014)).}


\footnote{Shields, supra note 80 (“In total, 78\% of respondents report that their firms maintain a presence on LinkedIn. This represents a drop from previous years, when this number topped 90\%. This could be due to a greater understanding on the part of respondents that a firm presence on LinkedIn (a law firm business page), may be different than firms requiring or encouraging their lawyers to complete their individual LinkedIn profiles, or it could mean that firms are not seeing the value of firm business pages on LinkedIn and prefer to focus more on \textit{individ-}ual lawyers [sic] profiles and networking to gain visibility for both the lawyers and the firm.”).}

\footnote{\textit{Lackey & Minta, supra} note 136, at 155.}

\footnote{D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, \textit{supra} note 33, at 3.}
marketing and networking tool, but for attorneys, these connection services could potentially identify clients or divulge other information that a lawyer might not want an adversary or a member of the judiciary to see or information that the lawyer is obligated to protect from disclosure. Accordingly, great caution should be exercised whenever a social networking site requests permission to access e-mail contacts or to send e-mail to the people in the lawyer’s address book or contact list and care should be taken to avoid inadvertently agreeing to allow a third-party service access to a lawyer’s address book or contacts.\footnote{Id.}

4. Unsecured Access

A major, but often unappreciated, risk arises from the prevalence of unsecured internet connections. Lawyers and clients may send and receive digital communications on unsecured internet access services at a restaurant, park, airport, and other public locations. Some still have home wireless routers that do not require passwords. Someone on the street can access an inadequately protected internet access point, even from outside a building or home, and monitor communications.\footnote{Cheryl B. Preston, \textit{WiFi in Utah: Legal and Social Issues}, 20 Utah B.J. 29, at *31, Sept.–Oct. 2007.} If a party other than the lawyer, such as a spouse, child, or untrained staff member, uses a computer, phone, or email account, communications and stored information are not secure.

In a recent case, an employee working with the lawyers for an insurance company made a grave mistake involving unsecured access. In \textit{Harleysville Insurance Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc.},\footnote{Harleysville Inc. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 4368617 (Oct. 2), \textit{overruling in pertinent part} No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 1041600 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017).} the district court with odd analysis overruled the magistrate judge’s opinion stating that the insurance company waived any attorney-client privilege in, or work-product protection of, their “Claims File.”\footnote{Id. at *5.} However, the magistrate’s reasoning is compelling. The magistrate observed that the insurance company knowingly uploaded the Claims File to a cloud storage and file sharing service operated by Box, Inc.\footnote{Harleysville Inc. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057, 2017 WL 1041600, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017).} Although the purpose of putting the Claims File on Box was to share it with outside counsel, the folder was available to
anyone with access to the internet because it was not password protected.\textsuperscript{161} In addition, an email to opposing counsel included the link to the Box folder, which included the Claims File.\textsuperscript{162} The insurance company later sent a thumb drive to opposing counsel in response to discovery requests.\textsuperscript{163} The thumb drive also contained the full Claims File.\textsuperscript{164} At this point opposing counsel alerted the insurance company’s counsel of a perceived mistake involving the thumb drive, but believed the online availability of documents through the provided link was intentional.\textsuperscript{165} In the magistrate’s opinion, this was the “cyber world equivalent of leaving its claims file on a bench in the public square and telling [opposing] counsel where they could find it.”\textsuperscript{166} The magistrate imposed a monetary sanction for failure to alert the insurance company that the file was available using the provided link, but refused to disqualify opposing counsel or take any further action.\textsuperscript{167}

The district court found, on the other hand, that the Claims File had been inadvertently disclosed.\textsuperscript{168} In a particularly generous move, the district court held that the insurance company took reasonable measures to protect the Claims File,\textsuperscript{169} notwithstanding the double disclosure. First it found that the Box cloud storage folder “was not searchable through Google or any other search engine, nor was it searchable on the Box, Inc. website. Therefore, a person would need to enter the specific URL of the ‘sharing’ link, which consisted of 32 randomly-generated alphanumeric characters.”\textsuperscript{170} Unfortunately, the link was knowingly given to opposing counsel.

The insurance company claimed it voluntarily provided opposing counsel with the link for the purpose of making available a video of the relevant fire.\textsuperscript{171} The district court excused the employee of the insurance company for putting the Claims File in the same Box folder with the video.\textsuperscript{172} The court noted that it was the employee’s first time using Box, he lacked a technical

\textsuperscript{161} Id. at *5.
\textsuperscript{162} Id. at *1.
\textsuperscript{163} Id. at *2.
\textsuperscript{164} Id.
\textsuperscript{165} Id.
\textsuperscript{166} Id. at *5.
\textsuperscript{167} Id. at *8.
\textsuperscript{169} Id. at *7.
\textsuperscript{170} Id.
\textsuperscript{171} Id. at *6.
\textsuperscript{172} Id. at *7.
background, and he believed he had utilized the security features.\footnote{173}{Id.}

Then the court looked at whether the insurance company waited too long to rectify the error.\footnote{174}{Id.} The court determined that the insurance company's delay in rectifying their error resulted from its ignorance, not its negligence.

It was perfectly reasonable—and, indeed, accurate—for Harleysville’s counsel to expect that no one could access the Box Folder unless he was given that specific URL. The fact that opposing counsel could access the Box Folder via a 32-character, randomly-generated “sharing” link in an email sent by Harleysville did not, and should not have, put Harleysville’s counsel on notice that anyone with an Internet connection could do the same.\footnote{175}{Id.}

The court also found that the disclosure to just one party, and not multiple parties, meant the disclosure was not extensive and concluded that no waiver occurred.\footnote{176}{Id.}

I find it very difficult to interpret as reasonable lawyers’ use of cloud storage files unprotected by password. The distinctive URL is no protection, even if the link was not disclosed. An experienced hacker can search the cloud without using Google. How can sharing the link not put lawyers on notice that the material in the folder accessed by that link has been made available to the recipient of the link? Actual realization of the consequences of an error is not required. In addition, employees and agents of lawyers are not typically excused because they are inexperienced in handling confidential material.\footnote{177}{See, e.g., Frances P. Kao, No, a Paralegal Is Not a Lawyer, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 11, 13–14 (discussing a lawyers’ duty to ensure that a paralegal maintains confidentiality).}

Most people do not have a technical background. In any event, outside of this court, lawyers cannot justify a breach of confidentiality by having client information handled by inadequately trained employees.

5. \textit{Terminated Devices}

Another common problem involves lawyers, clients, and firm employees who exchange or sell devices, or return company owned equipment. A departing employee may return a device with digital information still on it, even if the employee tried to erase it. If the employee did not remove passwords or
did not log out of accounts, privileged attorney-client messages could appear on the device now in the possession of another owner or former employer. One employee sued a former employer when he found out that his old company-issued iPhone, which he had returned to his former employer, was still linked to his Apple account.178 The text messages he received on his new phone were automatically sent to the phone that was now in his former employer’s possession.179 This case did not involve a lawyer, but a lawyer or litigant could easily make the same mistake. In addition, devices may have been programmed to remember passwords or otherwise contain cookies that store and apply all kinds of information automatically, giving the new owner access to a host of personal data containing confidential information.

The Florida Bar, the leader in addressing technology, issued an ethics opinion on the proper ways to handle hard drives from discarded computer equipment to protect confidential client information.180 The Florida Bar addressed the obligations of lawyers regarding information stored on hard drives in hopes of preventing the leak of confidential information. In the ethics opinion, the Bar stated that “hard drives from high speed scanners and other like computer equipment” may retain records of scanned documents that can be accessed after the equipment is discarded.181 “[L]awyer[s] must take reasonable steps to ensure that client confidentiality is maintained and that the Device is sanitized before disposition.”182 Other bar associations need to incorporate similar warnings.183

6. Ransomware

An increasingly common risk involves third parties who hack in and freeze lawyer’s computer systems and demand a

---

179 Id.
181 Schickel, supra note 180.
183 See Zelda Gerard, What After the Sony Hack? Examination of the Development of Cybersecurity Law in the United States and in France and Its Impact on Lawyers, 32 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 28, Winter 2016, at 28, 32 (citing Florida and California as examples of states that have implemented such warnings).
ransom be paid to unlock the system.\(^{184}\) Although the payment of the ransom does not itself raise ethical concerns, firms that are unable to pay the ransom risk the “or else” threat, which is that the hackers will release the information into the public or permanently delete it. A public release results in a breach of confidentiality and permanent inability to access firm files that dramatically affects a lawyer’s ability to competently represent a client. Loss of records entrusted to a lawyer raises a plethora of common law and statutory claims from affected clients.\(^{185}\) The incidence of ransomware attacks is rising.\(^{186}\) John Simek, the vice president at Sensei Enterprises Inc. said that

\[\text{[w]hen it comes to ransomware . . . attacks are growing and}\]
\[\text{that many firms end up having to pay the ransom because}\]
\[\text{they didn’t have systems in place to recover the stolen data.}\]
\[\text{“Our own clients are beginning to wake up to the fact that}\]
\[\text{these types of attacks can happen anytime.”}\(^{187}\)

In Rhode Island, the law firm Moses Afonso Ryan allegedly lost $700,000 in billings from a ransomware virus that infected the firm’s computer network.\(^{188}\) The virus was unwittingly introduced to the firm’s network because a lawyer clicked on an infected email attachment which downloaded the virus and encrypted the law firm’s network for three months until the ransom of $25,000 was paid to release the network.\(^{189}\) The law

\(^{184}\) See Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour. “Why Can’t We Be ‘Friends’?: Ethical Concerns in the Use of Social Media,” 57 S. Tex. L. Rev. 551, 568 (2016) (giving examples of firms that have been subject to such attacks).

\(^{185}\) See Vincent I. Polley, Cybersecurity for Lawyers and Law Firms, 53 Judges’ J. 11, 11 (Fall 2014) (“In 2012, the American Bar Association updated the model ethics rules to require lawyers to keep abreast of the benefits and risks associated with new technology and to maintain basic competency in the use of computer technologies. A blizzard of ABA and state ethics opinions address lawyers’ duties to protect confidential client information and to keep clients informed . . . .”).

\(^{186}\) See Herb Weisbaum, Ransomware: Now a Billion Dollar a Year Crime and Growing, NBC News (Jan. 9, 2017, 11:51 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/ransomware-now-billion-dollar-year-crime-growing-n704646 [https://perma.cc/QQ3M-QMTY] (“Ransomware payments for 2016 are expected to hit a billion dollars, according to the FBI. That compares to just $24 million paid in 2015. And it’s expected to get even worse this year — with more victims and more money lost.”)


\(^{189}\) Id.
firm had an insurance policy through Sentinel, which paid the maximum $20,000 as provided under the policy for virus coverage, but the policy would only cover “lost business income when there is physical loss or damage to property at the business premises.” Moses Afonso Ryan filed a claim against Sentinel for the $700,000 in lost billings because of the virus. Cases like these demonstrate how lawyers need to guard themselves against the risks of not only their unethical behavior, where purposeful or not, but also against the behavior of others who could use technology to extort money from a law firm or compromise confidential client data.

7. Employer Access

A serious and not uncommon example of confidentiality breach involves the attorney who communicates with a client who is at work. Recently in California, a lawyer permitted a client who was involved in litigation with her employer to discuss the case, facts, and strategy from her workplace using her employer’s equipment. A company policy had warned that an email account “was to be used only for company business, that e-mails were not private, and that the company would randomly and periodically monitor its technology resources to ensure compliance with the policy.” The employee had been given the company’s handbook and signed that she had read its terms. Like the rest of us, she did not think twice about it again and fell into the common illusion that emails are private. Of course, the court determined that the emails were not private, and therefore, they were not protected by attorney-client privilege. The employer could use against her any content it found.

The emerging view is that employees, like this client, have no reasonable expectation of privacy when using employer equipment or systems. And even if there were a reasonable expectation of privacy, many companies require the employee to enter into an agreement regarding the terms of using the

190 Id.
191 Id.
193 Id. at 896.
194 Id. at 883.
195 Id. at 895.
196 See, e.g., id.
employer’s equipment or internet access.197 If an employee’s email address or IP address includes words or numbers relating to the employer, a reasonable employee should realize that the employer may have rights to access and use electronic communications.

8. Lawyers’ Employees’ Access

A member of a lawyer’s staff who has terminated employment at a firm or other business may retain passwords that allow continued access to company email and electronically stored information. If a dispute arises, or just out of curiosity, the former employee may seek to access digital information.198 In a recent criminal complaint, Michael Potere, a former associate at Dentons’ Los Angeles office, was charged with extortion.199 Potere allegedly threatened to reveal sensitive firm documents that he had obtained by using the email password of a partner at Dentons.200 The email password was given to Potere when he worked on a case together with the partner in 2015.201 Potere, upset about not being able to continue working at Dentons until the fall where he would start a political science degree program, “demand[ed] that the law firm pay him $210,000 and give him a piece of artwork to ensure the documents remained secret.”202 This is a prime example of why lawyers must frequently change passwords, especially when employees are terminated.

In addition, lawyers should be warned about the frequent cases involving current employees allowing others to use their online identities or passwords that link and allow access to lawyer information. One attorney in West Virginia repeatedly

197 See, e.g., Kristin J. Hazelwood, Technology and Client Communications: Preparing Law Students and New Lawyers to Make Choices that Comply with the Ethical Duties of Confidentiality, Competence, and Communication, 83 Miss. L.J. 245, 270 (2014) (discussing cases in which plaintiff waived reasonable expectation of privacy because defendant had retained right to access in employee handbook).
198 See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing how a Cornell researcher used his knowledge and access to security networks to infect them).
201 Id.
202 Id.
accessed the emails of his wife and seven of his wife’s co-workers at her law firm because he thought she was engaging in an extramarital affair.203 There is no evidence in this case that the outside attorney was looking for client information, but if the fear had been that the wife was having an affair with a client, sensitive information on the client’s legal matters may have been exposed. Spouses of employees may have legal access to passwords or share computers with cookies permitting access to private sites. Lawyers and firms need to be much more vigilant in policing employee access to client information.

Some kinds of employees and agents have access to computer systems or equipment for repair or maintenance purposes. Something available on the computer may tempt such a person to copy or use the information or disclose it to others. Or, as happened to the Utah Bar Association in March 2018, someone in the office may stick a full frontal photo of naked breasts at the end of an email sent to all active attorneys asking them to sign up for the bar convention.204 Anyone in the office may access a lawyer’s computer and any open internet sites while the lawyer is out to lunch, in a conference, in the bathroom, etc. Of course, before the digital era, co-workers and maintenance staff could always have looked at papers on the desk or opened files and drawers. However, papers on a desk do not include a record of the user’s search history or networks of stored information. Digital information can be searched by keyword easily and quickly. It can be printed, forwarded to another account, or saved on a flash drive. Moreover, someone with access to a lawyer’s email account or blog may post information in the name of the lawyer or send out requests for information that may result in breaches to confidentiality.

204 Christina Zhao, Utah State Bar Emails Photo of Naked Breasts to Every Lawyer in the State, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2018, 12:12 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/utah-state-bar-emails-photo-boobs-every-lawyer-state-832710 [https://perma.cc/XMY7-SUMR]; see also David Wells, Utah Bar Commission Cites Human Error for Email Containing Nude Photo, FOX 13 NEWS NOW (Mar. 9, 2018, 9:54 AM), http://fox13now.com/2018/03/09/utah-bar-commission-cites-human-error-for-pornographic-email/ [https://perma.cc/22NA-4L5U] (quoting email from John Baldwin, executive director of the Bar, to Utah lawyers. The Bar’s response email said, “We have determined that a link to the inappropriate image was inadvertently added to the email as a result of human error. That error is being addressed as a personnel issue.”). Id.
9. **Information Storage**

Storing information in a cloud creates a risk of disclosing confidential client information. In addition to large, sophisticated firms, the 2016 ABA Legal Technology Report found that forty-six percent of two-to-nine attorney firms and forty-two percent of solo practice attorneys use the cloud. Outsider hacking of firm computer systems to obtain information on clients, potential stock offerings, and political dirt is a serious risk brought on with the use of technology.

A startling report released on June 27, 2017, by LogicForce, a cybersecurity firm, detailed just how “woefully unprepared” law firms are against cyber threats. The report used data compiled from surveys and found that “77 percent of responding firms did not have cyber insurance, 95 percent of responding firms were noncompliant with their own cyber policies, 100 percent were noncompliant with a client’s policies, and 53 percent of responding firms do not have a data breach incident response plan.” The report notes that, because of most law firms’ dreadful state of unpreparedness, “It is truly not a question of if, but when, an incident will occur.” The risks go beyond a failure to keep client information private, and include the loss of the attorney/client privilege, loss of work product claims in discovery, and loss of trade secret protection. In addition, information exposed may be a violation of various securities laws and confidentiality agreements with third parties. Exposing client information opens up an attorney to a variety of common law and statutory claims. This section discusses various information storage related technoblunders and their consequences.

Of critical concern is cloud storage. Much has been written elsewhere on the benefits and risks of attorneys using the

---


208 Id.

209 Id.

cloud and this is not the place for a thorough exploration of all the implications. However, the risks are sufficiently substantial that mention of methods to protect stored information in professionalism creeds warrants discussion. Even with ordinary precautions, electronic storage of large amounts of data is risky and history has amply shown that such data can be hacked, or worse, can be accidentally downloaded on another user’s device. In relation to trade secrets, Professor Sharon Sandeen has gone so far as to say, “The mere fact that you’re storing on the cloud, in my opinion, is a strong argument that you’ve waived your trade secrecy.”

The ABA now “recognizes a . . . world where law enforcement discusses hacking and data loss in terms of ‘when,’ and not ‘if,’” and offers an insurance policy to cover cyber-incidents, including network extortion. A press release noted:

In recent years, the legal profession has become a popular target for hackers. Despite vigilance and increased awareness by law firms and individual lawyers, cyber-related risks have escalated based on the sensitivity and nefarious uses of that data. Last year, for example, the Manhattan U.S. attorney’s office unsealed indictments against three Chinese men who are accused of using stolen law firm employee credentials to access troves of internal emails at two law firms. The men, according to prosecutors, used details they obtained from partners’ emails about pending deals to make more than $4 million in illegal stock trades.

One study estimated that eighty percent of the 100 largest law firms have had a malicious computer breach during a one-

\[211\] See Victor Li, Tools for Lawyers Worried that NSA is Eavesdropping on Their Confidential Conversations, A.B.A. J. [Mar. 30, 2014 12:44 PM], http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/tools_for_lawyers_worried_that_nsa_is_eavesdropping_on_their_confidential_c/ [https://perma.cc/PV7C-SGCE].


\[213\] Neil, supra note 205.


\[216\] Id.
year period. Some of these may include ordinary phishing scams, but an occasional employee falls for the ploy and reveals confidential information. Some have been major breaches with serious confidentiality implications and may result in class action lawsuits against the firms.

Another risk of storing large amounts of data in the cloud is access to the information by the service provider. Recently, Google introduced a free service called Optical Character Recognition (OCR) that extracts information from documents and images stored in your drive to make your files more searchable. Google uses information to trigger advertising and sells user data to others. Some commentators suggest that "lawyers should avoid using free email or cloud storage services like Gmail and Dropbox. The free versions allow Google and Dropbox to scan everything sent to the service, which compromises client confidentiality." While Google may use client information for advertising, a potentially greater risk is that Google Drive may be hacked.

10. *Reasonable Efforts to Protect*

Following the 2012 amendments, Model Rule 1.6(c) provides: "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client." At least nineteen state and local ethics opinions have

---


222 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
addressed the question of cloud-based information storage, and all have decided that it is ethically permissible to use cloud storage services, but only if attorneys use “reasonable care.”

The problems with this advice is that lawyers may not be alert to the risks and will not seek out advice from ethics opinions and, more importantly, there are no concrete standards for “reasonable care.” Each opinion notes different specific obligations of attorneys to shield against confidentiality concerns.

One thing is clear: the failure to take any precautions certainly is a violation of the duty of confidentiality. And failure to respond appropriately once a system is hacked is another risk, as Yahoo!’s top lawyer can attest. In addition, lawyers need to be reminded of the obvious professional duty to report data breaches to clients, who are the real victims of these kinds of attacks.

When the ABA amended Model Rule 1.6, rather than clarifying a position reconciling or directing the suggestions in various bar associations’ statements on cloud computing and rather than giving lawyers a clear standard for what is “reasonable,” it chose to give vague and limited guidance in the Comment to Rule 1.6:

[A] lawyer [must] act competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized access . . . and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure . . . . When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients.

Lawyers’ views of “reasonable” depends on their awareness of the risks, which is still doubtful, and their awareness of the easily available security options.

Unfortunately, the Comment begins by ignoring the facts of modern practice and lulling lawyers into believing that “[t]his duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special

---


226 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmts. 18–19.

227 Id.
security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 228 The Comment admits that “[s]pecial circumstances, however, warrant special precautions,” and offers a list of extremely vague factors. 229 First is the “sensitivity of the information.” 230 What information about a lawyer’s representation of a client is not per se “sensitive,” other than what can be reported in the newspaper, such as scheduling and published court orders, and friendly chitchat? The Comment also reminds lawyers that some information is “protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement.” 231 The Model Rule 1.6 Comment does not educate or guide lawyers by identifying various laws that protect information. Moreover, all attorney-client information is protected by a “confidentiality agreement” imposed as a matter of common law, if not ethics rules.

Other factors include “the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed.” 232 Like speeding, not everyone gets caught, but the risks of disclosure are broad and cannot be denied. Another factor is “the cost of employing additional safeguards [and] the difficulty of implementing the safeguards.” 233 While technoneophytes likely think that investigating and implementing security measures is daunting, the 2017 ABA Opinion 477R* acknowledges

a variety of options to safeguard communications including, for example, using secure internet access methods to communicate, access and store client information . . . using unique complex passwords, changed periodically, implementing firewalls and anti-Malware/AntiSpyware/Antivirus software on all devices upon which client confidential information is transmitted or stored, and applying all necessary security patches and updates to operational and communications software. Each of these measures is routinely accessible and reasonably affordable or free. 234

Why not require the use of measures that, at any given time, are "routinely accessible and reasonably affordable or free" or at least provide a list of the kinds of simple, low cost measures that are available in the Comment Rule 1.6? At a minimum, the ABA Model Rules should address the use of unsecured

228 Id. at cmt. 19.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. at cmt. 18.
233 Id.
networks and public Wi-Fi and the risk of unsuspectingly downloading viruses.

The last factor found in the Rule 1.6 Comment for determining the level of security necessary is “the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software excessively difficult to use).” The Comment thus offers an easy excuse, without acknowledging that almost none of the routinely available security measures make anything “excessively difficult to use.” Moreover, ample examples in this Article and elsewhere show that some lawyers believe that avoiding unsecured networks, restricting posts on social media, occasionally changing passwords, and avoiding cell phones for sensitive communications is just too difficult. Some lawyers may think that giving up the convenience of discussing client matters with a colleague in a crowded elevator or at a bar makes practice excessively difficult, but that has never been an excuse.

In an attempt to add some specificity to the woefully inadequate Comment to Rule 1.6, the ABA recently issued ABA Formal Opinion 477. It adds various tips about obvious risks and is a starting point for training lawyers, even though it offers no more concrete standards than the Comment to Rule 1.6. Opinion 477 mentions the well-known fact that a “client [may use] computers or other devices subject to the access or control of a third party,” and it reminds lawyers of their duties to supervise staff and nonlawyers to whom work is delegated.

Finally, in addition to other “may”s and “should”s, Opinion 477 suggests one specific “better practice” of marking communications “privileged and confidential.” Such disclaimers are usually at the bottom and not noticeable until the message has been read in full. In addition, those with a financial or strategic stake in the legal matter are unlikely to immediately delete it, even if they had not already read the contents.

Opinion 477 lists in a footnote various lawsuits involving the breach of confidentiality by electronic communications.

---

235 See Model Rule 1.6, supra note 222, at cmt. 18.
237 Id. at 8.
but nothing in the Opinion sets a standard stronger than “reasonable,” but undefined, steps to avoid these or other risks.239

A specific step that should be required as a reasonable effort to protect against technoblunders is a requirement for lawyers to become aware of the policies of online platforms and services and then avoid those whose policies allow the provider wide powers to access information and relieve the provider from liability for giving information to others or other mishandling of information. The District of Columbia Bar recently addressed an issue few if any lawyers have grasped.240 “It is critically important that lawyers review the policies of the social media sites that they frequent, particularly policies related to data collection. Privacy settings on social media are not the equivalent of a guarantee of confidentiality.”241 Lawyers, as with all other internet users, will resist taking the time to find the providers’ terms on their webpages, reading the lengthy statement, and understanding how the policies relate to risks.242 Even if the policies were initially read, lawyers do not keep up on the regularly changing terms even if they have notice of the changes. Bar associations might provide the service of reviewing the policies of popular social media sites and advising lawyers of the specific risks. Certainly professionalism standards in each jurisdiction should specifically alert law-

communications with lawyer over company owned computer not privileged); Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Center, Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 2007).


241 Id. at 2.

242 See Nancy S. Kim, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 1, 213 (2013) (citations omitted):

One study estimated that it would cost the average American Internet user 201 hours or the equivalent of $3,534 a year to read the privacy policies of each website that he or she visits, you would not have time to engage in productive work, recreational activities, or relationships. Modern life, in other words, would break down if we treated wrap contracts just like other contracts.


In addition to time drain, a second reason not to read wrap contracts is that they are difficult, dense texts. Most readers cannot be expected to comprehend them even if they read every word. Wrap contracts are increasingly elaborate, monotonous, and written in ways that suggest the drafter intended to obfuscate the scariest parts by embedding them in excess verbiage and repetition. Remember, wrap contract drafters do not have to worry about printer or paper costs, mailing or storage costs, or the cautionary impact of presenting a long paper contract to a consumer in its obvious fullness. Key sections in wrap contracts are frequently presented in all capital letters, but that does not help.
yers to the risks created by common online provider contracts and advise against using platforms with certain terms or a history of disclosures.

Although using two-step passwords and encryption is a better practice, a minimum step that should be required is strengthening and protecting passwords. Risks abound. For instance, the Heartbleed bug, which allowed third parties to potentially view encrypted data, affected many sites that could contain sensitive information, such as Yahoo!, Google, Box, and Dropbox, as well as other sites that cater specifically to lawyers.243 One commentator opined that, at a minimum, ethics required lawyers to change their passwords regularly.244

Requiring particular methods of security runs the risk of becoming outdated, but the Model Rules or state professionalism standards can require the use of at least one of a variety of methods subject to advances in the field. Without federal legislation, the bar can adopt standards for ethical behavior that draw on the specifics in The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX),245 Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA),246 Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),247 Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA),248 or Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS).249

Bar association standards can, at a minimum, advise lawyers who are not technologically sophisticated and not employing existing security measures to get professional advice on securing communications and cloud storage from an information systems expert. If a disclosure or breach occurs, a lawyer’s failure to have reasonable security measures in place should be an ethics violation subject to bar disciplinary action. Bar associations could also require continuing legal education hours in the subject of communications and information security.

Language setting forth the most minimum of standards that can be added to bar association standards is as follows:

Lawyers should be alert to the increased risk of interception of, and unauthorized access to, digital communications and information storage, including the risks of unauthorized access, unintended disclosure of details that can be aggregated, and oversharing of personal information or activities that might allude in any way to clients and cases. Lawyers should carefully screen any information posted to social media sites. Lawyers should use frequently changed and robust passwords, two-factor authentication, or encryption. Unless technologically sophisticated or advised by a security expert, lawyers should not store client information on the cloud. Lawyers should not use unsecured internet access points or routers to discuss client business. Lawyers should consider cyber liability insurance.

Lawyers are responsible for failures to protect information from improper use by employees, agents, and repair service technicians who have access to electronic devices on which client information may be stored. Lawyers should discuss with, and obtain consent from, clients regarding the use of electronic communications in various circumstances. Lawyers should request that clients store and discuss case details only on reasonably secure devices and provide clear advice about the risks of client use of social media.

C. Rule 1.7(b) and (c): Conflicts of Interest

Rule 1.7(b)(4) prohibits representing a client with respect to a matter if “[t]he lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be or reasonably may be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property, or personal interests,” unless the conflict is resolved in accordance with Rule 1.7(c). Posts on social media may take a position that is contrary to the interests of a current or potential client. The District of Columbia Bar warns about such inadvertent creations of conflicts and notes that even “the acquisition of uninvited information through social media sites . . . could create actual or perceived conflicts of interest for the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm.” Lawyers and firms often post legal updates where they may opine on the merits of new legislation or a recent case. Others run opinionated blogs as a way of attracting clients or garnering social and peer acceptance for

D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (D.C. BAR 2015).

positions taken by existing major clients. These practices must be carefully monitored.

Professionalism standards adopted by bar associations should include:

Lawyer or firm postings on social media, as well as third party comments (invited or uninvited) may create subject matter conflicts even if a future client is not adverse to a prior client.

D. Rule 3: Obstruction and Extrajudicial Statements

1. Rule 3.4(a): Obstruction and Spoliation of Evidence

Model Rule 3.4(a) creates the duty not to “obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value, [or] counsel or assist another person to do [so].”252 Copies of electronic communications should be preserved in the client’s file. The District of Columbia Ethics Opinion 370 adds a further twist: “Social media sites may not permanently retain messages or other communications; therefore care should be taken to preserve these communications outside of the social media site, in order to ensure that the communications are maintained as part of the client file.”253 In addition to keeping their own records, lawyers must warn clients of the consequences resulting from spoliation of evidence,254 including an adverse inference at trial, assessment of costs and fees, disciplinary action, default judgment, as well as tort and criminal liability.255 A good reference is Professor Browne-Barbour’s citation of several cases, ethics opinions, and commentators that discuss spoliation.256

252 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
253 The D.C. Bar Association also recommends that lawyer-client communications be made through a secure office email rather than social media. D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 2.
254 Browne-Barbour, supra note 184, at 575.
255 Id.
In addition, District of Columbia Ethics Opinion 371 warns that the law, which varies among jurisdictions, may prevent advising a client to “modify their social media presence once litigation or regulatory proceedings are anticipated.”\textsuperscript{257} Lawyers must consult obstruction statutes, spoliation law, procedural rules for criminal and regulatory investigations, and rules for civil cases before taking down or advising clients to take down social media posts.\textsuperscript{258} The time to advise clients about the risk that information in social media will come back to haunt them is before it is posted.

2. Rule 3.6: Extrajudicial Statements by Non-Prosecutors

Model Rule 3.6 provides: “A lawyer . . . shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”\textsuperscript{259} The Rule expressly details the limited kinds of information that can and cannot be revealed. Being in front of a television camera or talking to a reporter would put most lawyers on alert to carefully monitor information disclosed. However, in this generation, every lawyer can actually be the press. At any time, including while sitting at the counsel table, a lawyer may, with a few thumb strokes, broadcast a message to untold millions. Hopefully, it is unlikely a lawyer would actually intend to broadcast the information about the legal proceeding to inappropriate parties, but the belief that a tweet or text will be kept private is unfounded.

Already situations involving lawyer communications during judicial proceedings are coming to light. The harm is compounded if the lawyer is an employee of the government working for the court. For instance, a court research attorney tweeted during an attorney discipline proceeding what was her take on the merits of the case and the moral turpitude of the respondent Phil Kline\textsuperscript{260}: “Why is Phil Klein [sic] smiling?”

\begin{footnotes}
\item[257] D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 371. \textit{supra} note 33, at 3.
\item[258] \textit{Id.} (citing other sources).
\item[259] \textit{MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT }r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
\end{footnotes}
There is nothing to smile about douchebag”; “ARE YOU FREAKING KIDDING ME. WHERE ARE THE VICTIMS? ALL THE PEOPLE WITH THE RECORDS WHO [sic] WERE STOLEN”; “I predict that he will be disbarred for a period not less than 7 years”; and finally, “It’s over . . . sorry. I did like how the district court judges didn’t speak the entire time. Thanks for kicking out the SC Phil [sic]! Good call!”261 The bar association reprimanded the tweeting attorney, finding that her prediction was a misrepresentation of fact and law, implied that she had undue influence over the judges, disrespected a litigant, disrespected the judges, and prejudiced the administration of justice.262 This consequence of a mere reprimand seems inadequate to address such a breach. This behavior throws the legal system in disrepute because of the implication that a party involved in the proceeding was subject to a general bias and not able to obtain a fair outcome.

A new standard can remind lawyers that their online communications during a proceeding are inappropriate.

Communication via social media platforms by lawyers and court personnel constitutes "public communication." Lawyers must avoid extrajudicial statements via social media platforms that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

3. Rule 3.8: Extrajudicial Statements by Prosecutors

Rule 3.8 provides, “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused . . . .”263 There are already reported cases involving prosecutor tweets made during a trial. One case was based on these tweets: “I have respect for attys who defend child rapists. Our system of justice demands it, but I couldn’t do it. No way, no how,” and “Jury now has David Polk case. I hope the victim gets justice, even though 20 years late.”264 The appellate court that considered the prosecutor’s tweets did not decide whether they were improper since the real test is whether the trial was fair.265 However, the judge mentioned

261 Id. ¶ 15.
262 Id.
263 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). In addition to the Rule, thirty states have adopted a standard encouraging honesty. Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 717 tbl.3.
265 Id. at 696.
that the timing and content of the messages increased the likelihood that a jury would be tainted. \(266\) Aside from tainting the jury, providing information to the public that predicts a result or suggests facts not elicited in the evidence is covered by the intent of Rule 3.8. The question arises of whether prosecutors can risk posting anything on the internet relevant to any cases.\(267\)

A new standard can remind prosecutors that online social media communications are public, and thus there is great risk of abuse when commenting about an ongoing case. A standard might look like this:

Prosecutors should know that online social media posts are public extrajudicial comments. As such, prosecutors should ensure that their social media posts \(i\) do not have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and \(ii\) do not have a substantial likelihood of tainting a jury.

E. Rules 3.4, 4.1, 4.4, and 5.3: Abuse of the Research Process

Model Rule 3.4 requires parties to act in fairness during the discovery process.\(268\) This Rule originally addressed abusively large and detailed discovery requests intended to require excessive and unnecessary effort and expense of the other party.\(269\) This problem is vastly magnified with the ease of generating electronic requests and the vastly increased amounts of digitally stored data.

Something new and insufficiently addressed, however, are abuses involved with electronic fact research regarding opposing parties, opposing attorneys, judges, jurors, or witnesses. In a recent study, eighty-one percent of attorneys who responded used evidence from social media in their cases.\(270\) “Facebook was found to be the most popular source of evidence, with 66% of attorneys responding indicating that they had used evidence found on the site.”\(271\) Some argue that a lawyer who does not

\(266\) Id.
\(268\) MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
\(269\) Id. at cmts.
\(271\) Id. at 230.
take advantage of the vast new resources for discovery is guilty of malpractice.272 One court recently held that it was not only acceptable, but good practice, for attorneys to bring their laptops to the courtroom and conduct searches while potential jurors are being questioned.273 Because of the potential for online factual research, lawyers should warn their clients to post only truthful statements, encourage clients to avoid posting information that could be detrimental, and provide guidelines for taking down information.274

This vast body of potential evidence comes with the risk of various abuses. For example, some courts do not allow questions about political affiliations,275 but this information is often available on social media web pages.276 Some courts and commentators express concern that, when jurors know that lawyers use various means, especially online, to find information about jurors, some people would be discouraged from jury duty.277 Other issues involving research are even more serious.

Finding and using information that is publicly available online is legitimate.278 “Lawyers, just like everyone else, are

---

272 See, e.g., Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery Frontier, 66 BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2009, at 22, 26 (“[A]ttorneys should explore social networking sites as part of their formal and informal discovery efforts and case preparation. Just as it would be unthinkable nowadays to conduct discovery without considering what email evidence may be available, attorneys should give the same attention to social networking information to ensure that all smoking guns have been uncovered and addressed.”); Andy Radhakant & Matthew Diskin, How Social Media Are Transforming Litigation, 39 LITIG., Spring 2013, at 17, 18–19.


276 See Robert B. Gibson, Researching Jurors on the Internet—Ethical Implications, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Nov.–Dec. 2012, at 10, 12 (“Now, through the Internet, trial attorneys can obtain information about prospective jurors that would otherwise not be disclosed during voir dire, such as the juror’s political beliefs and economic philosophies.”).

277 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2012-02, at 9 (2012) (“[I]f jurors who understand that many of their social networking posts and pages are public may be discouraged from jury service by the knowledge that attorneys and judges can and will conduct active research on them or learn of their online—albeit public—social lives.”).

278 See, e.g., Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2005-164, at 453 (2016) (finding that accessing an opposing party’s public website does not violate the
freely permitted to search social media for information concerning a litigant and to view the information that is generally available to the public.”  

However, attempts to gain access to private social media accounts, blogs, and chat rooms are generally improper. This includes the actions of third parties at the direction of the lawyer.

Most lawyers are not experts in internet law nor do they carefully think through the implications of the Model Rules when applied to novel techniques. Lawyers should be warned about how easy and tempting overreaching is online and reminded that their behavior may be exposed even if lawyers believe they act anonymously. The implications of improper conduct affect the reputation of the lawyer personally and the legal system as a whole if their conduct is exposed.

The use of any kind of intentional deception to obtain advantage in the legal system should be strictly prohibited. A person who sees a communication not knowing it came from a lawyer or a person involved in a legal process cannot weigh the credibility of the information or recognize harmful strategic behavior. When doing research, lawyers must avoid making any communication with a judge or a person represented by counsel as covered by Model Rules 3.5(b) and 4.2. Ex parte communications of this sort, including “friending” in that context, are discussed further in subpart III.G.

1. **Friending**

Lawyers are tempted to send friend requests under their names but without disclosing the lawyers’ interest in a case given that some people accept friend requests indiscriminately. Several state and local bar associations have addressed friending specifically. The San Diego Bar Association concluded that “friending” potential witnesses without disclosing the purpose of the request is unethical, even when using a true name.  

Further, the Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Philadelphia Bar Associations have found that viewing the public portions of a Facebook profile is ethical, but requesting access to a private

---


 However, the New York City Bar Association reached a different conclusion. If a real name appears on the friend request, it is not making a false statement. “Consistent with the policy [in favor of informal discovery], we conclude that an attorney or her agent may use her real name and profile to send a ‘friend request’ to obtain information from an unrepresented person’s social networking website without also disclosing the reasons for making the request,” as long as it does not include any kind of misrepresentation. The opinion draws the following analogy:

[If a stranger made an unsolicited face-to-face request to a potential witness for permission to enter the witness’s home, view the witness’s photographs and video files, learn the witness’s relationship status, religious views and date of birth, and review the witness’s personal diary, the witness almost certainly would slam the door shut and perhaps even call the police.

In contrast, in the “virtual” world, the same stranger is more likely to be able to gain admission to an individual’s personal webpage and have unfettered access to most, if not all, of the foregoing information.

Unlike the opinion’s holding, this reasoning suggests that, because we are not as careful in granting friend requests as we are with opening our door even though the results could be similar, friending to garner evidence or private information is never proper.

Furthermore, regarding technology abuse in research, lawyers must be warned that directing someone else to do the research does not remove liability. Responsibility lies with the

281 N.H. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 2012-13/05, at 3 (“There is a split of authority on this issue, but the Committee concludes that such conduct violates the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct.”); Pa. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2014-300, at 8–9 (2014); Phila. Bar Ass’n, Op. 2009-02, at 3 (2009) (finding that directing a third party to friend a witness using only truthful information “omits a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to be allowed access to the witness’s pages is doing so only because he or she is intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to impeach the testimony of the witness”); see also Steven C. Bennett, Ethical Limitations on Informal Discovery of Social Media Information, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 484 (2013) (discussing a Philadelphia bar opinion).
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id.
lawyer even if an agent, employee, or other third party takes the action. Rule 5.3(b)-(c)(1) states:

(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the non-lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and

(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved.286

For example, while representing defendants in a personal injury lawsuit, two attorneys directed a paralegal to gather information about the plaintiff using the internet.287 The plaintiff’s Facebook page was initially public, and the paralegal accessed it multiple times.288 When the plaintiff’s profile became private, the attorneys directed the paralegal to continue to monitor the plaintiff’s social media activity by sending him a “friend request.”289 While the paralegal did not use a false identity, she also did not disclose that she worked for the law firm representing the defendants in the pending lawsuit.290 When the attorneys sought to introduce the paralegal as a trial witness and introduce documents from the plaintiff’s Facebook page, the plaintiff filed an ethical grievance complaint with the state ethics committee.291 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court did not directly decide whether the attorneys committed an ethical violation by requesting their paralegal to “friend” an opposing party, it did hold that the Office of Attorney Ethics could prosecute the alleged misconduct.292

While clients are not under the same obligations as lawyers and their employees, lawyers are obligated to advise clients to avoid overreaching, illegal or fraudulent conduct when trying to communicate with a party represented by counsel.293 Lawyers,

286 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(b)-(c)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 975.
293 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-461, at 5 (2011) (warning that lawyers must advise their clients that when communicating with other parties, they should not overreach or interfere with the other party’s client-lawyer relationship).
however, are fully responsible for using information improperly obtained by a client. Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court indefinitely suspended a lawyer for using information in a divorce case that was obtained by his client after guessing his wife’s email password.294

2. False Names and Identities

Most opinions so far focus on deceptive friending. Several Model Rules touch on misrepresentations. Model Rule 4.1 provides: “In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person.”295 Model Rule 4.4 provides: “[A] lawyer shall not use . . . methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”296 In addition, Model Rule 8.4 addresses fraud.297 Using subterfuge for purposes of gathering information is addressed in a variety of formal opinions.298 Even the New York City Bar Association held that using falsehoods to obtain evidence is unethical.299 “[F]or example, an attorney may not claim to be an alumnus of a school that she did not attend in order to view a juror’s personal webpage that is accessible only to members of a certain alumni network.”

In one example, a lawyer in a wrongful discharge action sought access using a false identity to the social media pages of a client’s co-workers in hopes of finding others who would make disparaging comments about the employer.301 One Pennsylvania county district attorney is currently facing disciplinary action for creating a fake Facebook page in an effort to gain information about defendants.302

---

294 In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759, 761, 764 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). One judge wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by one other judge, arguing that the attorney’s violation of various Model Rules warranted a suspension with no leave to apply for reinstatement for twelve months, rather than six months as in the majority. Id. at 764 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
295 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
296 Id. r. 4.4(a).
297 Id. r. 8.4.
298 See, e.g., Or. Bar, Formal Op. 2013-189, at 581 (2013) (“Lawyer may not engage in subterfuge designed to shield Lawyer’s identity from the person when making the request.”).
300 Id. at 8.
A particularly egregious case involves a forty-year-old former partner in a Bloomington, Illinois law firm. He undertook an eleven month cyber harassment campaign of a lawyer who had been opposing counsel in a prior matter. He set up a fake online dating profile of her, posted a false review about her to a database of legal professionals, and registered her to receive information from other organizations, such as Obesity Action Coalition, Pig International, and Diabetic Living.

Although a variety of similar deceptions likely occurred in cases before the internet, especially those involving private investigators, the simple and relatively costless methods of obtaining information online make this temptation significantly more powerful. In the real world, people do not generally give personal information to strangers indiscriminately, but people online are much less careful and lawyers should not abuse their misjudgment.

3. Entrapping Disclosures

Of even greater concern are attempts by a lawyer (or a lawyer’s agent or client) to direct the conversation on blogs, chatrooms, and other social media sites for the purpose of inducing comments or information that otherwise may not have been posted. In 2013, a prosecutor created a fake Facebook profile and, via the chat feature on Facebook, pretended to be the ex-girlfriend of a defendant in a murder case to get two witnesses to change their story about the defendant’s alibi.

Another issue with available technology involves recording conversations without the consent of all the parties to the conversation. In most state and federal jurisdictions, it is not illegal to secretly record a conversation as long as at least one party to the conversation (the party recording) has con-

---


304 See Dey, supra note 303; Ward, supra note 303.

sented.\textsuperscript{306} Although lawyers were forbidden historically by the ABA from making such recordings without disclosure to other parties, the ABA reversed this position in a 2001 formal opinion.\textsuperscript{307} It concluded that, although discouraged, secret recordings are not misconduct per se as long as it is not illegal to do so in a lawyer’s respective jurisdiction. “A lawyer who electronically records a conversation without the knowledge of the other party or parties to the conversation does not necessarily violate the Model Rules.”\textsuperscript{308} The previous opinion was based upon “the principle that a lawyer ‘should avoid even the appearance of impropriety.’”\textsuperscript{309} The ABA withdrew its previous opinion because an “overwhelming majority of states permit recording by consent of only one party to the conversation” and there may be legitimate reasons for making a record to avoid fraud.\textsuperscript{310}

Although the ABA changed its position, it continues to advise against recording exchanges with clients without their knowledge, and outright forbids any representation that a conversation is not being recorded when in actuality it is.\textsuperscript{311} With the ABA, most state bar associations discourage secret recordings and remind lawyers that the totality of circumstances surrounding the recording may suggest the lawyer has engaged in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Model Rule 8.4(c).\textsuperscript{312}

Sometimes lawyers, or even judges, show undue enthusiasm for recording devices. For instance, in New Mexico, the Attorney General has charged Magistrate Court Judge Connie Johnston in connection with recording telephone conversations involving multiple people, within secure, nonpublic areas

\textsuperscript{306} See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception . . . .”); AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2018); D.C. CODE § 23-542 (2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00 (Consol. 2018).
\textsuperscript{307} ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001) (replacing ABA Formal Opinion 337 which in part stated that “with a possible exception for conduct by law enforcement officials, a lawyer ethically may not record any conversation by electronic means without the prior knowledge of all parties to the conversation”).
\textsuperscript{308} Id. at 65.
\textsuperscript{309} Id. at 66.
\textsuperscript{310} Id. at 67.
\textsuperscript{311} Id. at 69–71.
\textsuperscript{312} See, e.g., Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’r on Grievances and Discipline, Informal Op. 2012-1 (2012); Utah State Bar Ass’n, Ethics Advisory Op. No. 96-04 (1997) (stating that it is not per se unethical to record conversations but describing circumstances where it would be).
of the courthouse without the participants’ consent.313 In Kansas City, a federal prosecutor lost her job at the U.S. Attorney’s office because she had listened to recordings of private conversations between a Leavenworth inmate and his lawyer provided by a private prison company.314 Lawyers must recognize that covert recordings bring many hazards.

4. **Hacking**

Some lawyers have superior technological skills. Bar associations should take the lead in warning them that gaining unauthorized access to another’s electronic communications and computers is not merely an ethical issue but is also illegal. In addition to prohibiting intentional interception during an electronic transmission without a court order,315 the Stored Communications Act makes it illegal to access electronic communications in an inbox, outbox or otherwise stored without authorization from the owner (or to intentionally exceed authorized access) and thereby obtain, alter, or prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic communication.316

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act317 makes unauthorized access to another’s computer for an improper purpose a crime. Subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) is surprisingly broad and, by its terms, makes it a crime to exceed authorized access of a computer connected to the internet without any culpable intent. Although some courts are unlikely to interpret minor violations as a crime,318 lawyers should stay well within the law when doing research on the case facts, parties, judges, or jurors.

The following is possible language addressing this concern for use in professionalism standards:

> Lawyers can and should search social media in the formal and informal discovery processes. However, lawyers should not seek to gain access to a private social media account by

318 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act does not extend to “violations of a company or website’s computer use restrictions”).
use of misleading statements or false names nor should they direct others under their control to do so. Even “friendring” the subjects of their inquiries without a clear disclosure of the lawyers’ identity and purpose can be misleading. Lawyers who comment online should avoid using potentially deceptive methods, such as false identities, to mislead others as to the source of online statements.

F. Rule 3.4(b): Coaching Witnesses

Another issue made critical because of electronic communications is sending messages to other participants during a proceeding. It seems to not fit well in any of the Model Rules. The closest is Rule 3.4(b), which prohibits assisting a witness to testify falsely.\(^ {319}\) Some professionalism creeds forbid lawyers from coaching witnesses or obstructing a deposition. Such language,\(^ {320}\) including direct reference to tweets and electronic chats during testimony, should be added to all creeds. When the Model Rules were written, improper coaching was hard to define and limited to discussion during preparation time or breaks, and rambling objections.\(^ {321}\) It would have been impossible for a lawyer to coach a witness in specific terms in real time.

Today, witnesses and lawyers can hold cell phones under a table and discreetly text a witness in a deposition or in trial, especially in video depositions. Technically, the Model Rules only address assisting false testimony; leading a witness to give responses that the witness did not come up with on his or her own is false and certainly misleading testimony.\(^ {322}\) For example, a lawyer in Michigan and his client in California exchanged five text messages while the client was being deposed via videoconference.\(^ {323}\) The only reason the exchange came to light is because the lawyer accidentally sent a text meant for his client to opposing counsel in New Jersey.\(^ {324}\)

\(^{319}\) Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct r. 3.4(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2013).

\(^{320}\) See Utah Standards of Professionalism & Civility r. 18 (2014). Six states have this standard. Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 721 tbl.7.


\(^{322}\) See Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (1995); Barber, supra note 321, at 58, 60.


\(^{324}\) Id.
Hopefully, the Model Rules will be amended to provide more specific coverage about inappropriate digital communication during testimony, but in the meantime, this temptation must be addressed in bar association standards. One option is to provide:

During depositions and testimony, lawyers should not obstruct the interrogator or object to questions unless reasonably intended to preserve an objection or protect a privilege for resolution by the court. “Speaking objections” designed to coach a witness are impermissible. This includes using technology to send any communication to, or receive any from, a witness, lawyer, or other participant. During depositions or conferences, lawyers shall engage only in conduct that would be appropriate in full sight of a judge.

G. Rules 3.5 and 4.2: Ex Parte Communications

Model Rules 3.5(a) and (b) prohibit ex parte communication with “a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law” and “with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order.”325 Model Rule 4.2 prohibits communicating directly with anyone represented by counsel.326 Recently, a district attorney was subject to disciplinary proceedings for texting with judges about pending cases without informing defense counsel and failing, during a subsequent investigation, to correct the judge’s assertion that he had not exchanged texts with her, even though he had sent her eighty-nine texts over a period of six months.327 Would a prosecutor and a judge have engaged in formal written communication without informing other parties? That seems less likely, but given the ease and ubiquity of digital communications, lawyers may fail to register the significance of texts although the ethical result is the same.

Not all improper electronic communications are so obvious as emails. Some lawyers may intentionally use electronic means to send “hints” and “thoughts” to persons covered by these Rules. Because of the increased risks and subtleties of electronic messaging, intentional and unintentional communication by social media must be directly confronted, defined, 

325 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(a)–(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
326 Id. r. 4.2.
and prohibited rather than relying on lawyers to register how such behavior might fit under Model Rules 3.5 and 4.2.

Recognizing the ease with which a lawyer can communicate with a juror online, the New York City Bar Association has urged lawyers to use extreme caution when researching jurors in the course of a trial. Its formal opinion warned, “[R]esearching jurors mid-trial is not without risk. For instance, while an inadvertent communication with a venire member may result in an embarrassing revelation to a court and a disqualified panelist, a communication with a juror during trial can cause a mistrial.” Several professionalism creeds include language addressing the prohibition on ex parte communications, but none implicate the heretofore impossible ways that a simple online click could constitute a communication. An affirmative attempt to engage in ex parte communications about a case through use of social media is clearly inappropriate, even if the facts and identities are veiled.

The ways in which messages can be communicated electronically are so varied, I discuss several of them specifically.

1. **Friending**

The subject of friending for purposes of research on parties, jurors, and witnesses is discussed in detail above in subpart III.E. In addition to the problems described in that subpart, using the various techniques of social media associations also risks violating the rules governing ex parte communications.

Sending a connection/access invitation (such as a “friend request” on Facebook) is widely regarded as a communication, even though it is simply a click of the mouse and no words are exchanged. The ABA’s Formal Opinion 466 states that, for purposes of Model Rule 3.5, a lawyer may review a juror’s or potential juror’s public postings but should not send a request for access to private sites, directly or indirectly. This applies to lawyers and to anyone acting on their behalf. The ABA offers an analogy for explanation:

---

329 Id.
330 See, e.g., Utah Standards of Professionalism & Civility r. 11 (2014) (“[L]awyers shall avoid impermissible ex parte communications”). Fourteen states mention this in their standards, in addition to it being a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 720 tbl.6.
331 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, supra note 32, at 4.
332 Id.
This would be the type of ex parte communication prohibited by Model Rule 3.5(b). This would be akin to driving down the juror’s street, stopping the car, getting out, and asking the juror for permission to look inside the juror’s house because the lawyer cannot see enough when just driving past.333 A New Hampshire Bar formal opinion reminds us that attempting to communicate, no matter how subtly, with a witness in the same matter involving a lawyer’s client is also an improper ex parte communication that implicates Model Rule 4.2.334

2. Follower Notifications

Some sites, such as LinkedIn, send a notification to users when a third party views their profile.335 This is relevant when a lawyer is researching a juror, represented party, or judge. Ethics opinions are split on whether this constitutes a communication.336 In a formal opinion, the ABA states that since the automatic notification is generated by the website, it “is akin to a neighbor’s recognizing a lawyer’s car driving down the juror’s street and telling the juror that the lawyer had been seen driving down the street.”337 The lawyer’s actions may seem invasive, discourage jury service, and suggest a threat. The New York City Bar Association adopted a broad definition of the

---

333 Id. (footnote omitted).
334 N.H. Bar Ass’n, Op. 2012-13/05, at 3 (2012) (“If the witness is represented by a lawyer with regard to the same matter in which the lawyer represents the client, the lawyer may not communicate with the witness except as provided in Rule 4.2.”).
335 However, the individual attorney can adjust his or her settings on LinkedIn to tailor what the user sees about the lawyer. See Who’s Viewed Your Profile - Privacy Settings, LINKEDIN, https://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/47992/ft/eng [https://perma.cc/H2CW-L4YG] (last visited Sept. 3, 2015). There are three options:
   Your name and headline (Recommended).
   Anonymous profile characteristics such as industry and title.
   You will be totally anonymous.
   If an attorney chooses one of the latter two options, however, the “Profile Stats” feature (which allows users to tell who has viewed their profile) will be disabled for the attorney’s account. Id. Essentially, if attorneys do not want that notification to the third party to contain any information about them, then they have to be willing to disable the setting that allows them to see who has been viewing their profile. In the ABA Techreport 2016, “76% of respondents report that they individually use or maintain a presence in one or more social networks for professional purposes. This number has also remained relatively steady since 2013.” Shields, supra note 80. Obviously, in a profession that is so dependent upon networking, disabling this feature on a personal account could be detrimental, and is therefore not a viable option.
337 Id.
LAWYERS’ ABUSE OF TECHNOLOGY

2018

word “communicate” and concluded that automatic notifications are a communication because “at a minimum, the researcher imparted to the person being researched the knowledge that he or she is being investigated.” Of course, researching opposing parties, the assigned judge, and a lawyer’s own clients is good practice. But attorneys must be cautious about the implications of any notice generated by the attorney that is conveyed to a third party.

One way to determine whether an online action should count as a prohibited “communication” is if the notification can be construed as an intentional effort to send a “message,” no matter how subtle. If this is the pertinent distinction, passively viewing a profile that automatically generates a notification is not a communication, but actively requesting a friend status is. Not all commentators make this distinction. But lawyers deserve better guidance on what is appropriate.

3. Public Posts Intended as Messages

Even if there is no communication targeted at a specific party, juror, judge, or witness, putting information out on the internet still may lead to a communication that raises ethical issues. A unique opportunity for public concern arises with lawyers’ online ability to communicate overt and covert messages through online postings that are likely to reach parties interested in a case. In some circumstances, tweeting falls into the prohibition against public communications by a prosecutor, discussed above in subpart III.D, as well as the prohibition on ex parte communications. In one example, a prosecutor tweeted updates before, during, and after a trial.

On appeal, the defense argued that the verdict should be overturned because the prosecutor’s tweets prejudiced the jury.
The appellate court did not find prejudice but voiced concerns that such actions could taint the jury:

> Extraneous statements on Twitter or other forms of social media, particularly during the time frame of the trial, can taint the jury and result in reversal of the verdict. We are especially troubled by the timing of [the prosecutor]'s Twitter posts, because broadcasting such statements immediately before and during trial greatly magnifies the risk that a jury will be tainted by undue extrajudicial influences.\textsuperscript{345}

This example serves to show that a lawyer making indirect communications may fail to assess the likelihood that online communications will spread beyond their intended recipients.

Currently, much of a lawyer’s correspondence is digital.\textsuperscript{346} As discussed above in Part II, one risk of digital information is accidentally forwarding an email, or “replying all,” without realizing a judge, court official, witness, or party is on the recipient list. Recall the example of a seasoned attorney who accidently sent an email with negative comments about the court to the chief judge.\textsuperscript{347} The judge treated the email as an improper ex parte communication.\textsuperscript{348}

A more subtle violation would be posting a copy of correspondence, or a summary of it, on a blog or social media site. The digitized image or text can easily be viewed by, or shown to, judges or members of the judge’s staff. As we discuss below, many lawyers and judges have connected on social media websites. Even if the judge is not likely to see the post, the lawyer may know that a friend or family member of the judge may see the post and pass it on. Traditionally, this kind of indirect communication would have required much more effort. A lawyer would have to start a rumor or give a copy to someone she believes will pass it on. Online, transmitting such information to anyone and everyone is fast, simple, and can include exact language. Many lawyers seriously underestimate how online posts and emails can be spread to potentially wide audiences. On the other hand, some lawyers may be fully aware of these patterns and intend to send a message to the judge through indirect means.

\textsuperscript{345} Id. at 695–96. Even though the court saw potential for harm with this behavior, it did not overturn the verdict because there was no evidence that the jury had been biased. See id. at 696.
\textsuperscript{346} LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
\textsuperscript{347} Patrice, supra note 110.
\textsuperscript{348} Id.
For example, after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Kennedy v. Louisiana*, a legal blogger found an error in the Court’s opinion. An attorney saw the blog post and mentioned it to his wife, a *New York Times* reporter, who then wrote a front-page story about the Court’s mistake. This eventually led to the court issuing an amended opinion, even though the outcome of the case was the same. Although in this instance the blogger was an attorney that was not representing either party in the case, it is not far-fetched to imagine a scenario where counsel for one of the parties posts something online about an ongoing case in hopes that the content gets back to the court. In high-profile Supreme Court litigation, this possibility is not too remote. SCOTUSblog, a popular Supreme Court blog, was accessed “over a hundred” times in one day from an IP address registered to the Court. This suggests that members of the Court or their staff are receiving the information included on the blog. Clearly, “the line between talking about the Court and talking to the Court” becomes blurred at times.

A standard can warn of the risks of ex parte communications:

Lawyers should be aware that communicating using digital mediums increases the risk of ex parte communications by inadvertently or intentionally sending a message or a copy of a correspondence to a judge or judicial staff through an indirect route online.

When conducting informal fact research online, lawyers should not do anything that might be interpreted as sending a message or ex parte communication to judges, jurors, identified witnesses, or represented parties. This includes a request to connect, “friending,” and other nonverbal actions that send a message to the recipient. It is always permissible to view publicly available information online. Since any online post has a potential of reaching unintended recipients, once a jury has been selected,

---

351 See id. at 1538.
352 See id. at 1539–40.
353 Id. at 1542 (“Of course, these visits could be from court personnel other than the Justices and their clerks, and some of the visits could be merely to peruse the court calendar or read coverage of a recently released decision. But a steady visitor to the site will be exposed to lists of cert petitions to watch, discussions of the filed briefs in various cases, and recaps of oral arguments, along with links to news stories or other blogs with similar material—all touching on the merits of pending litigation.”).
354 Id. at 1541 (emphasis added).
lawyers should avoid posts, tweets, and social media messages with content relevant to the case.

H. Rule 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law

Model Rule 5.5(a) includes: “A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction . . . .” Comment 4 adds, “Presence may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not present [in the jurisdiction].” A looming risk that accompanies the wonder of a webpage presence is the unauthorized practice of law. Related risks are misleading information about a lawyer’s services, discussed in subpart III.I, and violation of advertising regulations, discussed in subpart III.J. This subpart focuses on when a web presence constitutes practice in jurisdictions where the lawyer is not licensed. While the treatment of unauthorized practice is clear under the Model Rules, what virtual activities constitute the practice of law is enormously confusing. Lawyers need clear guidelines.

Any offer of legal advice online raises the risk of unauthorized practice. Webpages and online form services may constitute the practice of law in certain circumstances. Although this problem may seem obvious to some lawyers, other lawyers who set up webpages with legal information as a public service or as an inducement to attract clients seem to forget that a webpage reaches potentially every jurisdiction in the world. This issue becomes significantly more troubling when either the lawyer intends to attract non-residents or, when that is not the intent, the webpage is interactive and the host should have realized that an out-of-jurisdiction visitor to the website would rely on the posted information. For example, an appellate court in Indiana stated that attorneys consent “to the establishment of an attorney-client relationship if there is proof of detrimental reliance, when the person seeking legal services reasonably relies on the attorney to provide them and the attorney, aware of such reliance, does nothing to negate it.”

This hypothetical situation demonstrates the problem of giving advice online. When an Idaho resident felt his rights had been violated by the police, he turned to the internet for an

355 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014).
356 Id. at cmt. 4.
357 Geraghty & Michmerhuizen, supra note 224, at 571–72.
answer regarding how long he would have to bring a lawsuit in his jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{359} The answer was provided by a lawyer in Wyoming who told the Idahoan that he had one year to bring suit, which would have been accurate if the man lived in Wyoming instead of Idaho.\textsuperscript{360} However, when the man tried to bring his suit nine months later, he unpleasantly found out that the online advice he received was inaccurate for his jurisdiction, and that in Idaho he only had 180 days to bring his claim.\textsuperscript{361}

The lawyer in this hypothetical could and should have been more careful to identify the jurisdiction of the person to whom he or she was giving legal advice, rather than assume that the person was in the Wyoming jurisdiction. Furthermore, the lawyer in the hypothetical may not have even realized that a lawyer-client relationship can arise regardless of the residence of the questioner. If a lawyer’s statement regarding the statute of limitations had not been given in response to a question, it may still have created problems. Lawyers who give specific statements of law on a webpage may be inducing reliance and thus creating an attorney-client relationship and, if it is online and the applicable jurisdiction is not specified, the advice could be false and be malpractice.

This caution describes well the risks of creating a lawyer and client relationship online:

Lawyers should be cautious not to create an unintended attorney-client cyber relationship. Having a conversation via social media and offering legal advice in that manner is one way that this could happen. To the extent that social media involves two-way communication, the possibility exists that a lawyer might unintentionally form an attorney-client relationship through social media. Lawyers accordingly should avoid creating an impression that they are providing legal services with their social media when they do not intend to do so. Although lawyers may give legal information to members of the public, such information can be transformed into legal advice if the lawyer applies analysis of the law to the particular facts of an individual’s situation.

Having a conversation on social media might accidentally trap an attorney into being deemed to have provided legal advice to someone he did not think was his client. If an

\textsuperscript{359} This hypothetical is from Kristine M. Moriarty, Comment, \textit{Law Practice and the Internet: The Ethical Implications that Arise from Multijurisdictional Online Legal Service}, 39 \textit{Idaho L. Rev.} 431, 432–33 (2003).

\textsuperscript{360} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{361} \textit{Id.}
individual reasonably believes that a lawyer has undertaken representation, the lawyer can be liable for negligence in providing the legal service and be subject to disciplinary action.\textsuperscript{362}

Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) offers a safe harbor to mitigate the scope of the risk: “A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.”\textsuperscript{363} The D.C. ethics opinion however is quick to note that this model rule has not been adopted in every state, thus the caution for lawyers to do their due diligence in familiarizing themselves with surrounding jurisdictions’ rules.\textsuperscript{364}

To address this issue, the ABA Commission 20/20 proposed the following amendment to the Model Rules 5.5 Comments:

For example, a lawyer may direct electronic or other forms of communications to potential clients in this jurisdiction and consequently establish a substantial practice representing clients in this jurisdiction, but without a physical presence here. At some point, such a virtual presence in this jurisdiction may become systematic and continuous within the meaning of Rule 5.5(b)(1).\textsuperscript{365}

Unfortunately, this language was not adopted, apparently because of the fear that it would “chill cross-border practice.”\textsuperscript{366} This risk is serious even if the ABA chooses not to warn lawyers about it.

The problem is that webpages with legal advice are sprouting like mushrooms and attorneys are left without warning of the risks of creating a virtual presence in all the jurisdictions serviced by a webpage. Because practitioners with virtual offices can offer complete legal services, the foundational question arises of why licenses are required for having a physical office in a state.\textsuperscript{367} The ABA and bar associations cannot continue to ignore these issues.

\textsuperscript{362} Thomas Roe Frazer II, Social Media: From Discovery to Marketing—A Primer for Lawyers, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 539, 564–65 (2013) (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{363} MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014).
\textsuperscript{364} D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, at 5 (2016).
\textsuperscript{365} Initial Resolution by ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20-20 on Model Rule 5.5(d)(3)/Continuous and Systematic Presence, at 2–3 (Sept. 7, 2011).
\textsuperscript{366} Comments from N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Standards of Att’y Conduct on Ethics 20/20 Draft Reports Dated September 7, 2011, at 3 (Nov. 21, 2011).
Cases finding the unauthorized practice of law in an online context have already arisen. A California court acknowledged these issues when it held that “an out-of-state lawyer’s use of [electronic communications] could constitute unauthorized practice of law.”368 Other courts have also addressed virtual practice problems. A recent example is In re Brandes, where a New York appeals court held that a disbarred lawyer who provided service over the internet involving legal advice and contracting to draft briefs was engaged in unauthorized practice of law.369 The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that an operator of a website selling presentations on eviction law engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.370 Although the website operator in this case was not a lawyer, a licensed attorney offering similar services online could be deemed practicing in each jurisdiction where customers reside. A bankruptcy court in Montana ruled that the operator of an internet website through which debtors were advised of available exemptions and the site solicited information from debtors was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.371 In an unpublished opinion, the North Carolina Superior Court found that statements on a website included with a lien filing service constituted providing legal advice.372

In another example, the principal office of Low Cost Paralegal Services was in Texas, but its services were offered online to takers from other states.373 The Rhode Island Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee found that the operators of the webpage were engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, a finding affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.374 The court further recommended that its order be turned over to the attorney generals of Rhode Island and Texas, the North Carolina State Bar Association, and the federal agency with jurisdiction over internet-based fraud.375

368 Steven C. Bennett, Ethics of Lawyer Social Networking, 73 ALB. L. REV. 113, 128 (2009).
374 Id.
375 Id. at 1230.
The most notable case involved the legal forms offered by LegalZoom.com, Inc. After various law suits and appeals, a district court in Missouri held that the legal document preparation service on its website constituted the unauthorized practice of law. Some of the cases were settled and others were dismissed based on the settlement. In any event, lawyers with an online presence must carefully study which statements made and services offered constitute providing legal services and thus give rise to unauthorized practice claims in states where a lawyer is unlicensed.

The language of some state ethics rules can be interpreted to address virtual offices, but the results are inconsistent. For instance, Colorado allows lawyers from other jurisdictions to practice Colorado law, as long as they do not have a "domicile" or "a place for the regular practice of law" in the state. In Virginia, out-of-state lawyers can have an office in Virginia without a Virginia license as long as they do not practice Virginia law. This language seems to suggest that a virtual office may create the "systematic and continuous presence" for the practice of Virginia law even without any physical presence. These regulatory positions were not written to specifically cover online legal services and are inadequate to give lawyers sufficient notice on the extent to which an online presence is considered the practice of law within a state.

Other unauthorized practice-of-law issues arise when software designed to assist in legal matters is offered for sale online. Of course, nonlawyers who make these forms available or who use them may be engaged in unauthorized practice.

---

376 For more discussion of the various law suits involving LegalZoom and similar webpages, see Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological Change in The Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 583–85 (2014).


380 COLO. R. CIV. P. 205.1(I).

381 VA. ST. BAR RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5 cmt. 4 (2016).

382 Gillers, supra note 367, at 414 n.237.

383 An exception to the general rule exists in Texas. Texas took action to protect programmers of legal-use software, at least those who use conspicuous disclaimers, after a Texas court found software developers, whose program was
The users of legal forms generated by software are also at risk.\textsuperscript{384} Some commentators suggest all these problems can be avoided with a disclosure.\textsuperscript{385} A disclosure may be sufficient to warn a nonlawyer that general statements of the status of the law or the existence of a variety of legal options does not create an attorney-client relationship and such generalized statements should not be relied upon. It is far more difficult to argue that the offering of a form with specific legal language for specific purposes can be protected by a disclaimer. Action that contradicts the terms of the disclaimer invalidates the disclaimer. In addition, if the operator of such a website responds to a question or request from a nonlawyer, the disclaimer provides no protection. It is not the potential client’s job to self-screen based on a disclosure. Another option might be screening questions by asking the poster’s residence, but if the webpage itself contains advice without further interaction, screening is not a viable option.

The bigger problem, for purposes of this Article, is not nonlawyer programmers or users. It is the involvement of lawyers in drafting the forms, assisting in the creation of the software, and making a profit on the sale of the forms. They risk the creation of an attorney-client relationship in every state, since the webpage will be available to all, and can be sued for malpractice. Again, disclaimers are a good idea to aid in the prevention of family law disputes, to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999). Most states do not protect those who sell forms. Further, since a downloadable program can typically be obtained by residents of every state, even a Texas programmer is at risk in the forty-nine other states.

\textsuperscript{384} For example, an insurance agent used legal-based software to generate a fill-in-the-blank form which he then filled out to help his elderly neighbor make a will. Franklin v. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d 873, 875–76 (S.C. 2007). After the elderly neighbor’s death, her family sued Chavis for “engag[ing] in the unauthorized practice of law.” \textit{Id.} at 875. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Chavis had engaged in the unauthorized practice. \textit{Id.} at 876. “Even the preparation of standard forms that require no creative drafting may constitute the practice of law if one acts as more than a mere scrivener.” \textit{Id.; see also} Mathew Rotenberg, Note, \textit{Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Internet Legal Resources}, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709 (2012).

\textsuperscript{385} See, e.g., Bennett, \textit{supra} note 368, at 127 (“A lawyer may use disclaimers to reduce problems involving unauthorized practice of law . . . [stating] the state (or states) in which the attorney is admitted. Attorneys may take the additional step of asking potential clients about their residence before answering any questions or sending any messages.” (footnote omitted)); Jordana Hausman, \textit{Who’s Afraid of the Virtual Lawyers? The Role of Legal Ethics in the Growth and Regulation of Virtual Law Offices}, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 575, 587–89 (2012); Stephanie L. Kimbro, \textit{The Law Office of the Near Future: Practical and Ethical Considerations for Virtual Practice}, 83 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 30–31 (2011).
vention of inappropriate attorney-client relationships.\textsuperscript{386} Disclaimers must be conspicuous, easily understood, properly placed, and not misleading.\textsuperscript{387} A D.C. Bar ethics opinion puts disclaimers in context when it “reiterate[s] ‘that even the use of a disclaimer may not prevent the formation of an attorney-client relationship if the parties’ subsequent conduct is inconsistent with the disclaimer.’”\textsuperscript{388}

A professionalism creed should include the following:

Lawyers must recognize that a web presence is open to residents of other jurisdictions. Attorneys making specific statements of the law applicable to certain facts or answering questions online may create an attorney-client relationship. A lawyer giving legal advice or selling software to generate legal forms online must be licensed in all applicable states or undertake measures to screen potential clients’ residences. Lawyers must always ascertain the location of people with whom they electronically communicate before giving any legal advice via any electronic medium.

\textbf{I. Rule 7.1: Misleading Information about a Lawyer’s Services}

Model Rule 7.1 states: “A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”\textsuperscript{389} This restriction is related to, and overlaps some with, Rules 7.2 and 7.3, discussed in the next subpart, which directly addresses lawyer advertising, as well as Model Rule 8.4(e), discussed in subpart III.L, which addresses improper implications of influence.

Lawyers have historically used various mechanisms to mislead others about the nature or quality of their services. The internet has introduced ample additional cheap and easy opportunities for lawyers to make misleading assertions about themselves in a context that may or may not qualify as advertising. A New Jersey lawyer posted excerpts from court opinions that complimented his work.\textsuperscript{390} After a judge asked that

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{386} See Bennett, supra note 368, at 123; Kimbro, supra note 385, at 31.
\textsuperscript{387} See Browne-Barbour, supra note 184, at 572 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457, at 1–5 (2010)).
\textsuperscript{388} D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 2.
\textsuperscript{389} MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
\end{footnotesize}
his comment be taken down, the judge referred the matter to the New Jersey Committee on Attorney Advertising.\textsuperscript{391} The Committee subsequently issued a guideline forbidding the use of “a quotation or excerpt from a court opinion (oral or written) about the attorney’s abilities or legal services,” commenting that such statements are misleading.\textsuperscript{392} Such conduct could also fall under Model Rule 8.4(e) by suggesting that this lawyer can exercise improper influence over the quoted judge.

A recent D.C. Bar ethics opinion cautions lawyers to be careful in their social media posts regarding results of cases and information on clients “because [internet-based publications such as social media] have the capacity to mislead by creating the unjustified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others.”\textsuperscript{393}

One of the predominant features of the internet is the myriad of ways to collect and display rankings, reviews, and other kinds of feedback. Many businesses and professionals, including lawyers, have hired companies that specialize in writing and posting fake online reviews of their services.\textsuperscript{394} Fake reviews can be positive reviews that put one’s own services or firm in a good light, or they can be negative reviews intended to undercut other lawyers or retaliate against a judge.

Another infamous example involves a review posted by the CEO of a Fortune 500 company, Whole Foods Market.\textsuperscript{395} He used a fictional identity for eight years on message boards to praise his brand and disparage competitors.\textsuperscript{396} Lawyers with enough ego may well try the same scheme. For example, one small San Diego firm found itself embroiled in a suit with Yelp after allegedly soliciting fake reviews.\textsuperscript{397} Another concern is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{391} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{392} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{393} D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, at 3 (2016).
  \item \textsuperscript{394} Dominic Rushe, \textit{Fake Online Reviews Crackdown in New York Sees 19 Companies Fined}, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/23/new-york-fake-online-reviews-yoghurt?commentpage=1 [https://perma.cc/5HS7-CK8T].
  \item \textsuperscript{396} See id.
\end{itemize}
lawyers who pay real clients to write positive reviews for them on Google or other websites. Failing to state that the reviewers are paid or receive other forms of compensation is itself misleading. Pressuring ongoing clients to write positive reviews may be perceived as a condition of continued representation, and such reviews are not voluntary and thus their content is misleading.

As discussed in the next subpart, each jurisdiction may have slightly different rules about lawyer advertising that implicate testimonials. Some states do not allow testimonials or online reviews at all, which can cause problems for lawyers who use LinkedIn. Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 7.02(4) “prohibits comparisons to other lawyers’ services, unless substantiated by verifiable objective data.” A client writing a review on a lawyer’s page that says a particular lawyer is “the best trial lawyer in town” would be a violation of the rules because it is a prohibited comparison.

One unusual twist arose in a recent case involving a California lawyer who posted on her webpage photoshopped pictures of herself and various important politicians and celebrities including Barack Obama, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Ellen DeGeneres. The disciplinary body treated these photos as a method of making herself seem more important and connected than she really is. Similarly, such photos could suggest that she has improper influence with powerful government actors and may be willing to use that influence on behalf of a client.

Standards could include a provision that looks like this:

Lawyers should be wary of quoting out of context excerpts from court opinions that mention the quality or nature of a lawyer’s services since such statements may

398 Smith, supra note 56, at 7.
399 Id.
400 Id.
402 See id.
403 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law . . . .”). A more interesting question involves the lawyer who has authentic pictures of herself with various famous and powerful people, including judges. And consider the lawyer who includes on her Facebook page a picture of her and the judge for whom she clerked in a friendly embrace.
be misleading. Further, lawyers may not pay for online reviews or pressure clients to write reviews during an ongoing representation. Lawyers may never misrepresent their identities or write reviews of their own services online as such conduct is clearly misleading. Finally, lawyers should never use technology to misrepresent their legal services, their influence in the community, or their reputation.

J. Rules 7.2 and 7.3: Restrictions on and Requirements of Advertising

Rules 7.2 and 7.3 on advertising and solicitation of clients have been amended to refer to “electronic communication” along with other written and recorded communication.404 Rule 7.3 refers to “real-time electronic contact” along with in-person and telephone contact.405 Although lawyers may advertise through any kind of medium, Rule 7.2 provides in pertinent part that, “Any communication made pursuant to this Rule shall include the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content.”406 Lawyers wanting to garner clients will most likely display their name. Whereas office letterhead typically displays an address, social media posts or other forms of electronic communications are less likely to display an address. Presumably, a URL or Twitter moniker is not enough.

The most obvious problem with the advertisement regulations arises with online communications that the lawyer does not recognize as “advertisements.” The D.C. Bar warns that “any social media presence, even a personal page, could be considered advertising or marketing . . . .”407

The California Bar issued a formal opinion stating under what circumstances an attorney’s postings on social media websites would be subject to professional responsibility rules and standards governing attorney advertising.408 For example, in some states, creating a LinkedIn profile with testimonials is

404 Id. r. 7.2, 7.3.
405 Id. r. 7.3.
406 Id. r. 7.2(c).
a violation of advertising rules. Similarly, talking about case results on Twitter out of context may be deemed as soliciting clients. Webpages and blogs, like newsletters, largely consisting of “mundane advice” but including information on the lawyer’s practice areas and contact information are advertisements.

An interesting issue was raised by a firm that gave out free t-shirts with the firm logo and offered entry in a drawing for a prize to anyone who posted a picture on Facebook of themselves wearing the firm’s t-shirt. The ABA Commission determined that such a promotion pushed the lines of advertising and might violate existing ethics rules. One enterprising firm posted advertisements for their law services on the bulletin boards of thousands of online news groups. People in 140 different countries, some of which had laws prohibiting advertising by lawyers, viewed the advertisement. What seemed like an enterprising idea was not carefully considered.

For intentional advertising, lawyers should make certain that their social media advertisements comply with all applicable state rules. Some states may require keeping a copy of all social media posts for three years or giving the name and office address of the responsible lawyer or firm in the post itself. In Connecticut, “even a simple LinkedIn invitation to another user that links to a lawyer’s personal page describing his practice may be an advertisement subject to regulation.”

---


410 Id.


412 Lackey & Minta, supra note 136, at 160–61.

413 Id.


415 Id. at 309.

416 Lackey & Minta, supra note 136, at 158.

417 Id. at 158 n.57 (citing Ariz. Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 97-04 (1997)).

418 Id. at 159 n.59 (citing WASHINGTON RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(c) (2006)).

A New York ethics opinion forbids law firms from listing their services under the “specialties” section of LinkedIn, because under New York ethics rules, lawyers, but not law firms, can be certified as specialists. The D.C. Bar warns that lawyers should familiarize themselves with the ethical rules for social media and online resources not just in D.C., but also in the surrounding jurisdictions because some jurisdictions, such as Maryland and Virginia, have rules that allow for the discipline of lawyers that are not even admitted in their jurisdictions.

A standards provision might look like this:

At a minimum, lawyers need to ensure that intentional advertisements comply with local laws and rules. Lawyers should be aware that the advent of digital advertising allows them to advertise beyond state lines. As such, lawyers should be prepared to comply with regulations in other states to which they may be subject.

K. Rule 8.2: Disparaging Judicial and Legal Officials

Rule 8.2 provides:

A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.

A famous example illustrating the need for this rule involves a lawyer speaking on a talk show—although the same communication could just as easily have been made online. The lawyer “declare[d] war” on three court of appeals judges calling them “jackass[es]” and compared them to Adolf Hitler and other Nazis. Another lawyer on his blog called a particular judge an “evil, unfair witch,” who “is clearly unfit for her

---


421 D.C. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 5 (noting that although “jurisdictions, like New York, do not permit lawyers to identify themselves as ‘specialists’ unless they have been certified as such by an appropriate organization[,] [t]hey are . . . permitted to detail their skills and experience”).

422 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).

position and knows not what it means to be a neutral arbi-
ter."424 These are obvious violations.

Aside from a lack of civility, such comments erode public
confidence in the legal system and profession. First, most
readers may well believe that at least some toned-down version
of the allegations is factual. Second, many readers could per-
ceive the legal system as an ugly joke rather than a serious
place to resolve disputes. Although lawyers are free to criticize
judicial opinions in public, such criticisms should be profes-
sional and not personal. In recent years, the climate of public
discourse has so coarsened that public criticism of judges’
competency and neutrality has taken center stage.425

Language in a bar association’s standards might look like
this:

Lawyers may openly criticize judicial opinions. However,
such criticisms should always be professional and never a
personal attack on the person or the competence and bias of
the judge. Such criticisms damage the credibility of the law-
ner and bring the profession into disrepute. If the behavior of
a judge is subject to dispute, lawyers should refer the matter
to the appropriate regulating authority and avoid public
disclosure.

L. Rule 8.4: Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession

1. Rule 8.4(c): Fraud and Deception

Rule 8.4(c) offers a general statement advising lawyers to
avoid dishonesty in all its forms. It states: “It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”426 As
discussed elsewhere, many types of technoblunders involve
misleading others. The remainder of Rule 8.4 addresses addi-
tional specifics.

424 Steven Seidenberg, Seduced: For Lawyers, the Appeal of Social Media Is
Obvious. It’s Also Dangerous, 97 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2011, at 49, 50; see also John
Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,

425 For a discussion about President Trump’s disparagement of judges and
Justice Antonin Scalia’s biting and sometimes personal criticisms of his col-
leagues, as well as other social trends that lead to rude and uncivil language
within the profession, see Cheryl B. Preston, Professionalism in the Trump Era,
supra note 8.

426 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
2. Rule 8.4(e): Improper Implication of Influence

Rule 8.4(e) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law . . . .”\textsuperscript{427} This rule is directed to lawyers, but on occasion, judges lure lawyers into violations because they are not careful about their own behavior. This subpart focuses on lawyer-judge interactions that may give the impression that the lawyer has undue influence on the judge or that the judge is biased. It discusses judges’ friending and other social media relationships involving judges.\textsuperscript{428} Judicial conduct and technology has received attention from the ABA.\textsuperscript{429}

Issues relating to lawyers’ friending in the course of factual research are discussed in subpart III.E. Friending as a form of ex parte communications is discussed in subpart III.G. Issues relating to advertising and friending are discussed in subpart III.J.

A lawyer who is friends with or following a judge may use that fact to create the appearance of improper communications or relationships suggesting judicial bias.\textsuperscript{430} Such relationships may create an impression that the judges favor such attorneys or that the attorneys “are in a special position to influence the judge.”\textsuperscript{431} Such is why a Florida judge was disqualified in a criminal case when it was discovered that the judge was Facebook friends with the prosecutor.\textsuperscript{432} However, in a recent

\textsuperscript{427} Id. r. 8.4(e).
\textsuperscript{428} For detailed discussions of judges’ social media behavior, see John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487 (2014), and David Hricik, Bringing a World of Light to Technology and Judicial Ethics, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2014).
\textsuperscript{429} See ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 2 (“The judge should not form relationships with persons or organizations that may violate Rule 2.4(c) by conveying an impression that these persons or organizations are in a position to influence the judge.”).
\textsuperscript{430} The ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] judge shall act . . . in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.” MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
\textsuperscript{432} Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see also State v. Thomas, 376 P.3d 184, 198 (N.M. 2016) (cautioning against “friending” that can be misconstrued and “create an appearance of impropriety”); Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Reprimanded for Friending Lawyer and Googling Litigant, A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_reprimanded_for_friending_lawyer_and_googling_litigant/ [https://perma.cc/8KSE-823J] [noting that a North Carolina judge was reprimanded for
case, a Florida district court refused to disqualify a judge who was Facebook friends with a lawyer representing a party and a witness in the case, although it noted the earlier case in Florida reaching a different conclusion. The court stated that Facebook friending does not necessarily signify a close relationship.

Attitudes differ on judges and friending. Most official ethics opinions that address the issue do not condemn friending as *per se* improper. However, in a few states, ethics opinions state that lawyer-judge friending is prohibited. Whether or not judges should be allowed to friend lawyers, the mere presence of an online friendship can produce a variety of ethical problems. A Staten Island judge was transferred because he friended lawyers on Facebook, and the lawyers com-


435 See CHARLES GARDNER GETH ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 10.05[6] (Lexis Nexis, 5th ed. 2013). Compare Samuel Vincent Jones, *Judges, Friends, and Facebook: The Ethics of Prohibition*, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 281, 297 (2011) (“Whenever a judge permits a social media user to be a ‘friend,’ the judge risks violating this ethical standard because a potential consequence of [social media] ‘friending’ is that the [social media] user could use the [social media] ‘friendship’ with the judge to advance his or her personal or financial interest.”), with Bill Haltom, *If You Are a Judge, You Better Get a Dog*, 46 TENN. B.J., Feb. 2010, at 36 (offering a humorous rebuttal to the notion that “friending” between judges and lawyers is unprofessional and damaging).


437 Social Media and the Courts, *supra* note 436 (indicating that Florida, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma opinions state that judges may not friend attorneys that may appear in their court; California, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, and Ohio opinions state that judges may friend attorneys that may appear in their court).

A Florida judge was removed from a divorce case because she friended one of the parties. The litigant did not accept the friend request, and she feared that this offended and biased the judge against her.

In another example, a trial judge who sent a friend request to one of the parties in a divorce case was disqualified because sending the request placed the party in the position of accepting the invitation and engaging in improper ex parte communications or facing the reasonable fear that rejecting the request would offend the judge. Although these cases involve judges, who are subject to separate ethical rules, the rationales used in these cases may apply equally to a lawyer who accepts a friend request or who sends them to other lawyers or parties in the litigation.

Aside from friending, social media posts or other forms of electronic advertising may run afoul of Model Rule 8.4(e) because lawyers post pictures of themselves with judges or quote or restate praise given to them by a judge. One case that reached the Federal Circuit involved a lawyer from a big firm who circulated a praise-filled email received from a former chief judge. After the lawyer–recipient forwarded the email widely in connection with soliciting business, the lawyer was publicly reprimanded, and the judge resigned. The court held:

While the dissemination of complimentary comments by a judge contained in a public document would not itself constitute a violation of Model Rule 8.4(e), we conclude respondent’s actions violated the rule. First, the email both explicitly describes and implies a special relationship between respondent and then-Chief Judge Rader. The text of the email describes a close friendship between the two.

The lawyer may have had time to think in the process of retyping the words into an advertisement and mailing copies. But the ease of forwarding an email was too tempting.
A professionalism standard could include this language:
Lawyers should be very circumspect in requesting other lawyers and judges to indicate relationships on social media that may suggest any improper influence or potential lack of objectivity in resolving legal disputes even if the relationship was initiated by the judge.

3. Rule 8.4(d) and Rule 8.4(g): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice

Rule 8.4(d) is the catchall many judges and disciplinary councils use to punish a lawyer for bad behavior that is difficult to fit under one of the more specific Model Rules. It provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .” The Model Rules include a general statement requiring respectfulness in Rule 8.4(g), but the issue of civil discourse justifies more targeted attention.

a. Rude, Crude, and Inhumane Descriptions of Participants in the Legal System

Lawyers are sometimes crude and brutal in traditional written communications such as letters. This kind of language is often expressly covered by stated professional standards. The temptation to use disrespectful and vulgar language seems to be heightened in the fast and informal context of electronic communications. Even though mediums such as email invite offhanded and uncensored explosions and vitriol, hopefully lawyers can recognize that incivility in any communication to opposing counsel is subject to professionalism constraints. Examples abound. For instance, a lawyer in Ohio sent e-mails to the opposing party’s older brother, insulting and demeaning the entire family’s gene pool and calling the opposing party, a pro se litigant, an “anencephalic cretin’ with a ‘single operating brain cell’ whose ‘brain-dead ravings’ and ‘anal rantings’ were characteristic of the ‘lunatic fringe.’”

What may be less obvious are communications not intended to be seen by anyone other than those working on the case, or maybe family and friends. It has become increasingly easy and tempting for lawyers to criticize anyone—even their own clients—online, not realizing the implications of the online medium. In one instance, Steve Regan, an attorney at the

---

447 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
448 Butler Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Foster, 794 N.E.2d 26, 26 (Ohio 2003).
Pittsburgh office of Reed Smith, a big law firm, wrote on the Twitter feed of SCOTUSblog, which he mistakenly believed was the blog of the Supreme Court, “Don’t screw up this like ACA [Affordable Care Act aka Obamacare].” After SCOTUSblog tweeted back “Intelligent life?,” Regan replied, “Go [expletive] yourself and die.” His firm eventually stated “the posting of offensive commentary or language on social media is inappropriate and inconsistent with Reed Smith’s social media policy. We are addressing this matter internally.” In the heat of a tweet, people do not stop to think about how it will read in national news.

Even if the lawyer making the communication does not use names, context is frequently more than sufficient to reveal the targeted party. For example, an Illinois attorney lost her job when she posted in her blog about a judge referred to as “Judge Clueless.” She “thinly veiled the identities of clients and confidential details of a case, including statements like, This stupid kid is taking the rap for his drug-dealing dirtbag of an older brother . . . .” While she might have recognized the lack of professionalism in this language in a written letter, she did not expect her online comment to become as public as it was. Even communications intended for the private use of co-workers and family can be easily saved and then forwarded.

As discussed in Part II, online comments are likely to be read by more people than intended. The person who is criticized in an electronic communication is more likely to find out about the criticism than if the lawyer had expressed the criticism in a private conversation. Beyond the personal offense suffered by the victim, the injured party may experience damage to commercial, professional, social, and personal relationships stemming from any number of third parties who may harbor negative opinions about the victim.

Furthermore, electronic communications are forever. Even if something is “deleted,” the email or post can be preserved by

450 Id.
453 Id.
anyone who saw it before it was “deleted,” and the electronic memory of the transmission can be easily saved in a variety of ways. In May 2017, the ABA issued Opinion 477 that noted, “In the electronic world, ‘delete’ usually does not mean information is permanently deleted, and ‘deleted’ data may be subject to recovery. Therefore, a lawyer should consider whether certain data should ever be stored in an unencrypted environment, or electronically transmitted at all.” But no further guidance, standards, or advice is given.

Unfortunately, electronic mediums lend themselves to thoughtless outbursts. Worse, lawyers may believe they are posting anonymously, give sway to their coarser natures, and then discover that their identity can be traced and their content never disappears.

A possible civility standard to address these issues might state:

Lawyers should be respectful to all participants in the legal system and avoid vulgarity, personal insults, name calling, and other uncivil language. A lawyer should be cautious of memorializing in written electronic communications comments that are unprofessional and patently offensive regarding any person involved in a litigation or negotiation.

b. Disrespecting Opposing Counsel, Opposing Clients, and Others

Some states have adopted standards explicitly relating to communications to opposing counsel, in addition to a general

454 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
456 See supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text.
457 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 382, 385 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “a person who is required to put his name to a document is much less likely to lie than one who can lie anonymously” and that anonymity “facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability”); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 140 (2007) [concluding that “anonymous, people are often much nastier and more uncivil in their speech[ ] [because it] is easier to say harmful things about others when we don’t have to take responsibility’’]; Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642–43 (1995) [noting anonymous or pseudonymous postings “relieve[ ] their authors from responsibility for any harm that may ensue[ ] [and that] [t]his often encourages outrageous behavior without any opportunity for recourse to the law for redress of grievances”).
458 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
statement requiring lawyers to treat all others with dignity. Specifically, some standards forbid: imputing improper motives to an adversary without a factual basis; embarrassing or personally criticizing another attorney; attributing a position not taken to an adversary; and impugning an adversary’s character, intelligence, or morals. Online, lawyers sometimes make disrespectful statements about other lawyers and participants in the legal system in communications directed to third parties. Nonetheless, the target often discovers the communications directed to others. Even if undiscovered by the target, such postings can poison the well for judges, jurors, and the public who are exposed to the post.

In one example, the lawyer may have believed his email to opposing counsel seemed innocuous or even humorous at the time, but the Missouri Supreme Court found it to be a violation of Model Rule 8.4(d). After a contested hearing, the lawyer sent the following email: “Rumor has it that you are quite the gossip regarding our little spat in court. Be careful what you say. I’m not someone you really want to make a lifelong enemy of, even though you are off to a pretty good start.”

While the target of the criticism may deserve reprimand, the lawyer involved in a particular case should not be making judgment in an effort to intimidate, harass, or demean others involved in the suit. In a heated and pending domestic dispute, the mother’s attorney sent an email directed to the father’s attorney reciting details of his daughter’s drug dealing in a dangerous neighborhood and suggesting the father should take more seriously his daughter’s behavior. The recipient’s wife (who, coincidentally, was also an attorney) read the email and

---

459 Twenty-two states have adopted at least one of these standards urging respect towards other attorneys. Preston & Lawrence supra note 11, at 718–19 tbls.4 & 5.
460 Id.
461 In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
462 Id. at 761.
463 In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633, 636 (S.C. 2011). The email text reads: “I have a client who is a drug dealer on [ ] Street downtown [sic]. He informed me that your daughter, [redacted] was detained for buying cocaine and heroine [sic]. She is, or was, a teenager, right? This happened at night in a known high crime/drug area, where alos [sic] many shootings take place. Lucky for her and the two other teens, they weren’t charged. Does this make you and [redacted] bad parents? This incident is far worse than the allegations your client is making. I just thought it was ironic. You claim that this case is so serious and complicated. There is nothing more complicated and serious than having a child grow up in a high class white family with parents who are highly educated and financially successful and their child turning out buying drugs from a crack head at night on or near [ ] Street. Think about it. Am I right?”
reported the sending attorney for discipline.\textsuperscript{464} The Supreme Court of South Carolina issued a private letter of caution\textsuperscript{465} and dismissed the sending attorney’s claim that the bar’s civility oath was an unconstitutional limit on his First Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{466} Litigants do have a First Amendment right to be tacky, but lawyers cannot similarly conduct themselves in this way under the professionalism and civility constraints of the profession. Allowing egregious incivility to persist under the banner of freedom of speech would be a disservice to the profession. The South Carolina Supreme Court put it this way:

The State has an interest in ensuring a system of regulation that prohibits lawyers from attacking each other personally in the manner in which [the sending attorney] attacked [the receiving attorney]. Such conduct not only compromises the integrity of the judicial process, it also undermines a lawyer’s ability to objectively represent his or her client.\textsuperscript{467}

Lawyers are asked to report to the relevant bar association misconduct of other lawyers, and doing so through the established system is an appropriate way to seek improvement in the legal profession.\textsuperscript{468} However, a malicious online attack on an individual lawyer or firm is inappropriate. A judge or bar association, at least, can request and receive evidence and may refuse to take any action against the allegedly misbehaving attorney if there is not enough evidence to prove liability. The public, however, cannot request or receive evidence and may not be as careful about refraining from punishing a lawyer for unsubstantiated claims. Members of the public may choose not to go to a certain lawyer or firm based on malicious information they found online about that lawyer or firm, and thus the attacked firm or lawyer can lose clientele, even if the attack was unsubstantiated or completely false.

Last year, a lawyer sued the former spouse of a divorce client because he wrote a negative review of the lawyer on Google Plus.\textsuperscript{469} The review said the lawyer worked for an “exceptionally unethical law firm . . . .”\textsuperscript{470} The former spouse was

\textsuperscript{464} Id.
\textsuperscript{465} Id. at 638.
\textsuperscript{466} Id. at 637–38.
\textsuperscript{467} Id. at 638.
\textsuperscript{468} Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 8.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2013).
\textsuperscript{470} Id.
not a lawyer, but such comments could be posted by lawyers who falsely believe they are acting with anonymity. The perception that lawyers are lacking in moral and competency qualities by attacking, insulting, or demeaning others online erodes the public’s faith in the legal system.

c. Creation, Use, and Storage of Improper Electronic Content

In addition to sex discrimination implications, some behaviors involving sexually explicit materials bring the profession into disrepute, and often, these behaviors involve the internet. For instance, one would imagine that lawyers recognize that using electronic communications to request sexual services as pay is inappropriate, but not everyone gets the message.471 One lawyer persistently pressured in a series of emails a third-year law student who had worked for him for only a few weeks to provide sexual favors as a condition of keeping her job.472

One East Texas chief judge deleted his social media information and resigned rather than give up his records or produce his phone in an investigation of sexting allegations.473 He claims he gave his phone to “charity.”474 While serving in his official capacity as vice chairman of the State Commission for Judicial Conduct, he sent sexually explicit messages to a woman who responded to his friend request.475 She employed a private investigator to pursue the matter.476 The investigator found and turned over photos and more than a thousand sexu-

---


474 Id.


476 Id.
ally explicit messages, many of which were verified by a local television station.\textsuperscript{477}

Another issue implicating Model Rule 8.4 involves using the internet to access or store illegal or even unregulated sexually explicit content. Disciplinary actions have been brought against judges, district attorneys, and other governmental lawyers for excessive use of pornography on government-owned computers, using government-provided internet access, or on government time. In \textit{In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beatse}, pornography was found on an assistant district attorney’s state-provided computer.\textsuperscript{478} An investigation ensued which found that he had been spending massive amounts of time looking at pornography.\textsuperscript{479} He had originally lied and said that it was his son who had been looking at the pornography on his computer.\textsuperscript{480} He also sent a number of sexual email messages to various people, including two government employees, one of whom was a court reporter.\textsuperscript{481} Some of the emails described looking at and touching the breasts of government employees.\textsuperscript{482} He admitted to having lied about the emails and the pornography, and he was publicly reprimanded.\textsuperscript{483}

Some judges have been disciplined for sexually harassing or sexting staff or attorneys, even if the sexual exchanges were voluntary. In 2014, a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was ousted after sending pornographic emails to contacts in the Attorney General’s office.\textsuperscript{484} In another case, the court approved a stipulation for the retirement and public reprimand of a judge who was accused—along with failing to disclose a juror written communication and engaging in inappropriate conduct towards two female attorneys—of habitually viewing pornographic images on his courthouse computer.\textsuperscript{485} The court pointed out that this caused numerous viruses to infect his computer, that personnel were exposed to

\textsuperscript{477} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{478} \textit{In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beatse}, 722 N.W.2d 385, 386–90 (Wis. 2006).
\textsuperscript{479} \textit{See id.} (noting that the attorney had spent thirty-six hours browsing pornographic websites).
\textsuperscript{480} \textit{Id.} at 387.
\textsuperscript{481} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{482} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{483} \textit{Id.} at 388–89.
\textsuperscript{485} \textit{In re Downey}, 937 So. 2d 643, 645–49 (Fla. 2006).
the pornography when coming to repair the computer, and that the judge ignored requests to stop issued because his actions were threatening to infect the entire courthouse computer system with unwanted computer viruses.\footnote{Id. at 645–46.}

4. Rule 8.4(g): Discrimination and Prejudice

Model Rule 8.4(g) forbids a private attorney to make public comments that are racist, sexist, or that express negative group stereotypes.\footnote{MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).} Although few current statements of professionalism expressly warn about such bias, all bar associations should include a charge against comments that further racial, sexist, or other biases. Lesley M. Coggiola, disciplinary counsel for the South Carolina Supreme Court, reported that she has seen lawyer posts online that are degrading to various classes of people, and argues that the lawyers behind such posts should be sanctioned for "bringing the profession into disrepute."\footnote{G.M. Filisko, You're Out of Order!: Dealing with the Costs of Incivility in the Legal Profession, 99 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2013, at 35, 37; see also Christina Parajon Skinner, The Unprofessional Sides of Social Media and Social Networking: How Current Standards Fall Short, 63 S.C. L. REV. 241, 258 (2011) (noting a Texas judge’s comments that lawyers were “on the verge of crossing . . . ethical lines when they complain about clients and opposing counsel” in social media posts).} She noted that one of her ongoing cases involved a lawyer’s blog that she described as “vile.”\footnote{Filisko, supra note 488, at 37.} The blog is “insulting everybody from Hispanics to women to ‘midgets.’”\footnote{Id.} According to Coggiola, “technology is cited most often as the foundation for boorish behavior.”\footnote{Id.} The serious issues they have had, she explains, “[a]re all related to social media.”\footnote{Id.}

Various examples abound. A lawyer at a large law firm was unveiled as having posted misogynistic lyrics online.\footnote{LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 123 (2012).} Although the poster likely believed he or she was anonymous or speaking to a close and trusted group, the posting was exposed and the poster was fired.\footnote{Id.} But the consequences do not stop there. Those who associated those lyrics with a lawyer and those who read about it in the press retain an association of such attitudes with lawyers.\footnote{Cf. Filisko, supra note 488, at 37 (discussing how unprofessional conduct can bring the legal profession into disrepute).}

\footnote{486 Id. at 645–46.} \footnote{487 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).} \footnote{488 G.M. Filisko, You’re Out of Order!: Dealing with the Costs of Incivility in the Legal Profession, 99 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2013, at 35, 37; see also Christina Parajon Skinner, The Unprofessional Sides of Social Media and Social Networking: How Current Standards Fall Short, 63 S.C. L. REV. 241, 258 (2011) (noting a Texas judge’s comments that lawyers were “on the verge of crossing . . . ethical lines when they complain about clients and opposing counsel” in social media posts).} \footnote{489 Filisko, supra note 488, at 37.} \footnote{490 Id.} \footnote{491 Id.} \footnote{492 Id.} \footnote{493 LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 123 (2012).} \footnote{494 Id.} \footnote{495 Cf. Filisko, supra note 488, at 37 (discussing how unprofessional conduct can bring the legal profession into disrepute).}
While online comments on message boards, social media, and emails may not immediately be seen as “public comment,” the ease of spreading such comments to unintended readers and even the press argues for more explicit regulation. Such statements are detrimental to the perception of the profession and legal system. For example, underrepresented groups might be discouraged from using the legal system to resolve disputes, fearing that the biases of lawyers and judges make it unlikely they will receive fair treatment. Members of the maligned group may believe that their treatment in prior cases was unfair, and thus, they are justified in disobeying court orders or not paying judgments.

While bias reflects poorly on all of the profession, the problem is even worse if a judge or other public official is the source of the electronic communication. Judge Cebull, a federal judge, forwarded a seemingly racist email about President Obama to some of his close friends. After the email came to light, a commission investigating its impropriety uncovered many more emails laced with “disdain for African Americans, Latinos, women and various religious faiths.” Highlighting the problem in this case, the panel observed, “The racist and political [email language] reflects negatively on Judge Cebull and on the judiciary and undermines the public trust and confidence in the judiciary.”

Professionalism standards could state:

Lawyers should not express through electronic or other media sources bigotry, prejudice, or disdain for any class of people. Such behavior brings the legal profession into disrepute and weakens the confidence of the public in the fairness and efficacy of the judiciary.

CONCLUSION

As the recent ABA’s Commission 20/20’s failures amply illustrate, the ABA cannot be expected to address the risks of technology within any reasonable time. Moreover, the Model Rules acknowledge that they do not “exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, . . . [they]
simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law."499 Increasing pressure on the ABA to shore up the Model Rules is essential. In the meantime, however, bar associations must take action now.500 One option is formal ethics opinions that lawyers can research by jurisdiction, if the lawyer is alert enough to ask questions. A better option is a statement of best practices standards adopted by state, local, and practice group bar associations. Professionalism creeds address a more expansive range of behavior, but most are aspirational, meaning violators are not subject to formal discipline affecting their standing to practice law. New professionalism creeds must be adopted, integrated into lawyer education, and subject to enforcement. The legal profession, and the society it serves, deserves a clearer statement of moral ground in technology use.

Professor Chaffee suggests that aspirational standards can be implemented "with broad moral language and a high moral tone to engage with the emotions and intuitions of those practicing law and to play upon the intuitions and emotions of those interacting with lawyers to make them believe that they are being treated fairly."501 The importance of ensuring those who interact with lawyers believe they are being treated fairly is largely underestimated by the legal community. If the Model Rules and professionalism standards fall short of society’s expectations because attorney behavior seems “intuitively wrong or elicits negative emotions,” the legitimacy of the profession is threatened.502 The lack of stated moral standards relating to an issue as important as technology and social media abuses “creates an incentive for those outside of the legal profession to begin to interfere with the self-regulation of the profession, which may have negative consequences if it is done in an unsophisticated way.”503

As outrageous examples of attorney abuses of technology continue to make headlines, the public may form the opinion that attorney conduct is not sufficiently regulated and urge

500 For a discussion of the role of law schools in the professionalism crisis and how they can take concrete steps to educate law students better, see Cheryl B. Preston, Professionalism in the Trump Era, supra note 8.
502 Id. at 358.
503 Id.
lawmakers to impose external regulation on the profession.\textsuperscript{504} Rules backed by legislation will undoubtedly be more difficult to change and less attuned to realities of the practice than the Model Rules. The profession itself can no longer ignore lawyer abuses of technology.

\textsuperscript{504} Professor Chaffee recalls how this very thing happened with business conduct in the wake of the Enron scandal. \textit{Id.} at 358–60. Frustrated American people successfully urged Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; there were many regulations in the Act that addressed attorney ethics, which were previously regulated by the American Bar Association. \textit{Id.}