NOTE

REANALYZING REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS:
A SOLUTION TO THE PATENTEE’S DILEMMA

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INTRODUCTION

A brand-name drug company invests a considerable amount of
money and resources in developing a pioneer drug. It then success-
fully obtains patents, files with the Food and Drug Administration

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(FDA), and markets the drug. Later, the company files a patent-infringement lawsuit against a company that tries to market a generic form of the drug.1 Faced with the prospect of a tedious litigation marathon and the risk of losing its patents, the brand-name company often settles with the alleged infringer. Strangely, instead of receiving any compensation from the alleged infringer, the brand-name drug manufacturer pays the alleged infringer to stay out of the market until the patents expire.2 The problem that this presents is far from being settled: regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may challenge such settlements as illegal under the antitrust laws.3 Now what can the brand-name drug manufacturer do? Continue with litigation? Settle with the alleged infringer and subject both of them to the antitrust sanction? Or allow the alleged infringer to market its generic drug? None of these options seem appealing, locking up the company in a predicament.

This oversimplified story depicts what I call the “patentee’s dilemma,” which was created after Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (HWA).4 Under the HWA, a generic pharmaceutical company can challenge a pioneer manufacturer’s patents on the brand-name drug by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA.5

The HWA was enacted with the primary purpose of promoting generic drugs’ entry into the pharmaceutical market so as to increase competition and to lower drug prices.6 But Congress did not anticipate that the HWA would lead to the creation of “reverse payments.”7 Specifically, the ANDA filing usually triggers a lawsuit brought by the

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2 Id.

3 See infra Part II (explaining the FTC and DOJ’s position on the issue).


5 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (listing the requirements for applicants that seek to challenge a pioneer manufacturer’s patent).


7 Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 87 (stating that the DOJ “assumes that [Congress’s scheme under the HWA] does not anticipate, and is upset by, the existence of reverse payments”).
brand-name drug company against the generic drug company for patent infringement. Contrary to the common understanding of a judicial settlement, where the infringer pays the patentee to end the lawsuit, the brand-name drug company (the patentee) usually pays a large amount of money to the generic-brand drug company (the alleged infringer) to keep the generic drug out of the market. This practice of settling a patent-infringement lawsuit is called reverse-payment settlement. This allows the brand-name drug company to keep its exclusive monopoly over the patented product.

The practice of making reverse payments raises antitrust concerns. Both consumer groups and the FTC often file antitrust lawsuits against parties that settle in post-HWA litigation. These antitrust lawsuits created a federal circuit split, resulting in the Supreme Court rendering a decision on the issue in June 2013.

On the one side, the Sixth Circuit claimed that such reverse payments are per se illegal. Similarly, the Third Circuit decided that the payments are presumptively illegal unless the defendant can show that “the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.” The court held that this presumption of illegality could not be rebutted by proof about the merits of the patent suit because the reverse payment itself indicated that the purpose was to delay entry.

On the other side, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits recognized the need to evaluate the strength of the patent, holding that reverse-payment settlements violate antitrust law only if the settle-

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9 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 60 (describing reverse-payment settlements as settlements in which a payment is made from the patent holder to the alleged infringer). There can be other types of consideration or side deals as well, such as a nonexclusive licensing. See id. at 119.

10 See id. at 61 (suggesting side deals between patent holders and ANDA filers have an anticompetitive effect).

11 Id. at 60–61.

12 Id. at 60.


15 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2003).

16 In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.

17 Id.
ment exceeds the exclusionary “‘scope of the patent’s protection.’”18 Unless the patent was a sham or procured by fraud, reverse-payment settlements were illegal only if the settlement extended the patent monopoly, such as by “restraining the introduction or marketing of unrelated or non-infringing products.”19

The Supreme Court, however, took a middle ground position in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. With a heated dissent from Chief Justice John Roberts, the majority rejected the scope-of-the-patent test, announcing that the potential anticompetitive effect of the reverse payment could not be immune from antitrust law scrutiny.20 The Court adopted a rule-of-reason analysis, leaving the construction of the analysis open to the lower courts.21

Reverse payment has also been a popular topic of discussion among scholars.22 For example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. Lemley propose that reverse-payment agreements are presumed illegal unless the brand-name drug company can prove “(1) that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than the expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit.”23 In contrast, Daniel Crane proposes that such agreements should be presumed lawful and that the burden of proving unlawful conduct should fall on the shoulders of the plaintiff in the antitrust suit.24 Unsatisfied with both of these approaches, Henry Butler and Jeffrey Jarosch suggest a rule-of-reason analysis and discuss a list of factors that a court ought to balance when analyzing the reverse-payment issue.25 David Opderbeck advocates the importance of market power in an antitrust analysis and proposes a refined model of a “Settlement Competition Index,” which creates a safe harbor for certain agreements and sets a threshold for per se illegal violations.26

19 In re Tamoxifen Citrate, 466 F.3d at 213.
20 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230–31.
21 See id. at 2237.
22 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 101–14 (introducing different scholarly views).
25 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 114–18.
After the *Actavis* opinion, commentators believe that the Court has taken an antitrust-centric approach, brushing away the issue of patent validity.\(^{27}\) Some commentators go even further, interpreting the opinion as announcing a de facto presumptive illegality rule.\(^{28}\)

In this Note, I analyze the current debates on the reverse-payment issue and ultimately reject the de facto illegality presumption. In light of *Actavis*, this Note proposes a solution to the predicament that parties face in reverse-payment settlements. The proposed model is distilled from the aforementioned judicial decisions, academic debates, and recent developments in antitrust analysis on tying arrangements. Under the proposed model, an antitrust plaintiff challenging a reverse-payment settlement needs to prove three factors to establish an affirmative case of anticompetitive harm: (1) the patent holder has strong market power; (2) the settlement amount or other considerations are not justified; and (3) the potential enforceability of the patent is low.\(^{29}\) If a plaintiff meets this burden, a court should then weigh the procompetitive benefits of the settlement against its anticompetitive harm. Even if lower courts read *Actavis* as not requiring plaintiffs to prove lack of patent enforceability, they should allow the antitrust defendants to offer patent strength as a justification for the payment.\(^{30}\)

Part I of this Note introduces the background of the HWA and reverse-payment settlements. Part II analyzes the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s opinion in *Actavis*. Part III summarizes some scholarly debates and proposals. Part IV proposes a model to analyze the issue based on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Actavis*.

I

**Background of the Hatch-Waxman Act**

Congress enacted the HWA: “(1) to reduce the average price paid by consumers; (2) [to] preserve the technologies pioneered by the brand-name pharmaceutical companies; and (3) [to] create an abbreviated new drug application (‘ANDA’) to bring generic drugs to the market.”\(^{31}\) The HWA was designed to strike a balance between encouraging innovation by pioneers and promoting competition by the generic followers.\(^{32}\) However, its special procedural settings have created particular settlements between brand-name drug companies and generic-brand challengers in patent litigation where the brand-name


\(^{29}\) See infra Part IV.

\(^{30}\) See infra Part IV.

\(^{31}\) Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).

drug manufacturers may keep their monopolistic market status by paying the generic-brand drug companies to stay out of the market. As a result, drug prices remain at “supracompetitive” levels, and consumers do not get the benefit of lower prices, raising antitrust concerns.

Under the HWA, the pioneer pharmaceutical company that first launches a prescription drug must obtain FDA approval. In order to do so, it must submit a New Drug Application (NDA) that includes details of efficacy and safety from studies. These clinical studies may take a long time and are very costly for pharmaceutical companies. After approving the application, the FDA publishes the drug’s patent information in its famous Orange Book. The HWA gives NDA filers certain nonpatent exclusivities, one of which is the New Chemical Entity (NCE) exclusivity, which bars a generic drug company from filing an application for approval of a generic drug until five years after the first approval of the relevant NDA.

The HWA allows a generic pharmaceutical company to file an ANDA without conducting clinical trials. The company only needs to prove bioequivalence between the generic drug and the brand-name drug. The FDA also requires the generic pharmaceutical company filing an ANDA to certify:

(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted...

Most of the reverse-payment cases involve filers who certify that the patent is not valid or not infringed upon, known as a Paragraph IV certification. A generic drug company may file an ANDA with a Par-

33 This process is also known as “pay-for-delay.” Id. at 1557.
36 Id. § 355(b)(1).
40 One exception is Paragraph IV filers, who are barred for only four years. Id.
41 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).
43 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
agraph IV certification four years after the first NDA approval, despite the five-year bar provided by the NCE exclusivity discussed above. 45

Under the HWA, this ANDA filing with a Paragraph IV certification constitutes constructive patent infringement, even if the generic drug has not been marketed for sale. 46 The filer must also notify the patent holder, the brand-name manufacturer, who will usually bring a patent-infringement lawsuit against the ANDA filer. 47 If the patent owner does not bring the lawsuit against the ANDA filer within forty-five days, the FDA can approve the ANDA without further delay. 48 If, however, the patent owner brings the lawsuit, the ANDA is automatically stayed for either thirty months or until a district court renders a decision regarding the validity of the patent. 49

The HWA awards the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer a 180-day exclusive-entry period, making the market a duopoly of the first ANDA filer and the brand-name drug company. 50 However, subsequent ANDA filers cannot enjoy an equivalent 180-day exclusive-entry period, an effect known as the “bottleneck” effect of approval. 51 This

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45 Id. This provision also creates the possibility of multiple “first filers” on the four-year anniversary of FDA approval of an NDA subject to New Chemical Entity exclusivity. See infra note 50.


48 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).

49 Id.

50 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Hemphill, supra note 32, at 1560. In fact, “duopoly” may not be an accurate word under certain situations. The term “first ANDA filer” refers to all of the applicants who submit substantially complete ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications on the same day that is earlier than any other ANDA filing. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb). Multiple ANDA applicants may hold exclusivity concurrently on the same drug if they each apply on the same day and file Paragraph IV certifications concerning at least one of the Orange Book–listed patents for that drug. This most commonly occurs when multiple applicants file ANDAs on the four-year anniversary of FDA approval of an NDA subject to the NCE exclusivity. See id. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii) (allowing actions to commence beginning forty-eight months after the approval date of an application filed under § 355); see also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2246 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A]ccording to the Food and Drug Administration, all manufacturers who file on the first day are considered ‘first applicants’ who share the exclusivity period.”).

51 When the HWA was originally enacted, it provided two triggers for the 180 days of exclusivity: (1) the ANDA first-filer beginning marketing of its generic drug or (2) a court declaring the patent on the brand-name drug invalid or not infringed. The FDA conditioned the second trigger on the ANDA filer successfully defending against the patent infringement suit. Therefore, as long as the ANDA filer reached an agreement with the patent holder, the 180 days of exclusivity would never be triggered. However, after the D.C. Circuit’s 1998 decision in Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069–70 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, the HWA was modified to include a use-it-or-lose-it provision that requires the first ANDA filer to take 180 days of exclusivity before a certain triggering deadline. Otherwise, such exclusivity will be forfeited. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (including a forfeiture provision intended to promote more generic entry). For a detailed discussion, see Erica N. Andersen, Note, Schering the Market: Analyzing the Debate Over Reverse-Payment Settlements in the Wake of the Medicare Moderni-
lucrative 180 days becomes the main incentive for a generic drug company to be the first to challenge a brand-name drug company’s patent.  

In general, the brand-name drug company will then file a patent-infringement lawsuit against the Paragraph IV filer to litigate the patent’s validity. During the patent litigation, the brand-name company may elect to settle with the challenging generic drug company, offering it more money than it would make during the 180-day exclusive period, inducing the challenger to drop the ANDA filing and keeping the patent intact. Subsequent generic drug companies would not have the benefit of the 180-day exclusive period and would not be approved for entry into the market. After the 180-day exclusive period, subsequent sellers will lack the incentive to file an ANDA because the potential costs associated with a patent-infringement suit outweigh the low profit margins and the consequently low settlement amount. Both the brand-name company and the first ANDA filer benefit from settling the suit; subsequent ANDA filers will be blocked by the bottleneck and discouraged from entering the market for the particular drug, allowing the brand-name company to continue charging monopoly prices for its drug.

Another form of implicit compensation for delay is licensing, where the brand-name companies grant licenses to the generic companies to launch authorized generic drugs. As a result of nonexclusive licensing, the patent remains intact and the generic drug company is compensated through sales of the authorized generic drugs.


David A. Balto, We’ll Sell Generics, Too: Innovator Drug Makers Are Gaming the Regulatory System and Harming Competition, Legal Times, Mar. 20, 2006, at 39.

See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.


Scott Bergeson, Note, A Vaccine Approach to the Reverse Payment Illness, 18 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 26–30 (2012) (arguing that Congress should amend the HWA to allow the 180 days of exclusivity to transfer to subsequent filers to provide more incentives for the subsequent filers).

See id. at 15, 23 (discussing the resulting bottleneck effect on competition).

The agreement between the brand-name company and the generic company give rise to antitrust concerns. Any settlement agreement must be submitted to the FTC, although prior clearance is not required. The FTC and Department of Justice (DOJ) have joined together to argue that these reverse payments are illegal agreements between competitors. However, some federal circuit courts do not endorse the FTC and DOJ’s challenge to these settlement agreements. The disagreement among circuits led the Supreme Court to consider the issue of reverse-payment settlements in FTC v. Actavis, Inc. Part II of this Note will discuss the conflict among the federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis.

II
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ACTAVIS

Before Actavis, the decisions addressing reverse-payment settlements were quite polarized among the federal circuits. The Sixth Circuit once ruled that reverse-payment settlement agreements were per se illegal, and the Third Circuit, adopting the FTC and DOJ’s approach, held that reverse-payment settlements were presumptively illegal, subject to limited exceptions. In contrast, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits adopted the “scope of the patent” test, which states that reverse-payment settlements violate antitrust laws only if the settlements exceed the exclusionary scope of the patent.

In Actavis, the Supreme Court rejected the scope-of-the-patent test. The Court held that the fact that a reverse-payment settlement agreement’s anticompetitive effects fell within the patent’s scope did not immunize the agreement from antitrust attack. At the same time, the Supreme Court refused to embrace the “quick look” ap-

61 Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 61.
62 See infra Part II.
63 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
64 See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003).
66 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223; Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075–76 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1335–37 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
68 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
69 See id. at 2232.
proach advocated by the FTC, which would have had the effect of holding reverse-payment settlements presumptively unlawful. Rather, the Court adopted a rule-of-reason analysis, which will be discussed below.

A. The Circuit Split Before Actavis

In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., the Sixth Circuit ruled that a payment-for-delay agreement was per se illegal. The ANDA filer (Andrx) agreed with the brand-name company (HMR) to refrain from marketing its generic drug in exchange for a quarterly payment of ten million dollars, despite the FDA’s approval of the generic drug. Andrx also retained the exclusivity period once the patent litigation between Andrx and HMR terminated. The court ruled that the agreement “was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market.” Similarly, in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit adopted a quick look method, analyzing “any payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade.” The court agreed with the FTC and ruled that there was no need to consider the merits of the patent suit because “the quid pro quo for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.”

These cases set a very high level of judicial scrutiny of parties that settle with reverse payments, while overlooking an important aspect of

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70 See id. at 2237.
71 See id.
72 See 352 F.3d 896, 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
73 Id. at 902–03.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 908. This is no longer an issue under the current amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act, however, because under the amendment, a generic company would forfeit the 180-day exclusive award. See supra discussion accompanying note 51.
77 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The FTC and DOJ advocated for a similar approach: reverse payments should be illegal unless the defendant could propose procompetitive effects for the payments. See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 61. More specifically, the DOJ would presume that such payments were unlawful unless the defendant could show “either that (1) the reverse payment amount was ‘not greatly in excess of avoided litigation costs’ or (2) the settlement exclusion period did not exceed the expected litigation exclusion period, given the settlors’ contemporaneous estimates of the likelihood that the patent holder would have won the patent litigation.” Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 34, at 287 (quoting Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 10, 22, 28–32, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 05-2851-cv(L), 05-2852-cv (CON), 05-2863-cv (CON)), 2009 WL 8385027, at *10, *22, *28–32) (emphasis omitted).
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patent law: its monopolistic nature.\textsuperscript{78} Such decisions force the patent holder either to secure the validity of the patent through litigation or allow the alleged infringer to market the generics.\textsuperscript{79} While weeding out weak patents, the approach to reverse-payment settlements discussed above may burden pioneer brand-name companies and may discourage innovation in the long run.\textsuperscript{80}

On the opposite end of the spectrum was the “scope of the patent” test. In \textit{In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.}, two parties settled Hatch-Waxman litigation in which the patent was declared invalid by the district court and the case was pending appeal.\textsuperscript{81} The ANDA filer agreed to change its Paragraph IV certificate to a Paragraph III certificate in return for a nonexclusive license and a payment of more than forty million dollars from the brand-name drug company.\textsuperscript{82} The Second Circuit assumed the legality of the settlement, rejecting the argument that reverse-payment settlements are inherently anticompetitive. The court recognized that “the patent holder [was] seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”\textsuperscript{83} Therefore, the anticompetitive effect of the settlement was acceptable unless the terms of the settlement enlarged the monopoly’s scope.\textsuperscript{84}

As a result of the scope-of-the-patent test,\textsuperscript{85} courts have paid more deference to the patent scope and have allowed some blatantly an-

\textsuperscript{78} See Shannon U. Han, Note, \textit{Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-Splitting Headache Plaguing Big Pharma}, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 924 (2013) (“The court reasoned that ’[b]y their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple competition,’ and therefore the anticompetitive nature is present by force of law.” (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2005))).

\textsuperscript{79} See Meredith Bateman, Note, In Re K-Dur Litigation—Reverse Payments: Against Prices, Purchasers, and Policy, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 293, 302 (2012) (stating that critics “will likely assert that the holding is contrary to policy considerations favoring settlement over litigation”).

\textsuperscript{80} See Han, \textit{supra} note 78, at 938 (“Though commentators have argued that these settlements could ultimately have some competitive benefits by allowing earlier entry into the market, the standard does not call for an understanding of countervailing procompetitive effects.”).

\textsuperscript{81} See 466 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).

\textsuperscript{82} Id. at 193–94.

\textsuperscript{83} Id. at 208–09.

\textsuperscript{84} Id at 208.

\textsuperscript{85} In \textit{In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.}, the court differentiated \textit{Ciprofloxacin} from \textit{In re Cardizem}, in which case the agreement exceeded the exclusionary zone of the disputed patent because the generic drug company agreed not to market the noninfringing drug so as to delay the entry of other generic drugs. 544 F.3d 1323, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008), abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223. In \textit{Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC}, the court adopted a three-part test to determine if antitrust analysis was appropriate, examining: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects. 402 F.3d 1056,
ticompetitive reverse-payment agreements that fell within the patent’s scope.86

B. The Middle Ground: The Supreme Court’s Rule-of-Reason Approach in Actavis

The Supreme Court appears to settle the issue of reverse payments in Actavis. In this case, after the FDA’s approval of an ANDA filing, the ANDA filers (Watson and Par/Paddock) reached an agreement with the brand-name drug company (Solvay) where Solvay would pay Par/Paddock ten million dollars per year for six years and an additional two million dollars per year for backup manufacturing assistance.87 In addition, Solvay would share some profits of the brand-name drug with Watson through September 2015.88 In return, Watson and Par/Paddock agreed to delay marketing the generic products until August 31, 2015, and to promote the brand-name drug to healthcare professionals and urologists.89 The parties stipulated to dismiss the pending patent infringement litigation, which involved a patent that expires in August 2020.90 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FTC’s complaint, rejecting the FTC’s argument that it had sufficiently stated an antitrust claim.91

The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision by first rejecting the notion that reverse-payment settlements falling within the scope of the patent’s exclusionary power are immune from antitrust scrutiny.92 After the Court summarized controlling law, holding that patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws, the Court noted five sets of considerations that the FTC should have been allowed to prove its antitrust claim:93 First, “the specific restraint at issue has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”94 Second, “these anticompetitive conse-

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88 Id. at 1305.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 1303–05.
91 Id. at 1312.
92 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230.
93 Id. at 2234–37. But see id. at 2241 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that each of the cited precedents “stands for the same, uncontroversial point: that when a patent holder acts outside the scope of its patent, it is no longer protected from antitrust scrutiny by the patent”).
94 Id. at 2234 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
quences will at least sometimes prove unjustified.”

Third, “where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm about in practice.”

Fourth, “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.”

Fifth, “the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit.”

Although the Court identified these five issues, it rejected the FTC’s quick look approach and adopted a rule-of-reason analysis. Quoting California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, a case that discussed the quick look approach, the Court concluded that the quick look approach was not appropriate in the reverse-payment-settlement context. Rather, it was only appropriate when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”

However, the Court gave little guidance on how lower courts should apply the rule of reason. While this gave the lower courts flexibility on how to conduct the rule-of-reason analysis, as the dissenting opinion sarcastically pointed out, the lack of detailed instruction amounted to little more than wishing the lower courts “[g]ood luck” in analyzing the issues that arise with reverse-payment settlements under the rule of reason.

III

SCHOLARLY VIEWS ON REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS

The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis has settled the debate to some extent. However, some of the concerns and analyses in the following scholarly works will be helpful in constructing a rule-of-reason analysis post-Actavis. The theories discussed in this Part are among

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95 Id. at 2235-36.
96 Id. at 2236.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 2237.
99 Id.
100 Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101 See id. at 2238.
102 Id. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Good luck to the district courts that must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the ’likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances.’” (quoting id. at 2231 (majority opinion))).
the most influential analyses found in rich legal treatises that have considered the reverse-payment settlement issue.

Scholars who considered reverse payments prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Actavis* disagreed sharply on the proper approach. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley suggest that reverse payments should be treated as presumptively unlawful. On the other end of the spectrum, Daniel Crane has argued that reverse-payment settlements should be permitted when the ex ante probability of patent validity is high but not when it is low. He also argues that the burden of proof should not be placed on the settling parties. In contrast to both of the approaches above, Butler and Jarosch argue that since reverse payments are not anticompetitive in nature, the rule-of-reason approach is more appropriate because it balances multiple factors on a case-by-case basis.

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103 Commentators have discussed extensively about the reverse-payment issue. Some are not satisfied with courts’ undue deference to the exclusivity power of patent law, claiming that at least some reverse-payment settlements in Hatch-Waxman cases should be presumed illegal. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1759. Some criticize the scope-of-the-patent test as incompetent to solve the reverse settlement problem because the test assumes the validity of the patent and is inapplicable to the infringement issue. See Carrier, *Why the “Scope of the Patent” Test*, supra note 86, at 6–7. On the other hand, many commentators also defend reverse payments. See Joe Mullin, *Reversal of Fortune?*, IP L. & Bus., Oct./Nov. 2009, at 34 (listing the names of several attorneys who represent pharmaceutical companies and who favor reverse-payment settlement agreements); Marc G. Schildkraut, *Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy*, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1033, 1033–35 (2004) (arguing that reverse payments are not always anticompetitive and may have positive features). For example, one theory treats such payments as insurance paid to avoid the uncertainty of litigation. Cf. Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“It is not ‘bad faith’ to assert patent rights that one is not certain will be upheld in a suit for infringement pressed to judgment and to settle the suit to avoid risking the loss of the rights.” (citation omitted)). Others have also proposed novel treatments to the issue; for example, instead of using antitrust analysis, courts could use the patent law doctrine of patent misuse to determine the illegality of the reverse payment. See Ingle, supra note 59, at 503.

104 Of course, although this Note’s framework is not based on them, there are many other influential treatises. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ANTITRUST HANDBOOK (2009).


107 Crane, *Ease Over Accuracy*, supra note 24, at 709 (placing the burden of persuasion on the settling parties, however, would chill patent infringement settlements by making them presumptively illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act).

108 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 113 (indicating that the empirical data did not prove anticompetitive effect of reverse payments and that economic analysis shows both
tive measurement involving a determination of market concentration and the probability of the patent’s enforcement. 109

After the Actavis decision, many scholars believe that a full-scale analysis under the rule of reason is not necessary. 110 These scholars have read Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion in Actavis to presume that the brand-name drug company has market power. 111 One scholar, Thomas Cotter, has gone further, arguing that under the majority’s holding, the rule-of-reason standard is functionally no different from the presumptive illegality standard. 112

A. Presumptively Unlawful

Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley suggest that reverse payments should be treated as presumptively unlawful. 113 According to their analysis, in cases where an agreement itself looks like it would fall under an antitrust per se rule but for the presence of intellectual property rights, the traditional rule-of-reason analysis is not appropriate. 114 Specifically, cases challenging reverse-payment settlements center around the validity of the patent and the reasonableness of the settlement, whereas the rule-of-reason analysis assesses whether a practice tends to diminish market-wide output. 115 Therefore, Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley argue, these cases should be decided on intellectual property grounds and not subjected to antitrust scrutiny if it can be shown that “the patent in question is valid and infringed.” 116

These scholars also argue that there are two components to a reverse payment: “the cost of continued litigation” and “the value of eliminating competition that the patentee could not expect ex ante to exclude after trial.” 117 They argue that while it may be rational for a patent holder to enter a reverse-payment settlement to lower litigation costs, reverse payments are clearly anticompetitive because they permit patent holders to exclude potential rivals from the market. 118 To address these two components, they propose that a reverse payment should be presumed unlawful unless the plaintiff can prove “(1) that


111 See id. at 6, 23–24.

112 Cotter, supra note 28, at 43–46.

113 Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1759.

114 Id. at 1724.

115 Id. at 1724–25.

116 See id. at 1725.

117 Id. at 1758.

118 Id. at 1758–59.
the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than the expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit.\footnote{119}{Id. at 1759.}

Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley posit that such “a harsh rule will not necessarily impede settlement[,]” as settlements can take other forms such as licensing.\footnote{120}{Id. at 1760.} Another alternative is a settlement of delayed entry without reverse payments.\footnote{121}{Id. at 1762.} They also argue that this rule will not “reduce the legitimate value of pharmaceutical patent rights” because the legitimate exclusion value of a pharmaceutical patent is a function of the scope of the patent and its chance of being held valid.\footnote{122}{Id. at 1761–62.} The patent rights do not immunize from antitrust scrutiny reverse payments that seek to exclude potential competitors.\footnote{123}{Id.}

\section*{B. Presumptively Lawful}

Realizing that the presumption of illegality is harsh on antitrust defendants and would “unduly chill patent infringement settlements,”\footnote{124}{Crane, \textit{Ease Over Accuracy}, supra note 24, at 709.} Daniel Crane proposes a standard that places the “burden of persuasion” on the antitrust plaintiff to prove the defendants’ unlawful conduct.\footnote{125}{Id. (emphasis omitted).} He also emphasizes the potential validity of the patent at issue: an “optimal rule would permit exit payment settlements when the \textit{ex ante} likelihood of success of the patentee’s infringement suit is high and prohibit them when the \textit{ex ante} probability of success is low.”\footnote{126}{Cf. Crane, \textit{Ease Over Accuracy}, supra note 24, at 710–11 (“[T]he strength of the patent infringement suit, not the monetary structure of the settlement, determines whether the settlement is socially beneficial or costly.”).} If the patent holder can present evidence that it would likely succeed at the infringement trial, then the size of the payment should not trigger antitrust concerns.\footnote{127}{See Crane, \textit{Exit Payments}, supra note 106, at 783–85.}

Crane also proposes four methods to distinguish between cases that are free from antitrust scrutiny and those where heightened scrutiny is warranted: First, if the patent holder received a preliminary injunction against the alleged infringer, then the patent holder is likely to win its case on the merits.\footnote{128}{Id. at 1760, 1763.} Second, if a preliminary injunction issue was not litigated, then a court could conduct a “quick look” at
the merits of the patent-infringement suit to determine whether or not to allow the settlement.\textsuperscript{129} Third, if a patent holder pays a large proportion of its monopoly rents to the alleged infringer, then the settlement is suspicious, indicating either a low probability that the patent is valid or that the defendant’s use actually infringes the patent.\textsuperscript{130} Fourth, courts can look at which parties are affected by the reverse payment.\textsuperscript{131} For instance, if the settlement blocked a third party from entering the market, it could be anticompetitive.\textsuperscript{132}

\section*{C. Full-Scale Rule of Reason}

Realizing that the presumptive illegality rule can be an overdeterrent, Butler and Jarosch argue for a rule-of-reason analysis.\textsuperscript{133} Such an approach could minimize errors that occur when a per se or quick look rule is applied, specifically when challengers to reverse-payment settlements falsely accuse an activity that is procompetitive or antitrust neutral.\textsuperscript{134} The authors argue that in order to apply, both per se and quick look rules require an obviously anticompetitive agreement type, which reverse payments lack.\textsuperscript{135} Instead, reverse payments are context specific and can be better analyzed under the rule of reason.\textsuperscript{136} There are multiple policy concerns and economic incentives behind a reverse-payment settlement, and empirically, such a settlement can be procompetitive.\textsuperscript{137}

To operationalize the rule-of-reason analysis, Butler and Jarosch propose six factors that courts should examine: (1) market power—if a brand-name drug does not have market power in its targeted market, the reverse payment will not harm consumers and will not be anticompetitive;\textsuperscript{138} (2) the entrance date allowed by the reverse-payment settlement—“[i]f the negotiated entry date is significantly before the date that the patent will expire, the agreement is not likely to be anticompetitive”;\textsuperscript{139} (3) the relative size of the reverse payment—while a large payment is problematic and potentially signals an agreement not to compete, it can also demonstrate the patent holder’s extreme risk-aversion activities;\textsuperscript{140} (4) the ANDA filer’s ability to market

\textsuperscript{129} Id. at 785.
\textsuperscript{130} See id at 788.
\textsuperscript{131} See id. at 792.
\textsuperscript{132} Id.
\textsuperscript{133} See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 61–62.
\textsuperscript{134} See id. at 120–21 (noting the Type I error that would result from the DOJ’s per se rule).
\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 85–86.
\textsuperscript{136} Id. at 86.
\textsuperscript{137} See id. at 94–100, 112–13.
\textsuperscript{138} Id. at 116.
\textsuperscript{139} Id.
\textsuperscript{140} See id. at 117–18.
the drug without a reverse payment—a showing that the generic company lacks marketing ability may indicate that the payment has no anticompetitive effect;141 (5) sham litigation—nonmeritorious litigation strongly indicates anticompetitive effects;142 and (6) suspicious side deals—“[i]nequitable or severely unbalanced side deals suggest a payment for delay” and can be anticompetitive.143

This rule-of-reason analysis, which extensively reviews the reverse-payment issue, may overanalyze certain cases where agreements are clearly not anticompetitive. Therefore, this approach may be too cumbersome for lower courts to carry out on a case-by-case basis.144

D. “Settlement Competition Index” Analysis

Acknowledging that previous models might overdeter potentially beneficial settlements or underdeter deleterious settlements, David Opderbeck proposes a more quantitative and easier-to-operate model to analyze the issue, the Settlement Competition Index (SCI).145 This index is essentially a refinement of Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley’s theory.146 Using empirical data and a mathematical model, it creates three zones of antitrust scrutiny: the safety zone with no antitrust liability; the per se illegal zone, and a zone in between, which requires a rule-of-reason analysis.147

Opderbeck essentially uses two criteria to compute the SCI: “(1) [t]he difference in product market concentration that would likely result from the agreement; and (2) [t]he probability that the patent will be held to be valid and infringed.”148 The SCI was partly derived from the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures market concentrations before and after generic entry.149 SCI equals the change in HHI divided by the probability of a patent enforcement.150

141 Id. at 118.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 119.
144 For examples of contexts in which a reverse-payment settlement may be clearly anticompetitive, see Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1765. Chief Justice Roberts also strongly opposed the rule-of-reason analysis in his dissenting opinion to the Actavis case. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2245 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
145 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1305.
146 Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley argue that courts should treat reverse payments that are greater than litigation costs as presumptively illegal. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 23, at 1720. Opderbeck offers a “more refined inquiry into the actual anticompetitive effects” of these payments by considering market power. Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1325.
147 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1305.
148 Id. at 1328–29.
149 See id. at 1329.
150 Id.
Opderbeck argues that previous approaches overlooked or oversimplified the influence of market power.151 “Only in the context of per se liability, where the conduct is deemed inherently anticompetitive, is the question of market definition set aside . . . . [H]owever, [the authorities in reverse-payment settlements] do not explain why such agreements are inherently anticompetitive . . . .”152 The difference in the patented product’s market-power concentration is properly reflected in the change in HHI, consistent with the DOJ-FTC intellectual property licensing and merger guidelines.153

The second important aspect of the model is the probability of patent enforcement, which is, in effect, an assessment of the patent’s scope.154 Opderbeck argues that a capable expert could offer an opinion about the probability of patent enforcement, allowing a federal court to evaluate properly the merits of the underlying litigation or settlement.155

Under Opderbeck’s model, then, a settlement that yields high market concentration with a low probability of patent enforcement, meaning that the SCI number is high, is per se illegal.156 Conversely, a low SCI number creates a safe harbor for a settlement, which occurs when the market concentration, taking the settlement into account, is low and the probability of patent enforcement is high.157 Any settlements with SCI numbers falling between these two critical levels will be subject to heightened scrutiny, where the court or regulatory agency would inquire into a variety of factors under the rule of reason.158

E. Readings of Actavis

The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis inevitably preempted some scholarly views, but it also adopted certain insights from the aforementioned approaches.159 Moreover, post-Actavis, these schol-
ars’ works can still influence how lower courts will conduct their rule-of-reason analyses.160

One way of reading the Court’s opinion is that the lower courts do not need to launch a full scale rule-of-reason analysis161 because “the size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indicator of power.”162 Moreover, competitive harm could be inferred from a large payment where convincing justifications are absent.163 While Aaron Edlin, Scott Hempill, Herbert Hovenkamp, and Carl Shapiro propose several justifications for a significant reverse-payment settlement—patent strength, patent law and policy, and risk aversion—they still suggest that courts should reject these explanations under the Actavis holding.164

Professor Cotter’s reading of Actavis goes even further. By formulating a flowchart for a rule-of-reason analysis, he argues that when facing a reverse-payment settlement, a plaintiff will easily meet the burden of proof, which will shift the burden to the defendant to prove the payment’s procompetitive benefits.165 Despite the Court’s formal adoption of the rule of reason, Cotter asserts that this framework functions like a quick look or a de facto, presumptive illegality approach.166 To Professor Cotter, the potential risk to competition is obvious in the reverse-payment settlement context.167 In addressing why the Court adopted the rule of reason, Professor Cotter suggests that the Court’s reasons were either political or based on concerns that if the Court adopted a presumptive illegality standard, lower courts would apply such a test in cases outside of the Hatch-Waxman context.168

Some of these post-Actavis analyses seem to read the opinion as a landslide victory for the FTC and other antitrust plaintiffs in reverse-payment lawsuits.169 This reading may have gone too far. First, to

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160 See id. at 2238 (“We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”).
161 See Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 3, 6.
162 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236 (citing 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046 (3d ed. 2010)).
163 See Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237 (“[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 25.
164 See Edlin et al., supra note 27, at 18–20.
165 See Cotter, supra note 28, at 43–46.
166 See id. at 43, 46.
167 See id. at 45.
168 See id. at 47–48.
169 See, e.g., Alexandra Sklan, Supreme Court Rules in Favor of “Pay for Delay” Settlements, 2 PHARMACEUTICAL PAT. ANALYST 582, 583 (2013) (“FTC chairwoman, Edith [Ramirez], said
read the Court’s opinion as a functional equivalent to presumptive illegality ignores the Court’s clear rejection of presumptive illegality.170 Second, the de facto, presumptive illegality proposal also counters the Court’s holding that the anticompetitive effect of a settlement depends on various factors, including the payment’s size, scale, independence from other services, and lack of any other convincing justification.171 Since the Court leaves the construction of the rule-of-reason analysis to lower courts, it is likely that lower courts will require plaintiffs to make a more rigorous economic showing beyond just the size of the payment to satisfy the burden of proof.172

IV
PROPOSED MODEL TO ANALYZE REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS

The Supreme Court’s holding in Actavis leaves the construction of the rule-of-reason analysis to the lower courts.173 The Court also leaves the door open to “other justifications” for reverse payments.174 By analyzing the issues left open by the Court, this Note proposes an analytical model based on the Court’s holding and the aforementioned theories. In agreement with the notion that a full scale rule-of-reason analysis may not be necessary,175 this model draws from the recent judicial development of antitrust analysis in tying arrangements, especially the concurring opinion of four Justices in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde.176 This framework requires a plaintiff to demonstrate three factors to establish a prima facie case under the rule of reason: (1) the patent holder has strong market power; (2) the settlement amount or other considerations are not justified; and (3) the potential enforceability of the patent is low.177 If a plaintiff

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170 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (explaining that “quick-look” review is appropriate only when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics” could observe that “the arrangements in question would have . . . anticompetitive effect[s]” (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

171 See id. at 2237; see also id. at 2236 (“An antitrust defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the presence of the challenged term and showing the lawfulness of that term under the rule of reason.”).


173 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38.

174 See id. at 2236.

175 Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 3, 6.


177 See Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 23.
establishes these threshold requirements, then the court can proceed to weigh the procompetitive benefits of the reverse-payment settlement against the anticompetitive harm.178

A. Reanalyzing the Issue After Actavis: A Comparison of Reverse-Payment Settlements and Tying Cases

Actavis was not the first time the Supreme Court addressed the tension between antitrust and patent law.179 But one important principle in the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis is to strike a balance “between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.”180

In analyzing its precedents, the Court concluded that “patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”181 However, Chief Justice Roberts forcefully opposed this reasoning in his dissent, claiming that the key word was “sometimes.”182 He argued that only when agreements relating to patents confer benefits beyond the patent’s scope are those agreements subject to antitrust scrutiny.183 A close reading of the Supreme Court’s mixed antitrust-patent cases seems to indicate that the Chief Justice was right.184 Yet the majority in Actavis would extend antitrust scrutiny to reverse-payment settlements even if the benefits of the settlements fall within the scope of the patents,185 possibly because the Court was uncertain about the enforceability of the patents.186

178 Id. at 23–24.
180 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also considered other aspects such as the long-standing judicial objective to settle lawsuits without wasting judicial resources, see id. at 2234 (“The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion finds some degree of support in a general legal policy favoring the settlement of disputes.”), but it concluded that other antitrust considerations, taken together, outweigh the single desirability of settlement.
181 Id. at 2232.
182 Id. at 2242 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
183 See id.
184 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 494 (1926) (holding that a licensing agreement containing a restriction on sale price of the patented devices is a lawful exercise of the monopoly created by the patent).
185 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (“[W]e are willing to take this fact as evidence that the [agreement] . . . fall[s] within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent. . . . But we do not agree that that fact . . . can immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.” (quoting FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc. 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
186 Although the language in Actavis seems to suggest that the Court is willing to extend antitrust scrutiny to agreements that fall within the exclusionary potential of the pat-
Since the Court extended antitrust scrutiny to areas within a patent’s scope, it is helpful to look at the Court’s analytical framework for issues that fall outside the patent’s scope. One particularly probative framework is the Court’s analysis in tying arrangements.

A common type of tying case involves a product that has been tied to a patented product through licensing contracts. Of course, tying products do not need to be patented, but for the purposes of this Note, I will discuss cases that involve patented products. In *Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.*, an unpatented ink product was tied to a patented ink container designed for a printer. Wholesalers agreed with the manufacturer not to use ink from other competitors to fill the patented ink container.

The Supreme Court had previously held that while a natural monopoly in the tying product is lawful, any attempt to extend monopoly power to a tied market to extract greater profits, thus harming both competition and consumers in the tied market, is anticompetitive and unlawful. The Court had treated tying arrangements as per se unlawful for years. However, realizing that tying schemes might have some procompetitive effects, the Court later declined to apply a strict per se rule and instead adopted a qualified per se rule. Under this new rule, tying arrangements are illegal per se if the plaintiff can show that: (1) purchases of the tying product are conditioned upon purchase of a distinct, tied product; (2) the seller possesses sufficient market power in the tying market to compel acceptance of the tied product; and (3) the arrangement forecloses a not-insubstantial volume of commerce in the tied market. In *Illinois Tool Works*, the Court announced that tying arrangements involving patented products should also be evaluated under the same standard.

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187 See *Butler & Jarosch*, supra note 1, at 77–78.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 31–32.
191 See *Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984) (“Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product...”).
195 *Fortner Enters.*, 394 U.S. at 499.
conclusion that an arrangement is unlawful "must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof."197

The analysis in these cases shifted almost from a per se rule to a rule-of-reason analysis.198 In Jefferson Parish, five Justices in a sharply divided Court upheld the qualified per se rule.199 However, four Justices issued a separate concurring opinion advocating a case-by-case rule-of-reason application in tying arrangement cases.200 The concurring Justices proposed three threshold conditions prior to a balancing analysis: (1) market power in the tying product, (2) a substantial threat of market power in the tied product, and (3) a coherent economic basis for treating the products as distinct.201 If all three conditions are satisfied, they argued, courts should then weigh the economic benefits of the arrangement against its harms.202

The Court’s analysis of tying arrangements can shed light on the treatment of reverse payments. This analysis has migrated from a strict application of the per se rule to a more relaxed one.203 Similarly, on the reverse-payment settlement issue, the Supreme Court rejected the quick look analysis in favor of the rule-of-reason analysis, a more relaxed approach.204 Although developed under different historical settings, the schemes share many similarities. For example, both arrangements are anticompetitive when patent holders are trying to extract benefits that are not conferred by the immunized scope of the patent law.205 In tying cases, the anticompetitive harm comes from the extension of monopoly power in one market to obtain con-

197 Id. at 42–43.
198 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) ("[T]here is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct."); see also Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 35 ("Over the years, however, this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished."); cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) ("It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unreasonable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’"); Meribeth Richardt, Tying Arrangement Analysis: A Continued Integration of the Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule: Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984), 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 347–49 (1985) ("In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, the Supreme Court narrowed the distinction between per se and rule of reason analysis of tying arrangements.").
199 466 U.S. at 16–18.
200 466 U.S at 32–47 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 41.
202 Id.
203 See supra discussion accompanying notes 198–202.
205 Again, in tying arrangements, the tying products do not always need to be patented, but for the purpose of this section, I will focus on tying arrangements involving patented products. In tying cases, the patent scope analysis is closely related to the patent misuse doctrine. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 40–41 (2006)
trol of a second market.\textsuperscript{206} In reverse-payment settlements, parties reach agreements to exclude potentially noninfringing products from entering the market.\textsuperscript{207} Both arrangements can be anticompetitive if one party has sufficient market power but may also be procompetitive so that the traditional per se treatment (for tying arrangements) or quick look treatment (for reverse payments) would not be appropriate.\textsuperscript{208}

Therefore, analogous to the Court’s reasoning regarding tying arrangements, this Note posits that in reverse-payment settlement cases, the party who is challenging a settlement must demonstrate the following to satisfy a prima facie case: (1) the patent holder has strong market power; (2) the settlement amount or other considerations are too large to be justified; and (3) the potential enforceability of the patent is low. If the antitrust plaintiff meets this burden, the court should then conduct a balancing analysis to determine whether the procompetitive effects of the settlement outweigh the anticompetitive harm.

B. Analysis Under the Proposed Model

1. The Patent Holder’s Market Power

In a tying case, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant has monopoly power in the tying product market.\textsuperscript{209} Without market power, whatever arrangement the seller makes with regard to the tied product will likely not restrain competition in the tied product’s market.\textsuperscript{210} For example, if an item can be easily substituted, consumers will not buy the tied product if they are forced to purchase the tying product.\textsuperscript{211} To establish market power, antitrust analysis places emphasis on key factors such as market concentration and the fungibility of the product.\textsuperscript{212}

\footnotesize{(discussing the patent misuse treatment on tying arrangements); see also Ingle, supra note 59, at 538 (proposing a patent misuse treatment to the reverse payment).

\textsuperscript{206} See supra discussion accompanying notes 191–97; see also Richardt, supra note 198, at 340–41 (“Tying arrangements fall within the antitrust laws because they extend the seller’s power in the tying product’s market to the tied product’s market.” (footnote omitted)).

\textsuperscript{207} Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2226.

\textsuperscript{208} See Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 35–36; Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 112–13.

\textsuperscript{209} See supra discussion accompanying note 194.

\textsuperscript{210} See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1330–32.

\textsuperscript{211} Id. at 1331.

\textsuperscript{212} See id. at 1329–32 (discussing the importance of assessing a product’s market concentration); Herbert Hovenkamp, \textit{Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the Kodak Case}, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1447, 1450 (1993) (“Market power is a matter of degree. In perfectly competitive markets for fungible products, firms price at marginal cost and market power is said not to exist.”).}
In cases involving a patent, the antitrust analysis should not be different. In *Illinois Tool Works*, the Supreme Court held that to prove that a tying arrangement involving a patented product is unlawful, the claim “must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.” The Court ruled that “a patent does not necessarily confer market power upon the patentee.” Similarly, in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurrence in *Jeffereson Parish*, she argued that while a patent product may help give a seller market power, it is also possible that a seller will not have market power if there are close substitutes for the patented product. “[A] high market share indicates market power only if the market is properly defined to include all reasonable substitutes for the product.”

In *Actavis*, the Court seemed to indicate that the threshold for proving market power would be a very low one, stating that “the ‘size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is a strong indicator of power.’” However, the Court was probably not proposing that this threshold created a presumption of market power for at least two reasons.

First, the Court states that “where a reverse payment threatens to work *unjustified* anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm about in practice.” In other words, the plaintiff still has to prove that the anticompetitive harm, such as a price above the competitive level, is unjustified.

Second, the Court says that the size of the payment is “a strong indicator of power,” not the *only* indicator or a *sufficient* indicator. Thus, factors such as a brand-name drug company’s market share of similar drugs or annual profits on these drugs can demonstrate a patented drug’s market power. Determining market power should not cause substantial difficulties for courts, as a company’s public findings provide a common way to examine a product’s market share and corresponding annual revenue.

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214 Id. at 45.
216 Id.
218 Id. (emphasis added).
219 Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220 See Opderbeck, supra note 26, at 1329.
221 See, e.g., id. at 1339 (explaining courts’ ability to calculate a product’s HHI measurement); see also id. at 1344 n.275 (providing resources for obtaining sales figures and market data).
2. The Settlement Amount

In Actavis, the Court stated that a reverse payment “may amount to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement.” However, the Court also seemed to accept other types of settlements, such as “compensation for other services that [a] generic [company] has promised to perform,” delayed entry, but before the patent’s expiration, of the generic company into the market. This latter type of settlement benefits consumers of the patented drug more quickly, as it cuts the patent holder’s monopoly short. The Court did not clarify how to value these types of settlements or how to assess the validity of such settlements; however, to challenge the legality of these settlements, an antitrust plaintiff should nonetheless present evidence of the services’ market value or the generic manufacturer’s projected profits before the patent expires. The Court also did not mention how to determine the value and legality of settlements that relate to nonexclusive licenses. However, based on the Court’s primary emphasis on consumer welfare in the Actavis decision, it is likely that the parties to any settlement that limits competition may need to justify the settlement’s value to a court.

The Actavis decision also suggested that there could be other “justifications” for reverse-payment settlement amounts, as mere litigation costs are not always an accurate indicator of the settlement amounts. For instance, one way of calculating the reverse-payment settlement amount is by adding a generic company’s potential earnings to the litigation cost. This approach would be rational for a brand-name company to pursue because once a generic company enters the market, the brand-name company’s losses may exceed the generic company’s earnings due to a decrease in drug prices.

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222 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
223 Id.; see also In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12–cv–995 (WHW), 2014 WL 282755, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014) (reading Actavis to apply only to “reverse payments” of money).
224 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
225 This seems to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on customer welfare. For a general discussion about customer welfare and total welfare, see Hovenkamp, supra note 110, at 7–8.
226 Id. at 17 (“[Courts] must defer to the parties’ reasonable, good faith assessments of likely outcomes and risk.”).
227 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
228 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2255 (“The patentee and the challenger gain; the consumer loses.”).
229 Id. at 2236.
230 See supra Part III (discussing scholars’ various approaches to reverse-payment settlements that include litigation costs and other considerations).
231 See Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 106, at 780–82.
232 See Andersen, supra note 51, at 1059.
Therefore, in order to keep drug prices high and the generic company out of the market, a brand-name company is likely to pay more than the generic company could earn. However, it is not clear whether a court would accept a reverse-payment settlement amount comprised of litigation costs plus potential earnings, as the generic company’s delayed entry would harm consumers.

Another reverse-payment settlement amount that may be justified to a court is the patent holder’s cost of losing the patent-infringement suit against the generic company—determined by the lost profits of the patent holder from competition with the generic company, plus the patent holder’s expected litigation costs, plus any other explained costs. This calculation, however, is inevitably tied to a brand-name company’s risk averse nature. Under the current HWA framework, the first generic company that files an ANDA has nothing to lose and much to gain, whereas the brand-name company risks losing the monopoly benefits associated with its patent when it files the patent-infringement suit against the generic company. Even if a brand-name company in a reverse-payment settlement case pays an enormous amount of money to a generic company, this decision is economically rational as long as the settlement amount does not exceed the brand-name company’s estimated loss after a patent-infringement trial. The Supreme Court recognized this concern but determined that a payment based on this concern alone, without other explanations, likely seeks to prevent competition and is probably not justified.

If lower courts allow these considerations in assessing whether a settlement amount is reasonable, a brand-name company’s own estimation of loss after a patent-infringement trial will determine an appropriate settlement amount. This estimation indicates a brand-name company’s own confidence in its patent’s validity, which supports the previous commentators’ argument that in a reverse-payment settlement case, a patent’s validity rather than the settlement amount should be the focus of the antitrust inquiry.

233 See id.
235 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 95–96.
236 See id.
237 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2225, 2236 (2013) (“[B]e that as it may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition”).
238 See Crane, Exit Payments, supra note 106, at 780–82.
239 See Crane, Ease Over Accuracy, supra note 24, at 710–11.
3. Potential Enforceability of the Patent

Analyzing the enforceability of the patent will determine the patent’s scope, an important consideration when applying antitrust scrutiny to reverse-payment settlement agreements. In *Actavis*, the Court stated that the reverse-payment settlement agreement’s “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition” is premised on the hypothetical that, had the patent been invalidated or not infringed, a large sum of revenues would have flowed to consumers in the form of lower drug prices. However, since an antitrust challenge to a reverse-payment settlement occurs after the patent litigation has settled, there arises an issue of second-guessing whether the patent is valid. Thus, determining the patent’s validity during an antitrust challenge penalizes the brand-name drug company by having the brand-name company litigate the validity of the patent in both proceedings. The Court addressed this dilemma in *Actavis* and then quickly disposed of it, stating: “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question . . . [and] [a]n unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the patent’s survival.” Commentators read this language to suggest that the patent holder cannot raise the patent’s validity as a defense in an antitrust suit, as the Court appears to adopt a payment approach rather than a patent approach in assessing the reverse-payment settlement amount.

However, this interpretation seems to contradict the Supreme Court’s own view that “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.” Moreover, as previously discussed, the anticompetitive effect of the payment seems to be premised on the possible enforceability of the patent.

Therefore, I argue that to establish a prima facie case challenging a reverse-payment settlement, an antitrust plaintiff should provide certain proof, other than the payment itself, to indicate that the likelihood of the patent’s enforceability is low. This proposal is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that an antitrust action should be administratively feasible with no need to litigate the patent-infringe-

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240 See *Actavis*, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“The paragraph IV litigation in this case put the patent’s validity at issue, as well as its actual preclusive scope.”).
241 Id. at 2234 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242 See *Opderbeck*, supra note 26, at 1322–23.
243 *Actavis*, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
244 Edlin et al., supra note 27, at 17–18.
245 *Actavis*, 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
246 See supra discussion accompanying notes 240–42.
ment suit. Rather than the clear-and-convincing evidence standard applied to validity in a patent-infringement case, courts should require a lower burden of proof for the plaintiff in order to minimize the emphasis on the minitrial that determines patent-infringement issues within the antitrust case. For example, courts can require plaintiffs to prove that, more likely than not, the patent is not enforceable—by analyzing the history and records of the patent disputes, obtaining expert-witness testimony, or interpreting settlement amounts and patterns. Courts may also apply the “sliding scale” test, lowering the threshold for proving patent unenforceability if the reverse-payment settlement amount is exceptionally large with few justifications for such an amount.

4. **Balancing the Procompetitive Effects with the Anticompetitive Harm**

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a defendant should be allowed to provide procompetitive justifications while the court conducts a balancing test to decide whether the reverse-payment settlement passes antitrust scrutiny.

As the *Actavis* Court correctly points out, the HWA was not designed to allow deals between brand-name and generic companies. Both patent holders and ANDA challengers may abuse this system by colluding with one another to maintain exclusive power on weak patents, which will ultimately harm consumers through drug prices at supracompetitive levels. The “genuine adverse effects on competition” exist because a reverse-payment settlement agreement in effect “amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic product.” In other words, consumers will “continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.”

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247 See *Actavis*, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
249 See *Actavis*, 133 S. Ct. at 2226; Edlin et al., *supra* note 27, at 19.
251 See *Actavis*, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
252 Id. at 2234.
253 See *Andersen*, *supra* note 51, at 1043.
255 *Actavis*, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (internal quotation marks omitted).
While reverse-payment settlements may have their shortcomings, a short-term reduction in competition increases a patent’s value, provides more secure protection to a brand-name company, and allows a brand-name drug company to recoup more capital for later research and development.257 A reverse-payment settlement may also be an incentive for patent holders to be innovative and to file stronger patents,258 thereby creating procompetitive effects in the long term.259 Therefore, there is a consumer welfare trade-off between maintaining the prices that consumers pay for existing products and stimulating research and production of new products for future consumption.260
In addition, some empirical data seem to suggest that at least sometimes, reverse-payment settlements have very minimal or neutral impact on competition.261 The reverse-payment settlement agreement should be condemned only when its anticompetitive impact outweighs its procompetitive benefits.262

C. Limitations

Realizing the complexity of the reverse-payment settlement issue and the arguments from both antitrust law and patent law perspectives, I propose this mechanism to formulate a rule-of-reason analysis that can achieve balanced interests for both sides.

Perhaps the most contentious part of this proposal is the need for an antitrust plaintiff to prove that a patent lacks enforceability. It is unclear if the Supreme Court in Actavis suggests that only antitrust law should be utilized to analyze reverse-payment settlements.263 The Court does state that “the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”264 One way to read this opinion is that the enforceability of a patent should count as one explanation for the size of a re-

258 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 90.
259 Langenfeld & Li, supra note 257, at 778.
260 Id.
261 See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 1, at 112–13 (empirical studies show that reverse payments are not necessarily anticompetitive).
262 For a similar proposition in tying analysis, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 42 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A tie-in should be condemned only when its anticompetitive impact outweighs its contribution to efficiency.”).
263 Again, commentators vary on this issue, and Edlin et al. believe that the strength of the patent is not a valid defense post-Actavis. See Edlin et al., supra note 27, at 19. But FTC Commissioner Joshua Wright holds a different view. See Wright, supra note 172, at 15 (“[I]t would be surprising if courts summarily did away with the question of patent validity as part of their analysis altogether.”).
verse-payment settlement, of which anticompetitive effect should be weighed against other, procompetitive effects, such as efficiency.\textsuperscript{265} Therefore, even if lower courts would not agree that a plaintiff should be required to bear the burden of proof on the patent enforceability issue, they should allow antitrust defendants to provide evidence that, more likely than not, the size of the settlement is justified through the patent’s enforceability.\textsuperscript{266}

CONCLUSION

I propose a model for analyzing reverse-payment settlements in the antitrust setting. To strike a balance between patent law’s exclusionary exemption and antitrust law’s prohibition on anticompetitive agreements, I propose that antitrust plaintiffs bear the burden to prove their prima facie case under the rule-of-reason analysis. Three factors need to be present to prove anticompetitive harm: (1) the patent holder must have strong market power; (2) the settlement amount or other considerations must not be justified; and (3) the potential enforceability of the patent must be low. Only after a plaintiff establishes this prima facie case should a court conduct the more complicated balancing analysis to weigh the procompetitive benefits of the agreement against its anticompetitive harm.

\textsuperscript{265} See Wright, \textit{supra} note 172, at 16. \\
\textsuperscript{266} Id. at 15–16 (“What role patent validity will play within the rule-of-reason is an open question . . . . [O]ne possibility is that after a plaintiff satisfies its prima facie burden[,] . . . the defendant will be able to put on evidence that the strength of its patent justifies the size of the payment or the payment is otherwise not competitively suspect in light of the strength of the patent.”).